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ABSTRACT 
ATTENDING TO PRESENCE: A STUDY OF JOHN DUNS SCOTUS’ 
ACCOUNT OF SENSE COGNITION 
 
 
 
Amy F. Whitworth, B.A., M.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2010 
 
 
This project is guided and motivated by the question concerning the nature of the 
phantasm as that which mediates between sensation and intellection in John Duns Scotus’ 
account of cognition.  Scotus embraces Aristotle’s claim that the intellect cannot think 
without the phantasm.  The phantasm is in a corporeal organ, yet the immaterial intellect 
must act with it to produce an intelligible species.  In this project I examine the critical 
elements of Scotus’ cognitive theory in order to understand the nature of the phantasm. 
 
In the first chapter I discuss key elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics and give a 
close, textual reading of De Anima guided by his claim that the relationship of the body 
and soul is highly specific.  I then focus on his claim in De Anima 2.12 that sensation 
involves the reception of the sensible form without the matter. 
 
In the second chapter, I discuss Scotus’ key theological notions that guide and 
inform his cognitive project.  The beatific vision requires the presence of the divine 
essence in its own existence to the intellect.  As the highest cognitive experience, the 
beatific vision is definitive of all cognitive experience making the presence of the object 
to the cognitive faculty of central importance.  The discussion of the incarnation shows 
that the world is sacralized and thus, is a worthy object of cognitive attention in itself.   
 
In the third chapter, I discuss Scotus’ understanding of the body-soul relationship 
focusing on his notion of person to both secure the unity of the human being and to 
ground the mediation between sensation and intellection. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I first discuss Aquinas’ claim that sensation requires a 
spiritual change.  While Scotus’ account is in many respects the same as Aquinas’, Scotus 
does not maintain that sensation is primarily passive and is thus, able to account for 
cognitive attention by way of his understanding of the unity of the sense organ, immanent 
actions, and sensation as intuitive cognition.  What emerges in this discussion is Scotus’ 
particular understanding of an intentio by which the nature of the phantasm can be 
understood. 
 
 i 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Amy F. Whitworth, B.A., M.A. 
 I would like to thank Stephen, Sebastian, Emma, Audrey, and Samuel for their 
love, unconditional support, and patience.  I would like to thank my director, Dr.  James 
South, for his guidance and the freedom that he gave me in writing this dissertation.  I 
would like to thank my committee, Dr. Eileen Sweeney, Dr. John Jones, and Dr. Susanne 
Foster.  I would like to thank the Department of Philosophy of Marquette University for 
its support.  I would like to thank the faculty of the Department of Philosophy not only 
for their guidance and support but most especially for demonstrating excellent 
scholarship.  I would like to thank the library staff of the Marquette Library for their 
excellent work and service.  They made it possible for me to write this dissertation at a 
distance.  I would like to thank the Graduate School and all of the Marquette University 
administration.  Finally, I would like to thank all of my family and friends who offered 
their support and kindness to me along the way. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
 
CHAPTER 1  ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF COGNITION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 
 
 1.1  Some Underlying Metaphysical Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 
 
1.2  De Anima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
  
CHAPTER 2  INFORMING THEOLOGICAL NOTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
 2.1  The Divine Essence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
 
 2.2  The Beatific Vision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 
 
 2.3  The Incarnation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 
 
CHAPTER 3  THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE SOUL TO THE BODY . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
 
 3.1  Unity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
 
 3.2 The Unity of the Human Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 
 
 3.3 On Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions:  Can an Angel Be Made  
        into an Informing Form? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  103 
 
  3.3.1. First Argument - Per se Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 
 
   3.3.1.a. First meaning of per se being – Accident . . . . . . . . . . 108 
 
   3.3.1.b. The Second Sense of Per Se Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 
 
   3.3.1.c. Subsistent Per Se Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  116 
 
  3.3.2 Second Argument - Informing Form Communicates Actuality . 119 
 
  3.3.3 Third Argument - Remoteness from Matter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 
 
  3.3.4 Fourth Argument – Intellective Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 
 
 3.4  The Nature of the Human Being as Person . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
  
CHAPTER 4  SENSE COGNITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136 
 
 4.1  Thomas Aquinas’ Account of Sensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .137 
 
 iii 
 4.2  John Duns Scotus’ Account of Sensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164 
 
  4.2.1  Scotus’ Account of Natural Change and Spiritual Change . . . .  166 
 
  4.2.2   Sensation:  Corporeal or Incorporeal Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 
 
  4.2.3  The Ontological Status of the Sensible Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  173 
 
  4.2.4  The Cognitive Activity of Sensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 
 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 
       
 
 1
  
  
Introduction 
John Duns Scotus’ theory of cognition is an original confluence of elements taken 
directly or in a modified way from a variety of traditions including the Greek 
commentary tradition of Aristotle, the Augustinian illumination tradition rooted in 
Platonism, the Arabic Neoplatonic reading of Aristotle by Avicenna and Averroes, and 
the Christian theological tradition.1  The Aristotelian theory, filtered through these 
various traditions, provides the fundamental framework of Scotus’ cognitive theory, 
accounting for its basic structure and elements.  The study of cognition, both sensitive 
and intellective, that Aristotle presents in De Anima, however, is not completely worked 
out, and while there has been some consensus on the meaning of particular passages in 
Aristotle over the centuries, Aristotle’s intent still remains unclear.2  
Aristotle’s ideas had been the subject of many commentaries and had thus 
undergone various interpretations by the time they reached Scotus in the late 13th and 
early 14th centuries in an historical context vastly different from the one in which 
Aristotle himself wrote.   Scotus is then not only dealing with the perceived intrinsic 
inadequacies of Aristotle’s theory and its various interpretations, but also the concerns 
                                                 
1
  For the Arabic influences see, for example, Etienne Gilson, “Avicenne et le point de depart de Duns 
Scot,”  Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen-age, Paris 2 (1926-1927): 89-149; (Arabic, 
Neoplatonic and Christian) Mary Elizabeth Ingham,  “John Duns Scotus:  An Integrated Vision,” in The 
History of Franciscan Theology, ed. Kenan Osborne (St. Bonaventure, NY:  Franciscan Institute, 1994), 
191-2; (Avicenna) Joseph Owens “Common Nature:  A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and 
Scotistic Metaphysics,” Medieaval Studies (1957):  1-14.  For a discussion of the Augustinian influences 
see in particular, E. Bettoni, Duns Scotus:  The Basic Principles of His Philosophy, trans. B. Bonansea 
(Washington, D.C.:  The Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 20-21; Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns 
Scot (Paris:  J. Vrin, 1952), 10; Jerome V. Brown,  “John Duns Scotus on Henry of Ghent’s Arguments for 
Divine Illumination: The Statement of the Case,” Vivarium xiv, 2 (1976):  94-113; D.E. Sharp, Franciscan 
Philosophy at Oxford in the 13th Century (New York:  Russell & Russell, Inc., 1964), 279-370. It is clear 
that Scotus rejects the illumination of Augustine while embracing other aspects of Augustine’s theory.  
These latter aspects will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
2
 Zdzislaw Kuksewicz, “The Potential and the Agent Intellect,” in The Cambridge History of Later 
Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1989), 595. 
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and questions of his own day as found in his responses to his most influential 
contemporaries including, but not limited to, Henry of Ghent, Peter Olivi, and Godfrey of 
Fontaines.3  These concerns included the question of whether or not the Aristotelian 
framework could account for the various cognitive activities and thus offer a cohesive 
cognitive theory.  Scotus’ theory of cognition is indebted to these rich and varied 
traditions as well as to his contemporaries as they provide the context of his own thought 
and in many ways the content such that he incorporates many of their elements.4  Still, 
this debt neither renders Scotus’ cognitive theory wholly unoriginal nor his thought 
unworthy of study in itself.  Scotus’ own thought, more often than not, manifests itself as 
a compromise between various competing claims. His theory of cognition is one of 
complex mediation, not the result of mere reaction to the positions of others, but the 
product of a careful, deliberate, and sustained consideration of the issues, guided by his 
own insights and motivations.  Scotus places a new emphasis on certain aspects of the 
cognitive process, and thus, I will argue, lays the ground for a new approach to the 
questions of how we know and what we know.   
Scotus’ own approach to cognition is framed by and constantly attentive to the 
status of the wayfarer, the human being pro statu isto, in this life.  But though the status 
of the pilgrim certainly imposes limits upon the cognitive ability in this life, these limits 
are but temporary and do not intrinsically change the nature of the human intellect, its 
natural activity, or its adequate and proper object, and Scotus always treats them as such.5  
                                                 
3
 Katherine Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham:  Optics, Epistemology and the 
Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345 (Leiden:  E, J. Brill, 1988), 56. 
4
 Tachau 1988, 56; see also Robert Pasnau, “Cognition,” in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. 
Thomas Williams (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2003), 285-286. 
5
 Pasnau 2003, 294-95; Allan Wolter, “Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural,” New 
Scholasticism 23 (1940):  281-317. 
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His interests in cognition are steered beyond the limits of this life by his understanding of 
the natural ability of the intellect, which is determined and defined by the object that 
ultimately perfects the intellect in the next life, the beatific object.  His understanding of 
the beatific object informs the whole of his cognitive project, deepening his 
understanding of certain elements in Aristotle’s framework and allowing him to address 
unresolved issues in Aristotle’s account of cognition.   
The question that motivates and guides this dissertation is the particular question 
of the nature of the phantasm.  The phantasm is that sense image that somehow mediates 
between sensation and intellection.  The agent intellect acts with the phantasm to provide 
an object to the intellect.  Given, however, that the intellect is immaterial and inorganic, 
the question arises as to how it is able to act with the phantasm which is in a bodily organ 
and under the material condition of singularity.  
Aristotle claims that the intellect cannot think without a sense image, and 
therefore, though not dependent on the body for its own operations, is dependent upon the 
body-soul composite to provide such a sense image.  While Aristotle does give a 
somewhat detailed explanation of how he understands sensation, he does not give a 
detailed explanation of how the intellect acts with the sense image nor does he work out 
the problem of how the intellect relates to the body-soul composite. 
Scotus embraces Aristotle’s claim that the intellect cannot think without a sense 
image.  Given his Christian beliefs, Scotus understands that the intellective part of the 
soul is able to exist separately from the body, and yet, in this life, is dependent upon the 
body.  Whereas the sense has an external object, the intellect requires an internal object.  
The intellect, in this life, has no direct access to the external object and therefore depends 
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upon sensation, both external and internal, to provide a sense image or phantasm that the 
agent intellect is able to act with in order to make an object present to the intellect.  What 
is the nature of the phantasm that allows it to be present to the agent intellect? 
This is a complicated and involved question.  In order to be in a position to offer 
an answer, several other issues must be addressed and explained, for example how is 
sensation to be understood as a process of the body-soul composite that is ultimately able 
to produce a phantasm, and how is the relationship of the soul and body to be understood 
such that there can be a real mediation between the distinct faculties of sensation and 
intellection?  In this dissertation I will address these questions in the following way. 
In Chapter 1 I will discuss the basic elements of Aristotle’s metaphysics and 
account of cognition.  In this chapter I will first discuss key metaphysical notions.  I will 
then offer a detailed reading of De Anima in which I will emphasize the concerns that I 
see are critical to Aristotle:  the highly specific relationship between the soul and the 
body, his concern to detail the characteristics of a body that can be ensouled, his 
homonymy principle and understanding of ensouled being, and his understanding of 
sensation as the reception of sensible form without matter.   
In Chapter 2 I will discuss how two theological notions, the beatific vision and the 
incarnation, both inform and guide Scotus’ cognitive process.  The beatific vision 
requires the presence of the divine essence in its own existence to the cognizer.  Thus, the 
intellect of the cognizer must be intrinsically capable of attending to the presence of an 
extramental object existing in itself.  Given that Scotus claims that the proper object of 
the intellect is being, the cognitive faculties, both sense and intellect, are intrinsically 
capable of noticing the existence of their objects.  The notion of the presence of the 
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object is critical to Scotus’ account of cognition.  In the discussion of the incarnation I 
will endeavor to show that the world and the object are worthy of being loved and are 
therefore worthy of cognitive attention in themselves. 
In Chapter 3 I will discuss how Scotus understands the relationship of the soul 
and the body.  In the course of this discussion I will address how Scotus understands 
unity, the nature of the accident, the nature of a suppositum, and the nature of the 
immateriality of the intellect.  What I will show is that, for Scotus, the notion of person, 
allows him to guarantee the unity of the body-soul composite such that the mediation 
between sensation and intellection can be assured. 
In Chapter 4 I turn my attention to the process of sensation.  In the first part of the 
chapter I discuss in detail Aquina’s distinction between natural and spiritual action in 
terms of his discussion on sensation.  I also consider the debate in the current literature as 
a way of accessing the complexities of the issues in Aquinas’s account.  Four questions 
emerge from my discussion of Aquinas that serves as my organizational guide in 
discussing Scotus’ account of sensation.  In my discussion I will show how Scotus 
answers these questions and then discuss the way he comes to understand sensation in his 
mature work, the Quodlibetal Questions.  This allows me to consider the nature of the 
sensible species as an intentio, and thus, the nature of the phantasm. 
The main text of Scotus that I use in this dissertation is his Quodlibetal Questions, 
though I also use his Commentary on De Anima, Questions on the Metaphysics of 
Aristotle, and the Ordinatio.  The Quodlibetal Questions is one of Scotus’ most mature 
works.  The Quodlibetal Questions proves interesting as a text.  Though the questions 
were not of his own choosing, as Felix Alluntis and Allan Wolter point out in the 
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introduction to their translation of the Quodlibetal Questions, God and Creatures, upon 
revising these questions for publication, Scotus “wove in so much of his basic philosophy 
and theology as to make this work one of his mainstays.”6  I not only found this to be the 
case in my own study, but was further intrigued with the Quodlibetal Questions as a text.  
Scotus arranges the questions in such a way as to create an extended argument that serves 
to reveal the cohesiveness and depth of his own thought.  Thus, when working with 
passages from the Quodlibetal Questions, I found it helpful to consider several side by 
side or to offer a close textual reading of an extended argument in order to follow the 
path of his thought.   
                                                 
6
 Felix Alluntis and Allan Wolter.  God and Creatures.  Washington, D.C.:  The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1975, xviii. 
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Chapter 1  Aristotle’s theory of cognition 
The concern of this first chapter is to present the fundamental Aristotelian 
structure which frames Scotus’ thought so that his particular concerns and eventual 
solutions as a medieval Christian thinker can emerge and take shape in the chapters that 
follow.  My aim in this first chapter is to give an account of the central elements of 
Aristotle’s thought and along the way draw attention to issues critical to the medieval 
thinker.  In the first part of this chapter, 1.1, I discuss the key metaphysical principles of 
Aristotle’s system that guide and frame his approach to questions on the soul and 
cognition.  In the second part of this chapter, 1.2, I discuss key elements of Aristotle’s 
discussion on the soul and its cognitive activities as found in De Anima.7  I conclude the 
chapter with a brief critical summary. 
 
1.1 Some Underlying Metaphysical Principles 
Aristotle is a systematic philosopher such that every question, concern, or 
problem is addressed within a carefully reasoned framework.  The study of metaphysics 
for Aristotle is a study of the underlying principles of this framework and indeed is a 
study that only comes about through rigorous and abstract thought.  To understand the 
answers that he gives to any question, whether it is a question on the cognitive activities 
of the human being or otherwise, requires, then, that certain principles of this framework 
                                                 
7
 For the purposes of this dissertation, which is concerned with Scotus’ cognitive theory and how he 
understood critical passages in Aristotle’s De Anima, when quoting from De Anima, I give the Latin 
translation of the pertinent text.  I use the Latin translation of De Anima as found in Averroes’ Commentary 
of De Anima: Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De Anima libros (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts:  The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953).  For the English translation I use:  Aristotle, 
De Anima, trans. J.A. Smith in The Revised Oxford Translation of The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. 
Jonathon Barnes (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1984).   
       
 
 8
  
  
be present in the mind of his reader.  To that end, I discuss Aristotle’s notions of 
substance, matter (potentiality), form (actuality), and the hylomorphic (hylo – matter + 
morph – form) principle.  My aim in this discussion is to briefly outline these notions in 
as straightforward a way as possible without either oversimplifying or digressing into 
resolutions of difficulties that lie outside the scope of this work. 
 Substance.  Aristotle’s main discussions of substance are found in two different 
texts, Categories and Metaphysics (VII-IX).  There is still much debate over how 
Aristotle finally defines substance, what counts as substance, whether the accounts of 
substance given in these two texts are compatible, and whether Aristotle’s theory of 
substance is ultimately defensible.8  My purpose here is simply to discuss Aristotle’s 
notion of substance in a clear and concise way and so, while there does exist much 
scholarly debate, for my purposes here, I will set aside these debates.  
In the Categories Aristotle distinguishes ten categories of being. Substance is the 
first of these categories, while what is predicated of substance makes up the other nine:  
quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, condition, action, passion.9  These terms 
are meant to be understood as logical as well as ontological.  They are grounded in reality 
such that they indicate either the individual being, substance, or the aspects of being, that 
which is predicated of substance, i.e., accidents.  The first of the categories, substance, 
                                                 
8
 Christopher Shields, Aristotle (New York:  Routledge, 2007), 256.  See pp. 256-257 for Shields’ 
discussion of the debate that exists between the compatibilists, those scholars who see the accounts of 
substance found in the Categories and the middle books of the Metaphysics as compatible, and the 
incompatibilists who, Shields explains, typically argue that the account given in the Metaphysics is more 
mature and therefore “supplants” the account given in the Categories.  For Shields’ more in depth 
discussion of the Categories, see pp. 146-195 in the same text.  
9
 Aristotle. Categories. Trans. J.L. Akrill in The Complete Works of Aristotle:  The Revised Oxford 
Translation, Volume One, ed. Jonathan Barnes, ( New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 1984).  Aristotle 
gives different lists of the categories of being in different works, though the above list of ten categories 
appears both in the Topics and the Categories.  The medieval tradition recognized these 10 categories.  For 
a discussion on the medieval tradition see Chapters 4 and 5 in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval 
Philosophy, 1989.     
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answers the question what something is, whereas the other nine answer questions about 
some particular characteristic of this something.  According to Michael Frede, there is a 
general agreement of most scholars that what Aristotle intends by the division of the 
categories is a “scheme of classification such that all there is, all entities, can be divided 
into a limited number of ultimate classes.”10  While it can be said that all that is can be 
framed and understood by these categories, which Barnes in fact understands as “an 
inventory of our world – our ontological catalogue,” what these categories actually mean 
is not an easy matter.11 
At the beginning of the Categories Aristotle offers a four-fold distinction of 
things that are:  (a) those things that are said of a subject but not in a subject (man is said 
of the individual man but not in any subject), (b) those things that are in a subject but not 
said of a subject (not as a part of the subject but nonetheless in the subject such that it 
cannot exist separately from it examples being individual knowledge of grammar or 
individual white in a subject), (c) those that are both said of a subject and in a subject 
(knowledge is both in the soul and said of grammar), and (d) those that are neither said of 
a subject nor in a subject (the individual horse or man).12  What emerges from this 
                                                 
10
 Michael Frede, “Categories in Aristotle,” in Studies in Aristotle, ed. Dominic J. O'Meara (Washington, 
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1981), 1. 
11
 Jonathan Barnes, “Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 79.  See also Robin Smith, “Logic,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55-57. Here 
Smith argues that understanding the categories is difficult and then examines side by side Aristotle’s 
discussion in the Topics I.9 103b20-25 and Categories 4, Ib25-2a4.  Smith argues that these passages could 
be viewed in three ways, first as a list of types of predicates which arises out of reflection upon basic 
questions of being, second, the categories can be understood as the highest genera, and third, the categories 
are kinds of predication.    
12
 Categories 2, 1a20-1b6.  For an insightful reading of this particular passage see Sheldon M. Cohen, 
Aristotle on Nature and Incomplete Substance (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1996), 10-11.  
Cohen explains that the terms “said of” and “said in (or “present in”)” should be understood as technical 
terms instructive about the things that are.  What Aristotle ultimately does in the opening chapters of the 
Categories, Cohen observes,  is to turn Platonism on its head, making  primary substance the individual, 
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fourfold distinction is Aristotle’s fundamental distinction between substance and accident 
which governs the relationship between the first category of being (substance) and the 
other nine (accidents).  Aristotle defines substance (ousia) as “that which is neither said 
of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., the individual man or the individual horse.”13 Aristotle 
further posits that “it is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a 
subject,”14 and that “every substance seems to signify a certain ‘this’.”15  By contrast, an 
accident inheres in a substance and thus exists in a derivative way.16  Aristotle further 
divides substance into primary substance and secondary substance.  A primary substance 
is the existing individual whose existence makes possible the existence of all other 
things.17 Secondary substances are the species and genera.18  An existing individual or 
primary substance belongs to the species, which in turn belongs to the genus.  Neither the 
species nor the genus would exist if it were not for the existing individual.  The idea of 
substance that emerges here is that substance is a subject, that of which something is 
predicated.  Aristotle establishes in the Categories that the “highly actual concrete 
singular thing” is primary substance because it alone has independent existence and thus, 
                                                                                                                                                 
concrete being rather than the forms, and the forms (species, genera) secondary substances and thus, 
dependent on the individual concrete being. 
13
 Categories 5, 2a13-15.  See also Cohen 1996,  6-7.  Cohen discusses here the difficulties in the use of the 
English word substance for the Greek word that Aristotle uses, ousia.  The word substance is problematic 
because it can mean stuff aligning it more with the way that Aristotle understands matter, or it can mean 
essence which is clearly not the way that Aristotle is using it in the Categories.  Cohen offers that at times 
it might be better to use the word ‘thing’ in order to attend to the distinction between the individual being 
and its though still uses the traditional translation of ousia as substance.   I point this out here in a footnote 
in order to both address the translation difficulties and to underscore how Aristotle definition of substance 
here as the individual concrete being. 
14
 Categories 5, 3a9. 
15
 Categories 5, 3b10. 
16
 Barnes 1995, 77. 
17
 Categories 5, 2b5-6. 
18
 Categories 5, 2a15-19. 
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is logically and ontologically first.19  In the Categories, substance is what is primary, 
what is “basic and prior to all else.”20  A point that should be made here is that based on 
this classification scheme not everything that exists is a substance.  But the basic 
distinction between what exists as a substance and what does not is based on the four-fold 
distinction that Aristotle gives at the beginning of the Categories.  This four-fold 
distinction, however, falls short of providing an analysis of substance and its components 
that accounts for it standing alone and not being said of or said in a subject.  It is in the 
Metaphysics that such an analysis is offered.   
     In the middle books (VII-IX) of the Metaphysics, Aristotle offers a complex and more 
highly developed analysis of substance in which he considers whether substance should 
be understood as form, matter, or the composite of both.  What informs his discussion of 
substance here is the principle of hylomorphism, Aristotle’s doctrine that each thing is a 
unity of form and matter.  I will discuss hylomorphism in more detail later.  Nowhere in 
the Categories does Aristotle mention hylomorphism or its components, form and 
matter.21  So the discussion of substance in the Metaphysics has a decidedly different 
approach, and given that in this text Aristotle is not simply offering a classification of 
being, but a science of being, his discussion of substance engages the question of the 
intelligibility of being.  
 At the beginning of Metaphysics VII Aristotle claims that there are several senses 
in which a thing is said to be.  Either ‘to be’ means “what a thing is or a ‘this’,” or ‘to be’ 
                                                 
19
 Josheph Owens, “Matter and Predication in Aristotle,” in Aristotle:  The Collected Papers of Joseph 
Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 1981), 36. 
20
 Shields 2007, 257. 
21
 Shields 2007, 167-170.  Shields here discusses the possibility that the categories are derived from 
hylomorphism, that form is the basis of the category of quality and matter is the basis of the category of 
quantity.  Since form and matter make no appearance in the Categories, Shields thinks that this claim is 
problematic.  However, he points out that this is an approach that medieval thinkers took and has the 
advantage of grounding the categories in the world.  
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means “that a thing is of a certain quality or quantity or has some such predicate asserted 
of it.”22 Aristotle qualifies this statement, however, claiming that while there are indeed 
these several senses of being, that which is, in the primary sense, is the ‘what’ or the 
substance of the thing.23  Thus, the meaning of substance here departs from narrowness of 
the Categories. Perhaps to emphasize the greater breadth and depth that he will give to 
substance in the Metaphysics, Aristotle then, identifies the question, what being is, with 
the question, what substance is.24  According to Jonathan Barnes, this is Aristotle’s 
leading question.25  The question of substance, here, takes on existential and ontological 
import making it the most fundamental of all questions.26  Barnes contends that in this 
one question Aristotle implicitly asks three questions:  (1) What does it mean to call 
something a substance, i.e., to call something ontologically primary? (2) What must that 
which is called a substance be like in order to be ontologically primary?  (3)  What items 
actually qualify as substances?27 It is clear that Aristotle is concerned here, among other 
things, to provide the ground of the distinction between the substance and the accident, 
between those things that cannot be predicated of something else and those things that are 
predicated of something else, reaching beyond the discussion in the Categories.  These 
three implicit questions that Barnes observes here point to some of the difficulties that 
Aristotle is addressing.  Of these three questions, Barnes claims that it is the second that 
                                                 
22
 Metaphysics 7.1, 1028a10-13. 
23
 Metaphysics 7.1, 1028a13-15. 
24
 Metaphysics 7.1, 1028b2-4. 
25
 Barnes 1995, 90.  Barnes also explains here that what Aristotle means, indeed, “his overall metaphysical 
position,” is far from clear and still open to scholarly debate.  Nonetheless, Barnes offers what he calls a 
“simplistic” interpretation which I will follow in this chapter in order to present the basic elements of 
Aristotle’s thought.   
26
 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 7.1, 1028b2-4, trans. W.D. Ross in The Complete Works of Aristotle:  The 
Revised Oxford Translation, Volume Two, ed. Jonathan Barnes, (New Jersey:  Princeton University Press, 
1984).  
27
 Barnes 1995, 90. 
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is most problematic for Aristotle to answer because he seems to be pulled in opposite 
directions.28   
 On the one hand, Barnes observes, Aristotle clearly understands a substance as the 
individual entity he indicates in the Categories.29  On the other hand, he wants substance 
to be intelligible, that is, definable.30  The problem is that only common items, like 
species or genera, are definable.  This raises the question of the intelligibility of the 
existing individual and hence, of the world.31  Barnes sees a tension in Aristotle: 
“Substances are individuals:  Mozart is a substance, man is not.  Substances are 
definable:  man is a substance, Mozart is not.”32  In Metaphysics V, Aristotle claims that 
substance is “the ultimate substratum, which is no longer predicated of anything else,” 
and at the same time that a substance is “a ‘this’ and separable.”33  How Aristotle can 
hold both of these accounts is problematic, but Barnes offers a resolution. 
“This so-and-so” is the translation of Aristotle’s tode ti.  This phrase, tode ti, 
according to Barnes, is Aristotle’s attempt to resolve the tension between the 
individuality of substance, i.e., that substance indicates the existing individual as seen in 
the Categories, and the need for substance to be definable.  The ‘this’ indicates the 
individual, which for Aristotle, is “one in number” or as Barnes explains, “one item 
which can be identified and distinguished from other items and re-identified again as the 
                                                 
28
 Barnes 1995, 90. 
29
  Barnes 1995, 90-91.   
30
  Barnes 1995, 91. 
31
 Metaphysics, 7.10, 1036a1-8. This text is concerned with the difficulty of the ontological status of the 
individual concrete substance and hence its intelligibility.  Here Aristotle contends that there is no 
definition of the individual concrete substance.  They are known with the help of thought or perception, but 
when we are not actually conscious of them, we do not clearly know of their existence.  It is only by means 
of a universal formula that they are cognized.   
32
 Barnes 1995, 91. 
33
 Metaphysics 5.8, 1017b23-25.  Barnes’ translation of this passage is, “things are called substances in two 
ways:  a substance is whatever is an ultimate subject, which is no longer said of anything else; and a 
substance is a this so-and-so which is also separable,” 91.   
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same item.”34 The ‘so-and-so’ indicates the definable, the ‘what’.35  What Aristotle 
means by “separable” is unclear, but Barnes contends that it should mean that the 
existence of the substance “can be explained without invoking the existence of anything 
else.”36 Barnes observes that it is fairly clear that Aristotle understands substance as the 
individual and as that which indicates what the individual is, the form or essence.  
As abovementioned, at the beginning of Metaphysics VII, Aristotle claims that 
there are several senses of being. Aristotle here continues the distinction drawn in the 
Categories between the existing individual and the accidents said of this individual.  But 
he frames the discussion in Metaphysics in terms of ontology rather than logic, that is, he 
asks in what senses can a thing be said to be? The primary sense in which a thing can be 
said to be is the ‘what’ or the individual substance,37 while every other sense in which a 
thing is said to be predicates something of substance.  Aristotle here affirms what he 
argues in the Categories, namely, that substance is “that which is not predicated of a 
subject, but of which all else is predicated.”38 However, he observes that there is more 
than one way in which substance can be understood, namely, either as the essence, the 
universal, the genus, or the substratum.39 The substratum is “that of which other things 
are predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else.”40  Now if substance is 
understood as the substratum, it is necessary to determine the nature of the substratum.  
Aristotle considers that it can have the sense of being matter, form, or the union of matter 
                                                 
34
 Barnes 1995, 91. 
35
 Barnes 1995, 91. 
36
 Barnes 1995, 92. 
37
 Metaphysics 7.1, 1028a 14-15. 
38
 Metaphysics 7.3, 1029a 7-8.  
39
 Metaphysics 7.3, 1028b33-35. 
40
 Metaphysics 7.3, 1028b35-37. 
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and form.41  Before turning to a discussion of each of these notions, what can be taken 
from this discussion on substance is that Aristotle uses three criteria to determine what 
substance is, subject, individual, and separable.42   
Matter and Potentiality.  In the Metaphysics, Aristotle defines matter as “that 
which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity or assigned to any 
other of the categories by which being is determined.”43  Matter in itself is not a 
particular thing because, by definition, an individual thing is a composed of both form 
and matter.  Matter simply as matter has no actual existence, and this is due to the fact 
that it is not formed matter and not being formed matter is without definition or 
determination.  In fact, Aristotle claims that matter is “unknowable in itself.”44  This very 
lack of determinateness is what gives matter the capacity to be formed or determined.  As 
no particular thing and having not particular determination, matter is dunamis or 
potentiality.  Dunamis means the capacity of doing something or being something, a 
power, capacity, or a potentiality.45  So while matter as pure potentiality has no existence, 
potentiality itself is the power or capacity of matter to be formed, or to be acted upon, and 
is thus a necessary condition of the existence of a composite being or substance.46 
                                                 
41
 Metaphysics 7.3, 1029a7-33. 
42
 Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 131-135.  Cohen here acknowledges these three criteria of substantiality as 
being those widely discussed in the literature.  He finds, in addition to these three, six criteria of 
substantiality:  (1) the differentia of the species must be proper, (2) the thing must be one by nature, (3) Its 
parts must be incapable of separate existence, (4) its movement must be indivisible, (5) it must be naturally 
continuous, and (6) its parts cannot be full-fledged substances in their own right.  These criteria will 
become helpful when discussing the question of the substantiality of the soul in the section on De Anima.  
43
 Metaphysics 7.3, 1029a20-23. 
44
 Metaphysics 7.10, 1036a8. 
45
 Barnes 1995, 95; Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 164. 
46
 Metaphysics 9.1, 1046a16-21. 
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Matter as potentiality is the principle of change for Aristotle.  All things that 
change are composed, in part, of matter.47  In order to explain how something comes into 
being or changes, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle says that “everything that changes is 
something and is changed by something and into something.”48 A something is already 
formed matter, what is generated or comes into being is a this, a composite of form and 
matter.49  Matter only has actual existence as formed, as S. Marc Cohen explains that 
matter at every level except the lowest is “itself a compound of matter and form, and its 
essential properties will be those of its form.”50  As formed matter a thing is actually a 
specific something, and as this specific something, it has the capacity to be changed into 
a specific something else because it is composed of matter determined in a certain way.  
Aristotle says that when we look for the material cause of the human being, for example, 
we must look to the proximate material cause.  Rather than looking to the elements as 
material cause, we need to look to the “matter peculiar to the thing.”51  This is because in 
order for something to be changed into something else, it must already be that something 
else, potentially.  Thus, only matter that is already determined in some way has the 
capacity to be or become a particular thing.  For example, only certain kinds of matter 
have the capacity to become a saw; a saw cannot be made out of wool.52  Wool can never 
actually be a saw because in some sense, prior to being a saw, it would have to 
potentially be a saw.  But wool lacks such characteristics that would give it the capacity 
to be a saw.  Steel is able to be an axe because it has the capacity to have a sharp edge.  
                                                 
47
 Metaphysics 8.5, 1044b26-28. 
48
 Metaphysics 12.3, 1069b36-1070a1. 
49
 Metaphysics, 8.3, 1043b18-19. See also Metaphysics 7.11, 1037a1-2. 
50
 S. Marc Cohen, “Hylomorphism and Functionalism,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha 
Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1992), 71. 
51
 Metaphysics 8.4, 1044a33-1044b2. 
52
 Metaphysics 8.4, 1044a26-30. 
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Steel is potentially an axe.  Potentiality as a power or a capacity is essentially what it is 
capable of being, but this essential capacity comes not from matter, but from form.  
   Form and Actuality.  Form is that which determines and identifies a being as what 
it is.  In the Metaphysics Aristotle identifies the form with essence: “By form I mean the 
essence of each thing and its primary substance.”53 Essence is the word used to translate 
Aristotle’s to ti ên einai, which literally means “the what it was to be” for a thing. 
Essence is “what something is.”54 In the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle claims that the 
definition seems to be the “what it is” (to ti esti).55  But in the Posterior Analytics, 
Sheldon M. Cohen explains, Aristotle is not concerned with the “what it is” question in 
terms of substances, as is clearly the case in the Metaphysics where Aristotle contends 
that “definition and essence in the primary and simple sense belong to substances.”56 In 
the Metaphysics, Aristotle is concerned to show what substance is primarily, and what 
appears to win out is that substance is primarily form which is essence.57  Thus, the 
substance of the Categories is definable since, in being a composite of both form and 
matter, it has definition and determining characteristics.  Form determines and defines 
matter and is therefore prior to matter.    Form is actuality (entelecheia or energeia), 
matter is potentiality (dunamis).  The entelecheia or energeia can be understood as the 
exercise of a capacity or the actualization of a potential such that, as Sheldon M. Cohen 
explains, every “actualization or realization (energeia) of a dunamis is the completion 
                                                 
53
 Metaphysics 7.7, 1032b1-2. 
54
 Metaphysics 7.4, 1030a3. 
55
 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2, 90b4, trans. Jonathan Barnes, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The 
Revised Oxford Translation, Volume One, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, New Jersey:  Princeton 
University Press, 1984). 
56
 Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 15; Metaphysics 7.4, 1030b4-5. 
57
 Shields 2007, 256-257. 
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(entelecheia) of that dunamis.”58  Since is matter is nothing in itself, unknowable in itself, 
form as actuality, realizes the potentiality of matter.  Thus, it is unity of formed matter 
that has actual existence, not essentially, but such that existence follows from the form as 
actuality.59    
 Hylomorphic union.  Each individual being or substance is a composite, a unity of 
matter and form, a unity of potentiality and actuality.60  Matter as potentiality is capable 
of receiving the form which as actuality is only realized in matter.  Barnes explains that 
Aristotle originally understood matter as stuff and form as shape, his standard example 
being the bronze sphere.61 The bronze is the stuff and the sphere is the shape.  Stuff is 
indefinable in itself for it lacks the structure or determinateness that shape gives to it. In 
the Physics, Aristotle explains that every sensible substance is composed of two 
principles, matter and form.62  Joseph Owens uses an analogy to explain how the matter 
that is unknowable (potentiality) becomes knowable (actuality).  As bronze is to the 
statue, matter is the “underlying nature in any sensible substance to its corresponding 
form.”63  Matter as the underlying nature in any sensible substance is in itself completely 
indeterminate. In contrast, the form is the “fundamental knowable content” of the 
sensible thing.64 The form actuates the matter and thus constitutes the particular thing.65  
The result of the union of form and matter is the particular thing which is at once 
                                                 
58
 Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 164.  See also, Barnes 1995, 94-95. 
59
 Metaphysics 4.2, 1003b30-33. 
60
 Barnes 1995, 97. 
61
 Barnes 1995, 97. 
62
 Aristotle, Physics, 1.7, 190b17-28, trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, in The Complete Works of 
Aristotle:  The Revised Oxford Translation, Volume One, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, New Jersey:  
Princeton University Press, 1984). 
63
 Joseph Owens,  “The Grounds of Universality in Aristotle,” in Aristotle:  The Collected Papers of Joseph 
Owens, ed. John R. Catan, 1981), 48-58, 52. 
64
 Owens 1981, 53. 
65
 Owens 1981, 53. 
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individual and knowable.  That each particular thing is a union of form and matter is 
Aristotle’s hylopmorphic principle.  At the core of this principle is the claim that matter 
and form are one and the same thing.  In any given hylopmorphic union, the matter is 
essentially what the form is actually, and therefore are somehow one.66    
S. Marc Cohen observes that while Aristotle typically uses the artifact model of 
the bronze sphere or bronze statue to illustrate the hylomorphic union, it has its 
advantages and disadvantages.  In such a model, form can be easily understood as either 
the shape of the material or in more complex cases the functional organization.67  S. Marc 
Cohen explains, however, that a major disadvantage of the artifact model, to Aristotle’s 
own theory, is that it characterizes the connection of form and matter as contingent and 
thus oversimplifies the hylomorphic union.68   In all but the simplest of cases, the artifact 
model is unable to appreciate the complex unity of the form and matter relationship. In 
highly complex cases, for example, living being, it is only highly formed matter that has 
the capacity to receive a form, a soul, that has complicated material requirements.  The 
more complex a being, the less contingent the relationship between form and matter 
appears to be.     In De Anima, Aristotle considers the case of living beings, devoting 
much time to understanding the characteristics of a body that can be ensouled.    
 
1.2 De Anima 
 From the outset of his study of the soul in De Anima where he claims that the soul 
is the principle of animal life, Aristotle concerns himself with the difficulties of his task.  
                                                 
66
 Metaphysics 8.6 1045b18-21. 
67
 S. Marc Cohen 1992, 58. 
68
 S. Marc Cohen 1992, 58. 
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Aristotle’s stated aim is to understand first, the soul’s essential nature, i.e., the nature of 
the soul’s substantiality, and second, the soul’s properties or affections including those 
properties had by the soul itself and those had by the composite of the body and soul.69  
What complicates the study of the soul, the principle of animal life, is its relation to the 
body.  Early in Book I Aristotle observes that most of the affections or movements of the 
soul involve the body. 70  The only possible exception is thinking unless it be shown that 
thinking is impossible without the bodily imagination.71  Aristotle understands the soul’s 
affections as enmattered accounts (logoi), meaning that with most of the affections of the 
soul there is a concurrent affection of the body. 72  An enmattered account involves both 
psychic conditions and material conditions, or as Amelie Rorty characterizes it, cognition 
and the body.73  Aristotle offers the example of anger as such an enmattered account:  
“anger should be defined as a certain mode of movement of such and such a body (or part 
or faculty of a body) by this or that cause and for this or that end.”74   
Aristotle considers whether the affections of the soul should be studied by the 
physicist (physikos) or the dialectician (dialektikos); the physicist specifies the material 
conditions, the dialectician specifies the account or form.75  But Aristotle contends that 
simply supplying the material conditions and the form is not enough, a proper definition 
                                                 
69
 De Anima 402a7-9: “Et quesitum est scire naturam et substantiam eius; postea autem omnia que accidunt 
ei.  Et existimatum est quod horum accidentium quedam sunt passiones propire anme, et quedam accidunt 
corpori propter animam.” 
70
 De Anima 403a5-7:  “Et nos videmus quod plures earum impossibile est ut sint neque actio neque passio 
extra corpus, v.g., iracundia et desiderium, et audacia, et universaliter sentire.” 
71
 De Anima 403a8-10:  “Quod autem videtur proprium ei est intelligere. Sed si hoc etiam est ymaginatio, 
aut non potest esse sine ymaginatione, impossibile est ut sit neque hoc etiam extra corpus.” 
72
 De Anima 403a16-18:  “Et videtur etiam quod omnes passiones anime sunt in corpore, ut iracundia, et 
gratia, et timor, et pietas, et auda.”  See also De Anima 403a25:  “Unde manifestum est quod passiones 
anime sunt intentiones in materia.” 
73
 Amelie Rorty, “B. De Anima:  Its Agenda and Its Recent Interpreters,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De 
Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1992), 8. 
74
 De Anima 403a 26-28:  “Quapropter diffinitiones debent esse ita:  quoniam ira est motus alicuius parties 
istius corporis, aut alicuius virtutis eius, a tali, et propter tale.” 
75
 De Anima 403b1-2:  “Naturalis igitur dat materiam, Sermocinalis autem dat formam et intentionem.” 
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of the affections of the soul must also include a teleological account, i.e., it must specify 
the purpose or end.76  In other words, as Rorty points out, in order to understand the 
relationship between the material conditions and the account or form, we must know the 
“end designated in its logos.”77 Given the nature of the affections of the soul as 
enmattered accounts, a study of them requires more than either the physicist or the 
dialectician alone can give.  Rorty aptly characterizes Aristotle’s study of the soul as a 
philosophical bio-psychology acknowledging that it is broader than contemporary 
philosophy of mind or contemporary philosophical psychology.78  In the Metaphysics 
Aristotle considers whether matter should be part of the definition of substance.79  In the 
De Anima, in striving to give an account of living being and its activities, Aristotle 
refines his hylomorphic doctrine in order to expand and deepen how he understands the 
relationship of form and matter, actuality and potentiality.  From the beginning of De 
Anima, Aristotle alerts his readers to the intimate relationship between the soul and the 
body.   
In the rest of the first book of De Anima, Aristotle analyzes his predecessors’ 
notions of the soul observing two traditional characteristics used to distinguish the 
animate from the inanimate: movement and sensation.80  As Aristotle has identified (most 
of) the affections of the soul as enmattered accounts, that he begins his discussion of 
previous theories of the soul with movement and sensation is important.  Any account of 
                                                 
76
 De Anima 403b7-8:  “. . .alius vero dat formam existentem in hoc propter ista.” 
77
 Rorty 1992, 8.. 
78
 Rorty 1992, 7. 
79
 Metaphysics 7.10-7.11.  At 1037a25-29, Aristotle clearly claims that the material parts will not be present 
in the formula of a substance for they are only parts of the concrete substance.  At 1036a1-8, Aristotle 
claims that the concrete thing has no definition.  The concrete thing is known by its universal formula, but 
since matter in itself is unknowable, what is known is simply the form or essence.   
80
 De Anima 403b24-26:  “Et hoc ponemus principium, dicendo quod habens animam videtur differre a non 
animato his duobus proprie, scilicet motu et sensu.” 
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movement or sensation will have to be grounded in the relationship of the soul to the 
body.   It is from this point of view that Aristotle examines his predecessors’ ideas and 
admonishes them: 
The view we have just been examining, in company with most theories 
about the soul, involves the following absurdity:  they all join the soul to a 
body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason 
of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it.  Yet, such 
explanation can scarcely be omitted; for some community of nature is 
presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon, the 
one moves and the other is moved; but it is not the case that any two 
things are related to one another in these ways.  All, however, that these 
thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the soul; they do 
not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it 
were possible, as in the Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed 
by any body—an absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and 
shape of its own.  It is as absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could 
embody itself in flutes; each art must use its tools, each soul its body.81 
 
In this passage Aristotle clearly finds fault with those who do not specify either 
the reason that the soul is joined to the body or the bodily requirements for such a union.  
He reasons that given the fact that “one acts and the other is acted upon,” the relationship 
of the soul to the body is a special case.  In fact, he finds the view that a study of the soul 
that only focuses on the soul’s characteristics and not those of the body is absurd 
because:  “each body seems to have a form and shape of its own.”  The relationship 
between the soul and the body is a highly specific one, comparable to the relationship 
between an art and its tools.   
From Book I of De Anima, we can take the following points:  1) the soul is the 
principle of animal life, 2) any account of the soul will require an account of the specific 
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 De Anima 407b14-26:  “Et dicamus quod est alia improbabilitas contingens huic sermoni et pluribus 
sermonibus de anima; et est quia ipsi coniungunt animam corpori et ponunt eam in eo, et non dant cum hoc 
qua de causa sit coniuncta cum eo, et que est disposition illius corporis.  Et licet hoc, ut reputo, necessarium 
sit.  Quoniam propter communicationem hoc agit et hoc patitur et hoc movet et hoc movetur, et nichil ex 
hoc fit in quibuscunque adinvicem.  Dicere enim hoc in eis est simile ac si aliquis diceret quod ars 
Carpentaria existat in Musica.  Ars enim ita utitur instrumentis sicut anima corpore.” 
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characteristics of the body as well as the relationship between the soul and the body, and 
3) any account of the affections of the soul will require an account of the material 
conditions, the form, and the end or purpose.  Aristotle, thus, sets up the guidelines for 
the study of the soul.  
Aristotle begins Book II of De Anima by asking what the soul is, immediately 
drawing upon the hylomorphic principle.  His answer begins with a brief discussion of 
substance recalling the discussion in the Metaphysics where substance is considered in 
different senses, as matter, form, or the compound of both.  Substance can be considered 
in the sense of matter, i.e., “that which in itself is not a this,” in the sense of form or 
essence, i.e., “that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called a this,” or in the sense of 
the compound of matter and form.  Aristotle identifies matter as “potentiality” (dunamis) 
and form as “actuality” (entelecheia) and then adds an important qualification of 
actuality, distinguishing two kinds:  knowledge and reflecting. 82 
Aristotle next considers that among substances are to be found both bodies and 
natural bodies.  He notes that some natural bodies have life, some do not.  Life is here 
defined in terms of activity: “self-nutrition, and growth, and decay.”83  Aristotle then 
claims that “every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a 
composite.”84  In the Metaphysics Aristotle explicitly identifies the soul as primary 
                                                 
82
 De Anima 412a7-10:  “Substantiarum autem quedam est substantia secundum materiam, et ista non est 
per se hoc; et quedam est forma per quam dicitur in re quod est hoc; est autem tertia, et est illud quod est ex 
ambobus.  Et material est illa que est in potential; forma autem est perfectio.  Et forma est duobus modis:  
unus est sicut scire, et alius est sicut speculari.”   
83
 De Anima 412a14:  “Et dicere est vitam nutriri et augeri et diminui.” 
84
 De Anima 412a15-16:  “Unde necesse est ut omne corpus naturale habens communicationem in vita sit 
substantia; et est substantia secundum quod est compositum.”   See also Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 158.  
Sheldon M. Cohen points out that this is an odd claim since it might be expected that the body is simply 
matter, the material component of the composite and not a compound itself of form and matter. Cohen 
contends that Aristotle makes this unexpected claim presumably because we can think of the living body as 
distinct from the soul or as the ensouled body.  As distinct from the soul, the body is simply the material 
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substance and the body as matter.85  And in De Anima, Aristotle identifies the body as the 
subject or matter of the composite, for the soul cannot be a body.86    The soul, then, is the 
form, more specifically, “the form of a natural body having life potentially within it.”87  
What does Aristotle mean that the soul is the form of a natural body “having life 
potentially in it?   
Above, Aristotle defined life in terms of activity:  nutrition, growth, and decay.  
What Aristotle means by a body that has life potentially in it, is not a body that is not 
alive, but a body that is alive and therefore has the capacity for life as activity.88  A living 
body is a body that has life (as activity) potentially in it.  Only a living body has the 
capacity to carry out life activities.   However, unless some of these activities are being 
exercised there is no life.  So it seems that Aristotle runs into problems using the 
hylomorphic principle to specify what the material component is in the composite of the 
living being.  As seen above, the matter of the composite must potentially be what the 
form is actually.  The problem here is that Aristotle identifies the matter in the body-soul 
composite as the already ensouled body, the living body, and thus, as Akrill explains, the 
body does not have life potentially but necessarily.89  In fact, Aristotle further claims that 
a body that is no longer alive is a body in name only raising the thorny problem known as 
                                                                                                                                                 
component of the composite, human being.  But an ensouled body is the living body.   But every actually 
existing matter is already formed matter. So the body is itself a composite.   
85
 Metaphysics 7.11, 1037a5. 
86
 De Anima 412a17-18:  “Et quia corpus vivum est corpus, et est tale, impossibile est ut anima sit corpus.”   
87
 De Anima 412a20-21:  “Unde necesse est ut anima sit substantia secundum quod est forma corporis 
naturalis habentis vitam in potentia.” 
88
 De Anima 412b25-26:  “Et illud quod habet potentiam ut vivat non est illud a quo ablata est anima, sed 
illud quod habet animam.”  Aristotle explains, “We must not understand by that which is potentially 
capable of living what has lost the soul it had, but only what still retains it. . .”  See also, Cohen 1996,  158. 
89
 J.L. Akrill, “Aristotles’ Definitions of psuch,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 73 (1972-73): 
119-33.  See also S. Marc Cohen 1992, 68. 
       
 
 25
  
  
the homonymy principle.90  For example, Aristotle asks us to suppose that an axe is a 
natural body, such that being an axe is its essence.91  If the essence of being an axe is no 
longer present, then the axe is an axe in name only.92  So too with an eye that is deprived 
of sight; an eye without sight is an eye in name only.93  Thus, if we try to specify the 
body without the soul as the matter in the body-soul composite, S. Marc Cohen explains 
that “we must fail, for if what we pick out is not alive, then what we pick out is not a 
body.”94  While this is certainly a difficulty, I agree with Cohen here that the point of the 
homonymy principle is to remind us of the “crucial importance of function in the 
definition of a living creature,” and the fact that Aristotle contends that what a thing is is 
always determined by its function.95 At the beginning of Book I of De Anima, Aristotle 
claims that to grasp the nature of an affection of the soul, an enmattered account, we need 
to specify the material conditions, the formal conditions, and the teleological conditions.  
A teleological account always includes the function of the being.  The problem with the 
living being is that its functioning is at once psychic and bodily.  So that while the soul is 
not a magnitude or a body, it (or at least some of its powers) cannot exist without a 
                                                 
90
 Aristotle discusses the homonymy principle at De Anima 412b12-23 and Metaphysics 1035b24.  For 
further discussions on the homonymy principle see Akrill 1972-73, 119-133; S. Marc Cohen 1992, 68-72; 
and Jennifer Whiting, “Living Bodies,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and 
Amelie Rorty (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1992), 75-91.  
91
 De Anima 412b12-13:  “Et est substantia secundum hanc intentionem, scilicet secundum illud quod hoc 
corpus est quod est; quemadmodum, si aliquod instrumentum esset corpus naturale, ut securis, tunc acumen 
secures esset substantia et eius anima secundum hanc intentionem.” 
92
 De Anima 412b14-14:  “Et ideo, cum istud est abstractum, non erit securis post nisi equivoce.” 
93
 De Anima 412b18-22:  “Et considerandum est quod dicitur de hoc in membris etiam.  Oculus enim si 
esset animal, tunc visus esset anima eius; iste enim est substantia oculi, que est secundum suam 
intentionem.  Et corpus oculi est material visus, qui cum deficit, non dicetru oculus nisi equivoce, sicut 
dicitur de oculo lapideo.” 
94
 S. Marc Cohen 1992, 68. 
95
 S. Marc Cohen 1992, 69-71.  Cohen points out that Aristotle insists upon functional definitions “even of 
copper and silver, of water and fire. (71) 
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specific kind of body.  To know the soul is to know the living body.  Aristotle must adjust 
his hylomorphic principle in order to comprehend the wholeness of the living being.96 
This brings us back to the two types of actuality that Aristotle distinguishes:  
knowledge and reflecting.  The special case of the living body as a substance is a special 
case of hylomorphism because it requires a higher degree of unity of form and matter 
than the case of the bronze sphere because it has to function as a whole.  Moreover, 
Aristotle has to account not just for the existence of a living being, but the living of the 
living being.  This means being able to account for both life and the exercise of that life.  
The unity of a living being has to be a functional unity where the matter is of such a kind 
that it has the capacity to carry out the functions of life.  But such a capacity is held only 
by the body that is already living.   
To address the complicated status of the living being, Aristotle distinguishes a 
first actuality (entelecheia) and a second actuality (entelecheia).  The first actuality can 
be understood as a capacity or aptitude and is contrasted with the second actuality which 
is the exercise of this capacity.  Sheldon M. Cohen explains that first actuality stands to 
second actuality as a sort of dunamis or power.97  But, according to Cohen, Aristotle 
defines dunamis most basically as a source of change, the ability to change into 
something else.98  The ability to change into something else is the kind of change that 
Aristotle calls a kinesis.99  But not all dunamis is change of this type.  There is that 
change which is the exercise of a capacity.  The first actuality is this second sort of 
                                                 
96
 See, for example, Whiting 1992, 86.  Whiting argues that Aristotle must show “how a form’s coming to 
be embodied in some matter can yield a product which is not a property of what persists and which is itself 
an intrinsic unity—that, a unity neither component of which is separable from the other in a way such that 
it could serve as subject in some other unity. . . the form is essentially the form of this matter, and the 
matter essentially the matter of this form.” 
97
 Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 164. 
98
 Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 164. 
99
 Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 164.   
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change, it “marks a things’ ability to exhibit or become what it really is, rather than for it 
to become different.”100 Aristotle says that the soul, like knowledge, is such a first 
actuality.  Knowledge is a first actuality (entelecheia) that makes possible the second 
actuality or exercise of knowledge, reflection.  Thus, the soul is the first actuality of a 
“natural body having life potentially in it.”101 A body that potentially has life is a body 
that is organized, that is, has organs which have the power or capacity to carry out the 
exercise of life activities.  Thus, the soul is, more precisely, the first actuality of a natural 
organized body.102   
  Aristotle contends that the soul is the “what it is to be” for a body with organs, 
the soul is “an account or essence,” as well as “the cause or source of the living body.”103  
In fact, the soul is the source of movement, the end, and the essence of the whole living 
body.”104 As the essence and actuality of the living body, the soul or some parts of it 
cannot exist separate from the body.105  Aristotle emphasizes here that the soul is the 
actuality of certain kind of body and again claims that it is a mistake not to specify the 
                                                 
100
 Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 165. 
101
 De Anima 412a27-28:  “Et ideo anima est prima perfectio corporis naturalis habentis vitam in potentia.” 
102
 De Anima 412a28:  “Et est secundum quod est organicum.” See also, De Anima 412b5:  “Si igitur 
aliquod universale dicendum est in omni anima, dicemus quod est prima perfectio corporis naturalis 
organici.” 
103
 De Anima 412b11-12:  “Et est substantia secundum hanc intentionem, scilicet secundum illud quod hoc 
corpus est quod est;” See also, De Anima 414a14:  “Necesse est igitur ut sit aliqua intentio et forma, non 
quasi materia et quasi subiectum.” See also, De Anima 415b8-9:  “Anima igitur est corporis vivi causa et 
principium tribus modis determinatis.” 
104
 De Anima 415b11-12:  “Est enim illud ex quo fit motus, et illud propter quod fuit corpus; et et etiam 
anima est causa secundum quod est substantia, que est causa esse omnium.” 
105
 De Anima 413a4-5:  “Quoniam autem anima non est abstracta a corpore, aut pars eius,. . .” See also, De 
Anima 414a19-20:  “Et propter hoc bene existimaverunt dicentes quod anima non est extra corpus neque est 
corpus.”  
       
 
 28
  
  
characteristics of the body required for the soul because the actuality of any given thing 
requires a matter that has the appropriate potentiality.106  
The way that Aristotle characterizes the unity of soul and body goes well beyond 
the hylomorphism of an artifact.  Whether artifacts have real essences, or whether beds 
have a higher degree of unity than that of a heap are questions that are open to debate.107   
The case of the living being stands apart from these artifacts in that there seems to be a 
higher degree of unity of form and matter. When Aristotle defines the soul as the form of 
the body that potentially has life in it such that the soul is the “what it is to be” of an 
organized body, he is not concerned simply about the substantiality of the soul but is also 
addressing the nature of the relationship of the soul to the body, rejecting any 
contingency in the relationship between this body and this soul.108  Recall that Aristotle 
rejects the notion that he attributes to the Pythagoreans that “any soul could be clothed by 
any body.”  Rather, Aristotle contends that each body seems to have a form and shape of 
its own.  Since matter in itself has no determinateness, then matter without being highly 
formed, cannot account for the intricate and definable structures found in the bodily 
organs necessary for life.  But since the body and bodily organs exist for the sake of the 
soul, and the soul is the actuality of the a body with organs, then the structure of the 
bodily organ must be understood as form.  But the bodily organ as formed is the ensouled 
                                                 
106
 De Anima 414a26-27:  “Corpus autem non est, sed per corpus, et propter hoc est in corpore, et in tali 
corpore, non sicut fecerunt Antiqui in ponendo eam in corpore absque determinatione illius corporis, quod 
corpus sit et cuiusmodi; et hoc licet non quodcunque recipiat quancunque.” 
107
 See Sheldon M. Cohen 1996, 118, 169. 
108
 Whiting 1992, 86-87.  In the current literature there is much debate concerning the question of whether 
Aristotle is a functionalist.  While it is outside the scope of this dissertation to engage this debate, it is 
worth mentioning here some of the important articles.  Functionalism, according to S. Marc Cohen 1992, 
58, is the claim that mental states cannot be reduced to physical states but are rather the “functional states 
of the physical systems that realize them.”  This suggests a possibly contingent relationship between the 
matter and form.  See also M.F. Burnyeat, “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible?  A Draft,” 
in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 
1992), 15-26; Nussbaum, Martha C. and Hilary Putnam, “ Changing Aristotle’s Mind,” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1992), 27-56.   
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bodily organ.  Moreover, it is an organ that is attached to the living body.  The point is, in 
no way can inanimate matter account for the physical structures of the bodily organ 
required for the activities of life, like nutrition, growth, or sensation.109  When Aristotle 
defines the soul as the form of a living body, he is defining the relationship of matter and 
form as essential.  The living being is an essentially ensouled being.  While it is well 
agreed upon that Aristotle has this notion of an essentially ensouled being, how it is to be 
understood and its significance has given rise to much debate.110  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I simply want to stress the intimate relationship between the soul and the 
body.  It is within the intimacy of this relationship that Aristotle explains the various 
powers of the soul, nutrition, sensation, and thought.  Both nutrition and sensation are 
powers of the soul that depend on the body but thought is seen to be a different kind of 
power that does not itself depend on the body.111  Though sensation is dependent on the 
body and thinking is independent from the body, Aristotle holds that a kinship exists 
between them.  In the discussion on sensation that follows, I will pay particular attention 
to this kinship using it to guide the way into the main focus of this discussion, intellective 
cognition.112  Aristotle gives his main discussion on sense cognition or sense perception 
in De Anima. 
                                                 
109
 Alan Code and Julius Moravcsik, “Explaining Various Forms of Living,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De 
Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1992), 133. 
110
 Whiting, 1992; Burnyeat 1992. 
111
 De Anima, 413b24-26:  “Intellectus autem et virtus speculativa, nichil adhuc declaratum est de eis.  Sed 
tamen videtur quod hoc sit aliud genus anime.” 
112
 De Anima 427a20:  “. . . existimando quod intelligere est quasi sentire corporale quoquo modo (anima 
enim in hiis duobus modis iudicat aliquid et cognoscit ipsum). . .” 
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Sensation.  Aristotle characterizes sensation or sense perception as a “qualitative 
alteration” and says that only that which has soul is capable of sensing.113  Sensation 
requires the composite of the body and soul and more specifically, an appropriate bodily 
organ: 
A primary sense-organ is that in which such a power is seated.  The sense 
and its organ are the same in fact, but their essence is not the same.  What 
perceives is, of course, a spatial magnitude, but we must not admit that 
either the having the power to perceive or the sense itself is a magnitude; 
what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude.114 
   
Sense perception involves one or more of the five senses, each of which has its own 
proper organ and its own proper object.  Whereas in nutrition, the soul acts upon its 
object, food, it is the other way around in sensation which depends on “a process of 
movement or affection from without.”115  What Aristotle observes about sensation is that 
it only happens when there is an external sensible object present.  He compares sensation 
to the combustible which requires an external agent to ignite.116  Since sense perception is 
a process which requires the material bodily organ and the material sensed object, 
somehow the material object acts through a medium upon the sense organ; the organ is 
thus affected qualitatively by the sensed object. This change of quality can be understood 
in a certain sense as a transition from potentiality to actuality, e.g., the sense is potentially 
                                                 
113
 De Anima 415b24-26.  Following Hamlyn’s reading of Aristotle, I will use the terms sensation and 
sense perception interchangeably.  See D. W. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception (New York:  The 
Humanities Press, 1961), 28. 
114
 De Anima 424a24-27:  “Et in quo est ista potentia est primum sentiens.  Sunt igitur idem, in esse autem 
diversa.  Ilud enim uod sentit est aliqua magnitudo, et non secundum quod sentit; neque sensus sit 
magnitudo, sed intentio et virtus illius.”  
115
 De Anima 416a35:  “Et etiam, nutrimentum patitur quoquo modo a nutribili, sed non econtrario, sictu 
Carpentarius non a material, sed material ab illo. . .”  and De Anima 416b33-34:  “Dicamus igitur quod 
sentire accidit secundum motum et passionem, sicut diximus; existimatur enim quod est aliqua alteratio.” 
116
 De Anima 417a4-9:  “Sed est irrationabile quare sensus non sentient se, et quare etiam nullus sensus agit 
absque extrinseco, et in eis sun ignis et terra et alia elementa, et sunt illa que comprehenduntur a sensu per 
se, et accidentia contingentia eis.  Dicamus igitur quod sensus non est in actu, sed tantumm in potential, et 
ideo non sentimus; quemadmodum combustibile non comburitur a se absque comburente; et si hoc non 
esset, combureret se et non indigeret quod ignis esset in actu.” 
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what the sensed object actually is.  Actually sensing the object means that this object acts 
upon the sense so that the sense actually becomes what it only potentially was. 
 Aristotle gives a detailed account of what happens in the process of each sense.  
Each sense has its own proper object that cannot be perceived by another sense such that 
when the sense perceives its own proper object, it does so without error.117  Examples of 
the proper objects of the various senses include:  color for sight, sound for hearing, and 
flavor for taste.118  In addition to the proper sensibles, there are the common sensibles 
which include: motion, rest, number, figure, and magnitude, and are not proper to any 
one sense but common to all.119  In an interesting passage, Aristotle explains the 
difference between an incidental object of sense and a proper object of sense.  The 
example that Aristotle uses for an incidental object is a white object that we see that is the 
son of Diares (in the Latin text below we see that it is Socrates).  We see the white object 
because color is the proper object of sight whereas the son of Diares is only incidental to 
our perception of white.120  The point that Aristotle emphasizes here is that white is a 
proper sensible because it is perceptible in itself, that is, it affects the senses whereas the 
“son of Diares” does not.  Moreover, Aristotle says that the very structure of each sense is 
adapted to the nature of its perceptible object.121  Here again, Aristotle attends to the 
specific characteristics of the body that the sensitive part of the soul requires in order to 
                                                 
117
 De Anima 418a12-13:  “Et est dicere proprius quem non potest alter senus sentire, et illud quod 
impossibile est ut ei contingat error. . .” 
118
 De Anima 418a13-14:  “. . . visus apud colorem, et auditus apud vocem, et gustus apud saporem.” 
119
 De Anima 418a18-20:  “Communia autem sunt motus et quies et numerus et figura et quantitas.  Ista 
enim non sunt propria alicui, sed communia eis omnia; motus enim sentitur tactu et visu.”   
120
 De Anima 418a20-23:  “Accidentaliter autem dicitur in re quod est sensibilis, quasi sit album Socrates; 
iste enim non sentitur nisi accidentaliter; accidit enim albo quod fuit iste.  Et ideo non patitur a sensibili 
secundum quod est sic.” 
121
 De Anima 418a23-25:  “Ea autem que sunt sensibilia per se et propria sunt sensibilia in rei veritate; et 
sunt ea que sentire est nata substantia cuiusque sensuum.” 
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sense.  Moreover, what is sensed is that which in its nature is able to be sensed.  What 
senses is that which in its nature is able to sense. 
In an important passage in De Anima 2.5, Aristotle claims that “Everything that is 
acted upon or moved is acted upon by an agent which is actually at work.”122 What is 
acted upon is in a state of potentiality in relation to the actuality of the agent.  The 
different senses of potentiality and actuality need to be distinguished, and here Aristotle  
uses the example of being a knower.  Someone can be a knower in the sense that she is in 
the class of beings that are able to know, in the sense that she actually possesses a certain 
kind of knowledge, and in the sense that she actually is exercising that knowledge such 
that it is in this third sense that she is most actually a knower.123 When she is in the first 
sense of being a knower, she is in a state of essential potency where she requires a change 
of quality, that is, acquiring knowledge by way of repeated instruction.124 In the second 
sense of being a knower, when she actually possesses a certain knowledge, she is in a 
state of accidental potency.  When she actually exercises the knowledge that she has she 
is not fully actualizing herself as a knower.  To understand the transition between having 
knowledge and exercising it requires a more careful consideration of the being “acted 
upon.”  
                                                 
122
 De Anima 417a17-18:  “Et omne quod patitur et movetur non patitur et movetur nisi ab aliquo agente in 
actu.”   
123
 De Anima 417a23-417b1:  “Dicamus igitu quod intendiums, cum dicimus quo aliquid, v.g. homo, quod 
est sciens, quod homo est de habentibus scientiam.  Et quandoque dicimus hoc sicut dicimus de eo qui iam 
acquisivit scientiam Gramatice quod est sciens.  Sed potentia in utroque istorum non est eodem modo, sed 
potentia primi est quia suum genus est tale, secundi autem est quia cum voluerit, potest inspicere, dum 
aliquid extrinsecum non impediat ipsum.  Qui autem considerat est in perfectione, et est in rei veritate 
sciens hoc.  Illi igitur duo primi sunt scientes in potentia, sed alter eorum cum alterabitur per doctrinam et 
mutabitur multotiens ex habitu ad dispositionem contrariam, alius autem quando mutabitur ex habere 
sensum aut scientam Gramatice (sed non agit) quousque agat; modus igitur eius est alius.” 
124
 I here use the terminology of the medieval thinker who understands the two senses of potentiality here 
as essential and accidental.   
       
 
 33
  
  
Aristotle distinguishes two meanings of being “acted upon:”  first, “to be acted 
upon” means “the extinction of one of two contraries by the other” and second, “the 
maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is 
acted upon, as actual to potential.”125 Aristotle specifically discusses in this passage the 
transition from merely possessing knowledge to being an actual knower and contends that 
such a transition either ought not to be thought of as an alteration at all or else a different 
kind of alteration.126  The process by which one who has the power to know and who then 
learns or acquires knowledge by way of the one who actually knows ought only to be 
understood as a process of acting upon in the sense that a change to a thing’s disposition 
and nature has occurred.127 To be a knower fully requires that someone first acquires 
knowledge and then exercises it.  By acquiring knowledge something about the knower’s 
disposition has fundamentally changed so that she is now in a different state of 
potentiality such that she now has the capacity to exercise that knowledge.  Aristotle says 
that the process of sensation is comparable to intellection.  Aristotle says that, at birth, a 
living thing, in terms of sensation, is already in the same state of potentiality as the state 
of possessing knowledge, and thus, actual sensation corresponds to the exercising of 
knowledge.128   The sense is already disposed to sensing such that it only requires that 
there be an external sensible object present to it for it to actually sense.  The point here is 
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 De Anima 417b2-5:  “Et passio etiam non est simpliciter, sed quedam est aliqua corruptio a contrario, et 
quedam magis videtur esse evasio eius quod est in potentia ab eo quod est in actu et simile.” 
126
 De Anima 417b5-7:  “Ista igitur est dispositio eius quod est in potentia apud perfectionem; non enim 
considerat nisi habens scientiam.  Et hoc aut non est alteratio, quoniam additio in ipso erit ad perfectionem, 
aut est aliud genus alterationis.” 
127
 De Anima 417b10-16:  “Quod autem revertitur ad perfectionem ab eo quod in potentia existit in capitulo 
intelligendi non est rectum ut vocetur disciplina sed opertet ponere ei aliud nomen.  Qui autem addiscit 
postquam fuit in potentia, et accepit scientam ab eo qui est in perfectione Doctor, oportetaut ut non dicatur 
omnino pati, aut ut dicatur quod alteratio est duplex, transmutatio sciliect ad dispositiones non esse, et 
transmutatio ad habitum et naturam.”    
128
 De Anima 417b17-19:  “Et prima transmutatio sentientis est a generante, ita quod, cum fuerit generatum, 
statim est sentire etiam, sicut scientia est.  Et quod est etiam in actu est simile considerationi.  Sed tamen 
differunt, quod agentia in hoc sunt extrinseca, ut visum et auditum, et similiter alia sensibilia.” 
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that the change involved in sensation is unlike ordinary change.  It is a change in which 
that which that which has the capability of sensing actually now senses. 
In the process of being acted upon, the sense and the sensed object lose their 
dissimilarity such that the sense which is acted upon becomes like in quality to the object 
that acted upon it.129  The sense organ is that part of the body “which is potentially such 
as its object is actually.”130  The sense organ has a structure that is adapted to its proper 
object. Its proper object is by nature perceptible; the sense organ by nature is that which 
is able to perceive.  What makes an sensible object what it actually is, i.e., actually 
sensible, is its form, not its matter.  Somehow the sense is potentially what it senses, not 
the whole of the material object but just what makes the external sensed object sensible, 
and this is the sensible form.  But the sense does not become exactly what the object is, 
rather it becomes only a likeness or receives a likeness. How does the sense receive the 
form of its object? 
In order to answer this question we need to consider the elements that are 
involved in the process of sensation as well as Aristotle’s characterization of the way the 
form is received by the sense organ.  I will discuss the former first.  Aristotle discusses 
each sense in detail, for my purposes here, I will discuss sight only.  The object of sight is 
the visible, and this is color.131  Every color, Aristotle explains has the power to move the 
transparent where the transparent is that which is visible, though not in itself, its visibility 
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 De Anima 418a5-6: “Et sentiens in potentia est sicut sensatum in perfectione, secundum quod diximus; 
patitur enim dum non est simile, et cum patitur, assimilatur.” 
130
 De Anima 423b31 – 424a1:  “Illud autem quod est sentiens et tangens, et in quo est primus sensus qui 
dicitur tactus, est membrum quod est in potentia talis dispositionis.  Sentire enim est aliquod pati quoquo 
modo.” 
131
 De Anima 418a 26:  “Illud igitur cui attribuitur visus est visibile.  Et visibile est color. . .” 
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comes from the color of something else.132  Color sets in movement the transparent air 
which is the medium between the visible external object and the eye.  A medium is 
necessary because if the object of color is placed on the eye, the eye will not see.133  
Somehow the color (and in the case of hearing, sound) acts upon the transparent medium 
which then acts upon the eye.  All sensation involves the external object, the medium that 
is acted upon by the external object and which then acts upon the sense organ, and the 
sense organ itself.134  When a proper sensible acts upon the sense its effect is to bring 
about a perception of it.  For example, when an odor or smell acts upon the sense of 
smell, Aristotle says that its effect is to make something smell it.135  While the air is 
certainly affected by the smell, that is, moved by the smell to act up the organ of smell, 
the air itself does not smell the odor because it is not capable of doing so, only the sense 
organ of smell is capable of doing so.136  Only that which is capable of smelling the odor 
                                                 
132
 De Anima 418b1-6:  “Et omnis color est movens diaffonum in actu; et hoc est natura eius. . .Dicamus 
igitur quod diaffonum est illud quod est visibile, sed non visibile per se neque simpliciter, sed propter 
colorem extranei.”   
133
 De Anima 419a12-20:  “Hoc enimm etiam est illud quod fuit in colore quid est, scilicet quod st illud 
quod movet diaffonum i actu; et perfectio diaffoni est lux.  Et signum eius manifestum est, quoniam, si 
posueris aliquod habens colorem super ipsum visum, non videbitur.  Sed color movet diaffonum sicut, aer 
cum continuatur, movetur sensus ab eo. . .Visus enim non fit nisi quando sensus patitur aliqua passione; sed 
impossibile est ut visus patiatur a colore; remanet igitur ut patiatur a medio, unde necesse est ut aliquid sit 
in medio.”   
134
 See Aristotle’s discussion in De Anima 419a25-424a15 in which he gives a detailed outline of the other 
senses and claims that in each case a medium is required.  Sometimes the medium is distinct from the sense 
organ, in other cases the medium is united to the sense organ.  The point that I want to make here is that the 
requirement of the medium in the process of sensation complicates how we are to understand sensation as 
the reception of the sensible form and the nature of this form.  Does the sense organ receive the form in a 
way different from the medium or is it the same?  Does the form have a like existence in the medium as it 
does in the sense organ?  What is the ontological status of the sensible form either in the medium or in the 
sense organ?  These are some of the questions that arise in the way that the medieval thinker comes to 
understand the process of Aristotelian sensation as a “multiplication of species” where species refers to the 
sensible form.  These questions are ones that I will address in Chapter 4.  For a discussion on the 
multiplication of species theory see, for example, Tachau 1988, especially Chapters 1-3. 
135
 De Anima 424b5-8:  “Si igitur olfactum est odor, contingit ut omnis res que facit olfacere facit per 
odorem.  Unde necesse est quod nichil ex eis que non possunt olfacree patiatur ab odore; et iste est sermo 
de aliis; neque etiam aliquid exi eis que possunt, nisi secundum quod quodlibet eorem est sentiens.”  
136
 De Anima 424b15-18:  “Dicamus igitur quod non omne corpus est innaturm pati a sono et ab odoore, et 
quod patitur non est determinatum neque permanens, v. g. aer; est enim ventus, et propter hoc patitur.  Que 
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can be acted upon in such a way that sensation occurs, and in order for sensation to occur, 
an ensouled and properly structured sense organ is required.  I am now able to address 
how Aristotle characterizes the reception of form by the sense organ. 
Aristotle explains that the sense and the sense organ are in fact the same, but their 
essence is not.137  While what carries out the act of perception is the bodily organ or that 
which has “spatial magnitude,” the actual acts of perception are themselves distinct from 
the bodily organ: “what they are is a certain form or power in a magnitude.”138  In a well-
known but controversial passage in De Anima II, 12, Aristotle explains the activity of 
sense perception:  
Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the 
power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the 
matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a 
signet-ring without the iron or gold, what produces the impression is a 
signet of bronze or gold, but not qua bronze or gold;139 
 
Aristotle compares the act of sensation, the reception of the sensible form without the 
matter, to the way in which “a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without 
the iron or gold.”  The impression is made by the gold ring not qua gold but as it is a solid 
object in the shape or form of a signet ring.  The wax receives the form of the ring not the 
matter of the ring.  But the reception of form without the matter of the agent, Joseph 
Owens explains, is common to all change for Aristotle and is not peculiar to the kind of 
                                                                                                                                                 
est igitur differentia inter olfacere et pati?  Dicamus igitur quod olfacere est sentire; cum autem aer patitur, 
velociter fit sensatus.”  
137
 De Anima 424a 24-25:  “Et in quo est ista potentia est primum sentiens.  Sunt igitur idem, in esse autem 
diversa.” 
138
 De Anima 424a 27-28: “Illud enim quod sentit est aliqua magnitudo, et non secundum quod sentit; 
neque sensus est magnitudo, sed intentio et virtus illius.” 
139
 De Anima 424a 18-22:  Et dicendum est universaliter de omni sensu quod sensus est recipiens formas 
sensibilium sine materia, v.g. quod cera recipit formam anuli sine ferro aut auro, et recipit signum quod est 
ex cupro aut ex auro, sed non secundum quod est cuprum aut aurum.”   
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change that happens in sensation.140  What then, is the kind of change that Aristotle wants 
to indicate in his description of sensation as the reception of the sensible form “without 
the matter?” Does it involve a bodily change, a psychic change, or both?  How is this 
phrase, “without the matter,” to be understood? These are critical questions not only in 
terms of understanding the process of sensation but also in terms of understanding the 
likeness of the sensible object that now exists in the soul at the level of the body.  
In De Anima II, 12, 424a18-19, Aristotle, as quoted above, defines sensation as 
the reception of the sensible form without the matter.  At 424b3 he contrasts this 
reception by the sense with the example of the plant being warmed or cooled as a process 
of receiving the forms of sensible objects “with their matter.” Aristotle claims that plants 
are unable to perceive because they do not have a mean.  Without the mean, a plant has 
no principle in it for taking in the sensible form without the matter; plants are affected by 
sensible forms with their matter.  Though it is true that the hand can be warmed in the 
way that the plant can, there is a simultaneous awareness of this warmth by the sense, an 
awareness that is not present in the plant.  Aristotle at De Anima III, 2, 425b11-15 claims 
that through the power of sense we are both aware of the sense object and aware that we 
are sensing.  There is a vast amount of literature on De Anima 2.12 concerning just what 
Aristotle means by receiving the form without matter.  I will discuss first a traditional 
understanding of this passage and then briefly discuss some of the current debate. 
                                                 
140
 Joseph Owens,  “Aristotle—Cognition a Way of Being,” in Aristotle:  The Collected Papers of Joseph 
Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 1981), 74-80, 77-78.  See also 
Joseph Owens,  “Aristotelian Soul as Cognitive of Sensibles, Intelligibles, and Self,” (Albany:  State 
University of New York Press, 1981), 81-98. Owens makes the same observation, namely, that, “In every 
type of efficient causality observable in the universe does not the matter of the agent remain in the agent?  
It is not received by the patient,” 84. 
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Owens contends that in defining sensation as the reception of the sensible form 
without the matter, as opposed to the plant that receives the form with the matter, 
Aristotle is distinguishing between the cognitional and non-cognitional reception of 
form.141  Whereas the plant’s reception of form is merely physical, i.e., the plant is not 
aware of the received warmth, the sense is cognitional, that is, aware.142  The point is not 
to say that matter is not involved in sensation, for Owens contends that, for Aristotle, 
matter is involved “in every cognitive act by a man, as well as by every sensible agent 
that imparts the form.”143  The point is rather to understand the precise meaning of matter 
in this phrase, “without the matter.”   
Owens argues that it is not meant in a “jejunely physical sense,” that is, ‘matter’ 
here seems to mean the highly specific nature of the ring, gold, as opposed to its generic 
nature, solid body.144 Owens argues, the “generic nature of a solid body always 
accompanies the notion of a device,” since for Aristotle, an accident is inconceivable 
apart from the substance in which it inheres.145 The device is the signet, and as device it 
is an accident of a solid body.  So the distinction between matter and form in this 
particular instance, Owens argues, is a distinction between a body specifically 
determined, gold, and the notion of body in general as determined by a specific accident 
like a device.  The reception of the form is indifferent to the gold.  Thus, according to 
Owens, “the agent impresses the form on the patient as the form of a solid body,” not as 
                                                 
141
 Owens 1981, 82. 
142
 Owens 1981, 82. 
143
 Owens 1981, 83. 
144
 Owens 1981, 84. 
145
 Owens 1981, 84; see also Categories 1a24-25. How the accident is understood and especially in terms 
of inherence is an issue that becomes important for Scotus and will have some impact on his cognitive 
theory and especially on the nature of the intelligible species which will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. 
       
 
 39
  
  
the form of gold.146 If the phrase “without the matter” is meant to bear the weight of the 
distinction between the cognitional reception of form and the non-cognitional reception 
of form, how is this meaning of matter relevant? 
Owens contends that Aristotle here means the matter of the agent rather than the 
matter of the recipient.  But even so, matter here can take on a highly specific meaning as 
shown in his above argument.  In this way it is relevant to cognitional receptivity because 
it raises the issue of what the sense is sensing, and appears to be an explanation of the 
fact that each sense is aware of proper and common sensibles.147   It is here, though, that 
Owens looks to the Greek commentary tradition for its interpretation on this passage.148  
Owens contends that this tradition understands the reception of the sensible form without 
matter to mean a solely cognitive reception, that is, form is received by form.  While the 
sense organ is material, it does not receive the sensible form according to its materiality, 
but insofar as it is in act, that is, as it is a sense power at the level of form.149 It cannot be 
the case that the sensible form is received into matter because then a new composite thing 
would be formed.  Rather, the form is received by form thus giving support to Aristotle’s 
claim that the sense and the sensed are one in actuality just like the knower and the 
known are identified.150 Owens appeals to Metaphysics, 1041b7-28 to make his case.  
The form is what causes a thing to be and to be what it is.  The sensible form received 
                                                 
146
 Owens 1981, 85. 
147
 Owens 1981, 85.  The proper object of each sense is that object that cannot be perceived by any other 
sense and when each sense perceives its on proper object there is no error.  The proper or special objects of 
each sense are, for example,  color-sight, sound-hearing, flavor-taste.  The common sensible objects are 
those objects that are common to all of the sensese and include  movement, rest, number, figure, and 
magnitude.  See De Anima 418a7-19 for Aristotle’s discussion. 
148
 Owens 1981,  86-95. See also Richard Sorabji,  “From Aristotle to Brentano:  The Development of the 
Concept of Intentionality,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, supplementary volume, 1991:  
Aristotle and the Later Tradition, ed. H. Blumenthal and H. Robinson (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1991): 
227-59. 
149
 Owens 1981, 92. I will take the point up again in chapter 4 when I am discussing Scotus’ own account. 
150
 Owens 1981, 92. 
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without matter makes the sense be the sensed immaterially.151  Owens thus concludes this 
lengthy argument based on the highly refined understanding of matter that he offers, as 
well as the commentary tradition, to contend that Aristotle’s claim that the sensible form 
is received without matter is meant as an explanation of the sensible objects themselves 
and not merely proper or common sensibles.  Indeed, Owens argues that, “it is meant as 
an explanation of the nature of cognition itself insofar as cognition and immateriality 
coincide,” for “to be a thing immaterially is to be aware of it.”152 
This argument of Owens goes hand in hand with an argument he gives in another 
article in which he emphasizes that the form received without matter should be 
understood as a tool, an instrument in a causal chain.153  He appeals to De Anima III, 8 
where Aristotle draws an analogy between the soul and the hand: “the hand is a tool of 
tools, so thought is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things.”154 Owens 
here contends that the underlying framework is one of “efficient causality through the use 
of instruments;” by means of a causal chain the external sense object acts on the 
percipient.155  Owens concludes, “The mind is a form that makes use of the received 
forms as instruments for cognition, and correspondingly the sense uses the forms of 
sensible things.”156  The form is received without the matter because matter as 
indeterminate is unknowable and therefore cannot be instrumental in cognition since it is 
form that provides the perceptual and knowable content.157 
                                                 
151
 Owens 1981, 94. 
152
 Owens 1981, 95. 
153
 Owens 1981, 78-79. 
154
 De Anima 432a1-2:  “Et ideo anima est quasi manus; manus enim est intrumentum instrumentis, et 
intellectus forma formis, et sensus forma sensatis.” 
155
 Owens 1981, 78. 
156
 Owens 1981, 78. 
157
 Owens 1981, 79. 
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Both of Owens’ arguments serve to draw attention to two important principles 
that underlie Aristotle’s theory of cognition: (1) The identity of the knower and the 
known, and (2) In sensing the object we are aware that we are sensing, in knowing the 
object we are aware that we are knowing.158  Based on these principles, the sensed or 
cognized object is primary in Aristotle’s cognitive theory for it is only in cognizing the 
object that the mind can think itself.159   
One of the debates in the current literature centers on the question whether the 
reception of the form without the matter requires a bodily change or is simply a 
psychological or “spiritual” change, that is, a change to the soul that indicates perceptual 
awareness.160 In his text, Sense and Perception, D. W. Hamlyn explains the reception of 
form without matter as the sense organ receiving “a quality of the object without the 
material in which the quality inheres.”161  Though, according to Hamlyn, the sense organ 
receives a quality, for example, color, he rejects that the eye becomes colored when we 
see color.162  Seeing something colored must mean more than simply being stimulated by 
a colored object.  Somehow the “sense-organ and its object acquire the same quality” in 
perception.163  Hamlyn’s account emphasizes that the affection of the sense organ is a 
necessary condition of perception, suggesting that perhaps there is a bodily change but 
remains unclear on this point.164   
                                                 
158
 Owens 1981, 80. 
159
 Owens 1981, 80; De Anima 429b6-9:  “Et cum quodlibet eorum fuerit sic, scilicet sicut dicitur scientia 
in actu (et hoc continget quando poterit intelligere per se), tunc etiam erit in potentia quoquo modo, sed non 
eodem modo quo ante erat, antequam scivit aut invenit.  Et ipse tunc potest intelligere per se.” 
160
 For my purposes here, I will only consider only a few of the positions taken.  The ones that I have 
chosen, those of Richard Sorabji and Myles Burnyeat, are both well known in the literature and represent 
more or less extreme readings of Aristotle. 
161
 Hamlyn 1961. 
162
 Hamlyn 1961, 21. 
163
 Hamlyn 1961, 22. 
164
 Hamlyn 1961, 23. 
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Richard Sorabji offers a literalist interpretation of De Anima 2.12.165  Sorabji uses 
Descartes as a point of contrast with Aristotle, strongly advising against a Cartesian 
interpretation of Aristotle since for Aristotle there are no purely mental acts; every 
affection of the soul for Aristotle is a physiological process.166  Sorabji reads Aristotle’s 
conception of the soul as biological, that is, the soul is coextensive with life such that 
perception “manifests life” not consciousness.167  This means, according to Sorabji, that 
perception is not something mental in the Cartesian sense, but is a physiological change 
where the organ is literally colored in the perceptual process.168  Sorabji argues that sense 
perception involves a change in the body where, for example, the eye jelly literally 
becomes red.  What is received is not little bits of matter, but color patches or perceptible 
forms.169  In his article in which Sorabji replies to claims made by Burnyeat, he explains 
the eye jelly is itself transparent, and this is what enables it to receive or to take on color 
patches.170  Sorabji draws a comparison from the sea’s taking on color to explain how the 
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 Richard Sorabji,  “Body and Soul in Aristotle,” Philosophy 49(1974):  63-89.  See also, Richard Sorabji, 
“Intentionality and Physiological Processes:  Aristotle’s Theory of Sense-Perception,” in Essays on 
Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1992), 195-226 
166
 Sorabji 1974, 68-70.   
167
 Sorabji, 1974, 68.  Here Sorabji further distinguishes Aristotle from Descartes in terms of the role of 
self-awareness in the cognitive process.  Whereas, for Descartes, self-awareness is central to his view of the 
soul and in cognition, this is not the case for Aristotle.  Sorabji says that the closest that Aristotle comes to 
giving self-awareness a role in cognition is in a passage in the Physics where Aristotle says that a change in 
quality in the sense-organs of a living thing differs from a change in quality in a lifeless thing because it 
does not go unnoticed. (Physics 244b15-245a2)  Sorabji argues that Aristotle is inconsistent in his claims 
about self-awareness, does not make self-awareness a distinguishing mark of mental acts, and has an odd 
way of explaining self-awareness as an awareness of the bodily organ.  While this issue of the role of self-
wareness in the cognitive process is not a concern in my discussion of Aristotle’s account of sensation in 
this chapter, it is worth mentioning Sorabji’s remarks here because I will argue in later Chapters that in 
Scotus’ account of cognition, self-awareness does play a greater role than found in Aristotle. 
168
 Sorabji 1974, 72.  Sorabji cites a fair number of passages in De Anima to support his claim that Aristotle 
believes that when seeing red, the eye-jelly literally becomes red, such that this would be apparent by an 
appropriate observer.   
169
 Sorabji 1992, 209.   
170
 Richard Sorabji, “Aristotle on Sensory Processes and Intentionality. A Reply to Myles Burnyeat,” in 
Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, ed. Dominik Perler (Boston:  Brill, 2001), 49-61.  See p. 
53.  
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eye jelly literally becomes colored.171 The mechanism by which the sea takes on color is 
different from that of the eye, as the case of the sea depends upon a distance of 
viewing.172  The way in which the color patch is received in the eye is comparable to the 
sea’s receptivity in that it “lacks the material basis of a body’s own color, but it looks the 
way a body’s own color looks, as opposed to being, for example, a mere encodement.”173  
In other words, the color patch exists in the eye without the same material basis that the 
body’s own color has in the body, yet it is not simply an encodement for, as Sorabji 
further explains, the color patch exists in the eye in such a way that it would be able to 
stimulate the medium in such a way that the ophthamologist looking at the eye would see 
the color patch there.174  Thus, Sorabji’s claim that the eye literally becomes colored 
means that a patch of color comes to exist in the eye, and this is a physiological change.  
Sorabji not only argues that sensation is a physiological process  that involves a bodily 
change, but also contends that Aristotle’s De Anima fits well his other texts which reveal 
a whole program in which Aristotle gives physiological processes as the material causes 
of mental events.175   
Against such a view is the “spiritualist” reading offered by Myles Burnyeat.176  
Burnyeat sees himself following a long line of interpreters, John Philoponous, Thomas 
Aquinas, and Franz Brentano, all who deny the literalist reading and argue that receiving 
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 Sorabji 2001, 53.   
172
 Sorabji 2001, 53. 
173
 Sorabji 2001, 53. 
174
 Sorabji 2001, 53.  In Chapter 4, I discuss an example that Scotus often uses when he explains the 
sensible species, namely, when light passes through a piece of red glass such that a patch of red light 
appears on the wall.  Though there is a red patch of light on the wall, still the wall is itself not colored red. 
On another point, Sorabji claims in several of his articles that it was the commentary tradition that moved 
away from a literal reading of the reception of a color patch, such as the one that he offers.  Aristotle’s 
commentators slowly came to understand color patches as intentional objects. (60)  I discuss the intentional 
object in Chapter 4.    
175
 Sorabji 2001, 59. 
176
 Burnyeat 1992, 
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the form without the matter is “just one’s becoming aware.”177  According to Burnyeat, 
perception is simply awareness and does not require any bodily change.  Burnyeat argues 
while there are “no physiological sufficient conditions for perception to occur,” there are 
only necessary conditions that are states of receptivity to sensible forms.178  Burnyeat 
ultimately does not see Aristotle’s program as including or requiring an explanation of 
perception beyond the claim that there just is some physical matter, for example, the 
matter of the sense organ, that is “pregnant with consciousness,” that is, simply and 
fundamentally both alive and endowed with the capacity to perceive.179  Unlike Sorabji, 
Burnyeat contends that Aristotle does not offer a “bottom up” approach in his account of 
sensation, that is, Aristotle does not consider that there is any physiological event that 
underlies perception.180 All that the reception of form without matter means is perceptual 
awareness. 
These two accounts, on the one hand, Sorabji’s claim that sensation involves a 
bodily change and should be understood as a physiological process, and on the other 
hand, Burnyeat’s “spiritualist” reading that sensation is simply perceptual awareness that 
requires no bodily change, though it does require certain necessary conditions for 
receiving the sensible form, help to frame the issues that complicate an understanding of 
Aristotle’s own account of sensation.  These are not the only thinkers who weigh in on 
these issues, but my purpose in discussing Sorabji’s and Burnyeat’s accounts is to bring 
out the critical issues, not only in the current literature, but also those confronting the 
medieval thinker.  In my discussion in Chapter 4 of Aquinas’ and Scotus’ accounts of 
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 Burnyeat 1992, 18.  I will discuss Aquinas’ interpretation of Aristotle in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.   
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 Burnyeat 1992, 23. 
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 Burnyeat 1992, 19. 
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 Burnyeat 1992, 22-24. 
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sensation, these same issues will be a focus as well.  I turn now to Aristotle’s 
understanding of imagination. 
Imagination.  After discussing sensation, Aristotle turns briefly to the imagination 
(phantasia) before proceeding to intellection.  In De Anima III, 3 Aristotle defines the 
imagination as “that in virtue of which an image arises for us.”181 He explains that while 
imagination is different, in various ways, from both perceiving and discursive thought, it 
is also the case that where there is no sensation there is no imagination, and no judgment 
exists without imagination.182  So he concludes his examination of imagination by 
claiming that it must be “a movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of 
sense.”183 Imagination takes its name from light for light is what makes sight possible.184  
The imagination for Aristotle is bodily, its images (phantasms) are in the internal sense 
organs and in this way resemble sensations.185 
The images (phantasms) of the imagination play a critical role in intellective 
cognition. In De Anima III, 7 Aristotle explains how these images serve the intellective 
soul “as if they were contents of perception.”186 Dorothea Frede argues that the 
imagination, particular, the imagination’s image (phantasm) establishes the connection 
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 De Anima 428a1:  “Dicamus igitur quod, si ymaginatio est que fit que dicitur ymaginari non secundum 
similitudinem,” For a discussion on the role of the phantasia in cognition see Dorothea Frede, “The 
Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and 
Amelie Rorty (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1992), 279-295 and Malcolm Schofield, “Aristotle on the 
Imagination,” in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha Nussbaum and Amelie Rorty (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1992), 249-278; G. Watson, “Phantasia in Aristotle, De Anima 3.3.” Classical Quarterly 
32(1982): 100-13; Kevin White, ”The Meaning of Phantasia in Aristotle's De Anima, III, 3-8,” Dialogue 
24(1985): 483-505.  
182
 De Anima 427b14-15:  “Ymaginatio autem est aliud a sensu et aliud a distinctione.  Et hoc non fit sine 
sensu, et sine hoc non fit consilium.” 
183
 De Anima 429a2:  “. . . ymaginatio igitur est motus a sensu qui est in actu.” 
184
 De Anima 429a3-4:  “Et quia visus proprie est sensus, derivatum fuit ei nomen a luce; impossibile est 
enim videre sine luce.”   For a discussion on the etymology of phantasia see Schofield 1992 and Frede 
1992.   
185
 De Anima 429a5-6: “Et quia sensationes figuntur in eo, et ipse est eodem modo, 
186
 De Anima 431a15:  “Et in anima sensibili inveniuntur ymagines secundum modos sensuum.” 
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between the intellect and the sense object.187   Aristotle contends that the intellective soul 
never thinks without an image (phantasm).188 And what it thinks is the forms in the 
images.189  As Frede explains, since both practical and theoretical reasoning have need of 
images, and sense perception cannot provide the necessary images for a variety of 
reasons, the imagination provides them.190  The imagination produces the image or 
phantasm of sensations such that through the image the intellective soul can think the 
form of the sensible object. The imagination then plays a critical role in cognition.  It is 
the necessary link between the sense and the intellect while preserving the separation 
between them.191  
Intellection.  Aristotle devotes precious little time to his discussion of intellection 
to the consternation of his many and varied commentators.192  The point of my discussion 
here is to briefly discuss what Aristotle does say and point to some of the problems that 
arise.  To facilitate this discussion on intellective cognition I begin by quoting the most 
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 Frede 1992, 288. 
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 De Anima 431a16-17:  “Et ideo nichil intelligit anima sine ymaginatione.” 
189
 De Anima 431b2:  “Intelligit enim formas per primas ymaginationes.” 
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 Frede 1992, 289. 
191
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critical and perhaps difficult to understand passage in which Aristotle explains 
intellection: 
Since in every class of things, as in nature as a whole, we find two 
factors involved, a matter which is potentially all the particulars included 
in the class, a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all 
(the latter standing to the former, as e.g. an art to its material), these 
distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul. 
 And in fact thought, as we have described it, is what it is by virtue 
of becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue 
of making all things:  this is a sort of positive state like light; for in a sense 
light makes potential colours into actual colours. 
 Thought in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since 
it is in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to the 
passive factor, the originating force to the matter). 
 Actual knowledge is identical with its object:  in the individual, 
potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge, but absolutely it 
is not prior even in time.  It does not sometimes think and sometimes not 
think.  When separated it is alone just what it is, and this alone is immortal 
and eternal (we do not remember because, while this is impassible, passive 
thought is perishable); and with this nothing thinks.193 
 
Aristotle begins the passage by reminding his reader of the ground of the being of classes 
of things and of the whole of nature; every single thing is composed of matter and form, 
potentiality and actuality.  Matter is distinguished from form as that which is “potentially 
all the particulars in a class,” whereas form is the cause that “makes them all.”   
What then are these two distinct powers in the intellective soul which Aristotle 
speaks of in De Anima 3.5?  
                                                 
193
 De Anima 430a10-26:  “Et quia, quemadmodum in Natura, est aliquid in unoquoque genere 
quod est materia (et est illud quod est illa omnia in potentia), et aliud quod est causa et agens (et hoc est 
illud proptet quod agit quidlibet, sicut dispositio artificii apud materiam) necesse est ut anima existant hee 
differentie. 
Oportet igitur ut in ea sit intellectus qui est intellectus secundum quod efficitur omne, et intellectus 
qui est intellectus secundum quod facit ipsum intelligere omne, et intellectus secundum quod intelligit 
omne, quasi habitus, qui est lux.  Lux enim quoquo modo etiam facit colores qui sunt in potentia colores in 
actu. Et iste inellectus etiam est abstractus, non mixtus neque passibilis, et est in sua substantia actio.  
Agens enim semper est nobilius patiente, et principium nobilius materia.  Et scientia in actu eadem est cum 
re. Et quod est in potentia prius est tempore in individuo; universaliter autem non est neque in tempore.  
Neque quandoque intelligit et quandoque non intelligit.  Et cum fuerit abstractus, est illud quod est tantum, 
et iste tantum est immortalis semper.  Et non rememoramur, quia iste est non passibilis, et intellectus 
passibilis est corruptibilis, et sine hoc nichil intelligitur.” 
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Aristotle’s route to explaining intellection lies in its kinship to sensation.  
However, while Aristotle uses sensation as a model for intellection, there are some 
critical differences that are worth pointing out here.  First, the activity of sensation 
requires the complex of the body and soul together such that the sensitive part of the soul 
is inseparable from the body and the power of sense operates by way of a bodily organ 
whereas the intellective part of the soul is itself separable, differing as what is eternal 
from what is perishable.194 Second, sensation depends on a movement caused by an 
external object while the intellective soul requires an internal object and is impassable.195  
Third, Aristotle contends that whereas sensation apprehends individuals, intellection 
apprehends universals.196 While these are stark differences, the parallels between 
sensation and intellection are just as sharp.   
Aristotle regards thinking as being a kind of perceiving for he says that in both 
“the soul discriminates and is cognizant of something which is.”197  Just as a the sense 
must be capable of receiving the form of the object that acts upon it, the thinking part of 
the soul must also be capable of receiving the form, and that means that the thinking part 
of the soul must be “potentially identical in character with its object without being the 
object.”198 Thus, like sensation, intellection is grounded in the metaphysics of actuality 
and potentiality.  All change is governed by form such that what is able to become is that 
                                                 
194
 De Anima, 424a24:  “Et in quo est ista potentia est primum sentiens,”De Anima 413b25-26:  “Sed tamen 
videtur quod hoc sit aliud genus anime, et iste solus potest abstrahi, sicut sempiternum abstrahitur a 
corruptibili.” 
195
 De Anima, 416b32-33:  “Dicamus igitur quod sentire accidit secundum motum et passionem,” De 
Anima, 417b16-21:  Et prima transmutatio sentientis est a generante, ita quod, cum fuerit generatum, statim 
est sentire etiam, sicut scientia est.  Et quod est etiam in actu est simile considerationi  Sed tamen differunt, 
quod agentia in hoc sunt extrinseca, ut visum et auditum, et similiter alia sensibilia, see also De Anima 3.5. 
196
 De Anima, 417b22-23:  “Et causa in hoc est, quod sensus in actu comprehendit particularia, scientia 
autem universalia, quasi essent in ipsa anima.” 
197
 De Anima 427a 20-21: “. . .(anima enim in hiis duobus modis iudicat aliquid et cognoscit ipsum) .  . .” 
198
 De Anima, 429a16-17:  “Oportet igitur ut sit non passivum, sed recipit formam, et est in potentia sicut 
illud, non illud.” 
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which is capable of being formed, of receiving a form.  In receiving a form, what existed 
only potentially, now exists actually.  So it is the case with the intellect. 
In De Anima 3.5 Aristotle distinguishes two powers of the intellect, the power that 
becomes all things, the possible intellect, and the power that makes all things, the agent 
intellect.  The activity of the possible intellect is pure receptivity.  The agent intellect’s 
activity is “making all thing,” and Aristotle compares it to light in the sense that light 
makes potential colors into actual colors. 
Throughout De Anima, Aristotle emphasizes that all powers of the soul involve 
the body, the exception being the intellective power.  The intellective power is immaterial 
and inorganic.  Thought, Aristotle says is, separable, impassible, and unmixed since it is 
solely activity.  This means that thought operates at the level of form and is not mixed 
with matter.  Moreover, actual knowledge is the same as its object, and what the intellect 
knows is the form of the object, as Aristotle explains in De Anima 3.4:   
If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul 
is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different 
from but analogous to that.  The thinking part of the soul must therefore 
be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object. Thought 
must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.199 
  
Like sensation, intellection requires an object and therefore must be acted upon or receive 
an object. In sensation the relationship between the sense and the sensible object is not 
problematic because the sense organ and the sensible object are both material.  However, 
given the immateriality of the intellective power, it cannot be acted upon by that which is 
material, and therefore requires an immaterial object.   
                                                 
199
 De Anima, 429a13-18:  “Dicamus igitur quod, si formare per intelectum est sicut sentire, aut patietur 
quoquo modo ab intellecto, aut aliud simile.  Oportet igitur ut sit non passivum, sed recipit formam, et est 
in potentia sicut illud, non illud.  Et erit dispositio eius secundum similitudinem:  sicut sentiens apud 
sensibilia, sic intellectus apud intelligibilia.” 
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Now, Aristotle contends that everything is a possible object of thought. Of those 
things that involve no matter, thought and what is thought are the same, for example 
speculative knowledge and its object.  Those things that involve matter, however, are able 
only potentially to be thought and must be disengaged from matter in order actually to be 
thought.200 
 Though the intellect is immaterial, and thought is as well, still Aristotle contends 
that the “soul never thinks without an image.”201  Since Aristotle understands the mind as 
a tabula rasa202, as nothing, “pure from all admixture,” until there is actually thought, the 
intellect is dependent on images, which serve as the contents of perception.203  These 
images are of course provided by way of sensation and the imagination and therefore are 
understood by Aristotle as containing the object of perception.  However, sensation and 
imagination are themselves bodily processes.  So, while on the one hand, the intellect has 
something to think about by way of the image, on the other hand, how intellect accesses 
the image is problematic since the image being in a material organ cannot act on the 
intellect. Indeed, Aristotle explains that what the intellect thinks is the form in the 
images204, but how this occurs is left unspecified. 
 
 
                                                 
200
 De Anima, 430a2-9:  “Et est etiam intelligibilis, sicut intellecta.  Formare enim per intellectum et 
formatum per intellectum, in eis que sunt extra materiam, idem sunt.  Scientia enim speculativa et scitum 
secundum hunc modum idem sunt.  Et perscrutanda est causa propter quam non semper intelligit.  In eo 
autem quod habet materiam, quodlibet intellectorum est in potentia tantum; istis igitur non erit intellectus 
(intellectus enim ad ista non est nisi potentia istorum abstracta a materia), illi autem, quia est intellectum.” 
201
 De Anima, 431a16-17:  “Et ideo nichil intelligit anima sine ymaginatione.” 
202
 De Anima, 429b29-430a2:  “Dicamus igitur quod passio, secundum quod prius videbatur, est 
universalis, et quod intellectus est in potentia quoquo modo intellecta, in perfectione autem non, quousque 
intelligat.  Et quod accidit in intellectu debet currere tali cursu, scilicet sicut tabula est aptata picture, non 
picta in actu omnino.” 
203
 De Anima, 431a15:  “Et in anima sensibili inveniuntur ymagines secundum modos sensuum.” 
204
 De Anima, 431b2:  “Intelligit enim formas per primas ymaginationes.” 
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Conclusion 
The points to be taken from this discussion are as follows.  First, Aristotle’s 
cognitive process is framed by his metaphysics of potentiality and actuality at both the 
level of sensation and the level of intellection such that in each, the process of cognizing 
the object can be understood as a process of becoming that object in a sense.  The faculty 
of sense is somehow potentially the object and in sensation actually becomes what it was 
only potentially prior to sensation.  The faculty of intellection, likewise, possesses 
potential knowledge that is actualized in the process of intellection such that actual 
knowledge is understood by Aristotle as identical to the object of knowledge; when the 
mind is thinking, it is the objects that it thinks.  Second, in sensation the sense is acted 
upon by an external object; in intellection an internal object must be present to the 
intellect. Third, the sense apprehends the particular, the intellect knows the universal. 
Fourth, in sensation the form of the material object is received by the sense without the 
matter and a likeness or sensible species of the material object in its particularity is 
produced which becomes the phantasm.  The phantasm resides in the internal sense 
organs and as such is material.  Fifth, the intellect never thinks without the phantasm, but 
the intellect itself does not depend on the body or its organs for its own activities.  Sixth, 
as the intellect requires an internal object, Aristotle conceives the intellect as having a 
passive or receptive component, the possible intellect and an active component, the agent 
intellect.  Whereas the possible intellect receives a potentially knowable object, the agent 
intellect shines its light on this object making it actually knowable. The nature of the 
intellective process is complicated and needs to be worked through. Aristotle here is 
careful to distinguish between accidental potency and essential potency.  Prior to there 
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being any object present to the intellect, the intellect is in essential potency to knowledge.  
After there is an object present to the intellect, the intellect is now in accidental potency, 
meaning that there is a potentially knowable object present to the intellect, but not yet 
actually known.   
I do not mean to reduce the whole of Aristotle’s cognitive project to these six 
points, but only to indicate those Aristotelian principles which the medieval thinker in 
embracing the Aristotelian framework had to work through.  These issues as will be 
shown in the following chapters of this dissertation were what accounted for Scotus’ 
cognitive structure but at the same time presented problems that had to be addressed.   
The medievalist’s understanding of cognition (cognitio), as rooted in Aristotle, is 
not limited to intellectual awareness or activity but includes sensory awareness or 
activity.  Intellectual cognition not only begins with the data provided by sensory 
cognition but, in accordance with Aristotle, must always be accompanied by the 
phantasm which is the sensible image produced by the activity of the imagination on the 
sense data.205 Cognition then includes the whole process from the external senses to 
intellectual understanding.  However, Aristotle observed early in De Anima that 
intellectual activity seems to be the activity of a different kind of soul from the sensitive 
soul.  Thus, he questions whether the intellective soul might be independent from the 
body, not only in terms of being able to exist separately from the body, but also in terms 
of whether the intellective activity is an activity that does not depend on the body.206  The 
medieval thinker having different motivations addresses this same question. This 
                                                 
205
 See Kuksewicz 1989, 595; Pasnau 2003, 287;  Richard Dumont, “The Role of the Phantasm in the 
Psychology of Duns Scotus,” The Monist 49(1965): 617; James South, “Scotus and the Knowledge of the 
Singular,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 19(2002): 132-133. 
206
 Kuksewicz 1989, 595.  
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question of the independence of the intellectual soul or intellective activity leads to 
another, namely, how can the activity between the sensitive soul and the intellective soul 
be explained?  As I am especially concerned with Scotus’ understanding of sensation as a 
necessary process by which an object is ultimately made present to the intellect (with the 
help of the agent intellect), how Scotus answers this question needs to be addressed. In 
this chapter I endeavored to emphasize those elements of Aristotle’s thought that I think 
are especially critical and helpful in understanding Scotus’ project.  These elements 
include Aristotle’s understanding that the relationship of the soul to body is highly 
specific as seen in his continued emphasis on describing the characteristics of a body that 
is ensouled and can therefore carry out the activities of the soul, the homonymy principle 
which deepens our understanding of the unity of the ensouled being, and the complexities 
of the claim that sensation involves the reception of the form without matter.  
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Chapter 2  Informing Theological Notions 
The Aristotelian themes discussed in chapter one form the basic structure of 
Scotus’ metaphysics and theory of cognition.  However, his theological concerns and 
beliefs, rooted in his Christian faith, shape his understanding and use of Aristotle’s 
framework.  I contend that rather than rendering Aristotle’s framework inadequate as the 
basis of Scotus’ account of cognition in which he must address the intellect’s natural 
suitability for the beatific vision as the culminating cognitive experience for the Christian 
as well as the intellect’s cognitive activities in this life, Scotus’ theological concerns push 
the limits of the Aristotelian framework without breaking it.  For example, the beatific 
vision is the face to face vision of the divine essence as it is fully present in its own 
existence.  Such an experience requires that the extramental divine essence be present to 
the intellect of the blessed.  In this life, however, the only objects present to the intellect 
are internal objects.  The intellect, in this life, does not enjoy the direct presence of the 
external sense object.  Though the beatific experience lies outside of the Aristotelian 
project, the way that Scotus understands the beatific vision informs the way he 
understands the cognitive activities in this life, including sensation, in such a way that 
problems that arise in understanding Aristotle’s project can be addressed. 
In this chapter, I discuss those theological issues that I see as critically important 
to Scotus in terms of his cognitive project.  These theological issues include the nature of 
the divine essence as the object that ultimately perfects the human intellect, the nature of 
the beatific vision as the moment that defines the most perfect relationship between the 
knower and known, and the doctrine of the incarnation which reveals for Scotus the 
dignity of the material object, a dignity that reflects the unity of the divine essence, and 
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thus makes the material object a worthy cognitive object in itself.  This chapter is divided 
into three parts.  In part 2.1 I discuss the divine essence, in part 2.2 I discuss the beatific 
vision, and in part 2.3, I discuss the incarnation. I conclude this chapter with a brief 
summary that emphasizing the critical issues..   
 
2.1 The Divine Essence 
The divine essence cannot be known by the human intellect pro statu isto, in this 
life, where the human being is a wayfarer.  That this is the case is certainly not unique to 
Scotus, but the question whether this conditional limitation of the wayfarer is to be 
answered theologically, for example, as punishment for sin, or to be answered 
philosophically, for example, by the natural correspondence found between the 
intellective power of the soul and the sensitive power of the soul in the process of 
cognition, is not a question to which Scotus offers a definitive answer.207  Scotus’ 
concern lies in the question of the intrinsic capacities, i.e., the natural powers, of the 
human intellect, which are not defined by the conditional limitations imposed upon it pro 
statu isto but rather by its nature as an intellect. Allan Wolter points out that Scotus 
                                                 
207
 Quodl., 14.44 [12]:  “Et hoc saltem concedere debet Theologus, qui ponit istum statum non esse 
naturalem, nec istam impotentiam intelligendi, respectu ultorum intelligibilium, esse naturalem sed 
paenalem.” Throughout this dissertation, all English translations of the Quodl. passages will be taken from 
Felix Alluntis and Allan Wolter, God Creatures:  The Quodlibetal Questions (Washington D.C.:  The 
Catholic University of America Press, 1975).  I will provide the Latin text, taken from Ioannis Duns Scoti, 
O.F.M, Quaestiones Quodlibetales. de editione L. Wadding.  (St. Bonaventure, NY:  The Franciscan 
Institute, 1950).  The first numbers that I indicate are the section numbers given by Alluntis and Wolter 
1975, the bracketed numbers are from the Wadding text.   I have chosen to cite the Quodlibetal Questions 
in this way because Alluntis and Wolter’s numbers give a more clear and direct citation of particular 
passages.  That Scotus allows for the possibility that the wayfarer state is imposed  upon the human being 
as a penalty of sin is clear.  Scotus, however, does not thereby understand the wayfarer state as something 
to be dismissed or to treat as if there is no natural harmony between the soul and the body.  See Allan 
Wolter, “Duns Scotus on the Natural Desire for the Supernatural,” New Scholasticism 23 (1940): 281-317.  
Wolter discusses Scotus’ response to Augustine where he argues that to permit the intellectual soul, in this 
life, to function in complete independence of the senses, would destroy the harmony and unity of man’s 
psychic life. (293) 
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contends that “an intellectual power rooted in a spiritual nature, be it a pure angelic spirit 
or the soul-form of a body, is incapable of being limited to a certain sphere of objects by 
an intrinsic limitation.”208  Since Scotus contends that whatever one intellect can know, 
any intellect can know, any limitation that constrains the human intellect in this life is 
extrinsic, not intrinsic.209  So Scotus is interested in understanding the natural capacities 
of the intellect as such and makes these capacities the ground of his cognitive theory. 
Scotus does embrace the Aristotelian claim that, in this life, knowledge begins 
with sensation as well as Aristotle’s dictum that the intellect must have recourse to the 
phantasm in order to know.210  It is for this reason that the human intellect in this life is 
unable to cognize the divine essence, for as will be discussed in more detail in the next 
section of this chapter, the divine essence is known by the human intellect only through a 
face to face vision.  Such an encounter demands the immediacy of the object as it is 
present and existing in itself.  In the Aristotelian framework, the intelligible object is 
made present to the intellect by way of the phantasm, an image based on the activity of 
sensation.  The intellect’s object is also abstract, that is, an intelligible form or universal.  
What the beatific vision requires, however, is the unmediated presence of the divine 
                                                 
208
 Wolter 1940, 292.  Wolter observes that this is the reason why Scotus objects to the division of 
cognitive faculties in Aquinas (Summa, I, 85, 1). 
209
 Quodl. 14.43 [12]:  “. . . tamen obiectum adaequatum intellectui nostro ex natura potentiae on est aliquid 
specialius obiecto intellectus Angelici, quia quicquid potest intelligi ab uno, et ab alio.” 
210
 Quodl. 7.30 [11]:  “. . . quia non est sibi possibilis ex naturalibus nisi conceptus, qui potest causari 
virtute intellectus agentis, et phantasmatum:  nihil enim aliud est naturaliter movens intellectum viatoris de 
lege communi. . .” See also, Ord. I, d. 3, pars, 3, q. 1, n. 392:  “Quod additur de Philosopho quod 
<<speculamur ‘quod quid est’ in phantasmatibus>>, etc., - pro omnibus talibus auctoritatibus dico quod 
talis est conexio istarum potentiarum phantasiae et intellectus pro statu isto, quod nihil intelligimus in 
universali nisi cuius singlare phantasiamur, nec est alia conversio ad phantasmata nisi quod intelligens 
unversale imaginatur eius singulare,”  See Robert Pasnau, “Cognition,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press), 285-311, in particular p. 
299; Allan Wolter, The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (St. 
Bonaventure, NY:  The Franciscan Institute, 1946), 59.  
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essence, present and existing in itself.211  The point to be taken here is that the human 
intellect, once free of the limitations of the wayfarer, can in fact know the divine essence, 
if God so wills it, and this means that the capacity to know the divine essence already 
intrinsically exists in the human intellect and is not something that the human intellect 
must acquire later.212   
The claim that the divine essence can be known by the human intellect is 
supported by Scotus’ complex metaphysical system which, while an integration of 
theological and philosophical principles, is made solid through intricate philosophical 
argument.213  Underlying this system are Scotus’ claims (a) that being is the primary 
object of the intellect, (b) that being is univocal to God and creatures, and (c) that the 
ground of being is the ground of knowing. I will discuss each of these briefly in order to 
establish a groundwork for the more specific discussion of the divine essence. 
                                                 
211
 Quodl. 7.22 [8]:  “. . .quia etsi cognitio abstractiva possit esse non existentis, aeque sicut et existentis, 
tamen intuitiva non est nisi existentis, ut existens est.”   See also Quodl. 6.18-19 [7-8]:  “. . . et ad 
intelligere principii postest satis proprie dici abstractivu quia abstrahit obiectum ab existentia et non 
existentia praesentia et absentia.  Alius autem actul intelligendi est quem tame non ita certitudinaliter 
experimur in nobis possibilis tame est talis qui scilicet praecise sit obiecti praesentis ut praesentis et 
existentis ut existentis.”  As I discuss both in this Chapter and in Chapter 4, the beatific vision requires 
intuitive cognition.  I give a detailed discussion of intuitive and abstractive cognition in Chapter 4.  For 
discussions on Scotus’ theory of intuitive cognition see Sebastian Day, Intuitive Cognition:  A Key to the 
Significance of the Later Scholastics (St. Bonaventure, NY:  Franciscan Institute Press, 1947); Stephen 
Dumont, “Theology as a Science and Duns Scotus’s Distinction between Intuitive and Abstractive 
Cognition,” Speculum 64 (1989):  579-99; Pasnau 2003; Tachau 1988, 68-81. 
212
 Quodl. 14.4 [2]:  “Anima humana, etsi in quocunque statu, sive scilicet naturae institutae, sive destitutae, 
sive restitutae, habeat eandem perfectionem naturalem.”  Scotus also explains that unless the intellect had 
the natural ability to know the divine essence, it could not be so elevated.  See Quodl. 14.41 [12]:  “Nec 
valet dicere, quod elevatur per lumen gloriae.  Nullus enim habitus elevans potentiam potest habere 
obiectum, quod transcendat primum obiectum potentiae, quia ille habitus non esset illius potentiae:  sed vel 
esset in se potentia, vel faceret potentiam esse aliam ab ista; sicut haberet aliud obiectum primum.”  See 
Wolter 1940.  Wolter here shows how Scotus understands all knowledge to be natural to the human 
intellect, including the beatific knowledge.  What makes the beatific vision supernatural is the agent that 
causes it is not a natural cause of the intellect. 
213
 See Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-14;  Stephen Dumont 
1989; William E. Mann, “Duns Scotus on Natural and Supernatural Knowledge of God,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. Thomas Williams (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2003), 238-
262. 
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First, (a), Scotus argues that the primary object of the human intellect is being.214  
Two things here need to be understood, namely, the meaning of the notion of primary 
object, and how being qualifies as a primary object.  I will take up the former first.  As 
the primary object of the human intellect, being is that object that is most suited to the 
intellect; being is the intellect’s primum obiectum adaequatum.215  
To be adequate means to be “properly proportioned or commensurate” to the 
power in question, which is, in this instance, the power of intellection.216 An adequate 
object is the primary or proper object of a faculty of the intellect as such.217 Allan Wolter 
explains that the notion of an adequate object, for Scotus, contains at least two distinct 
requirements:  (1) it must be able to motivate the intellect and (2) it must be formally or 
virtually coextensive with whatever the intellect is able to know.218   
In terms of the first requirement, (1), motivation, Wolter explains that the act of 
motivating is an act by which the object is able to elicit from the faculty, here, the 
intellect, “an awareness of itself both as to its formal content and its virtual 
implications.”219 Scotus clearly says that in this life the object that moves the intellect is 
the quiddity of the sensible object.220 But the quiddity of the sensible object is not the 
adequate object of the intellect as such, that is, without the limitations of the wayfarer.221   
                                                 
214
 Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 3 “. . . dico quod primum objectum intellectus nostri est ens. . .” (Duns Scotus, 
Philosophical Writings, trans. Allan Wolter (Indianapolis:  Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 4.  
215
 Quodl. 14.46 [13]:  “. . .quod ens non tantum limitatum, sed ilimitatum sit obiectum naturaliter motivum 
intellectus creati, et ita ens ut est indifferens ad utrunque, erit obiectum adaequatum naturale, siclicet per 
actionem causae naturaliter agentis attingibile.”  See also Pasnau 2003, 294; Wolter 1946, 71-77. 
216
 Wolter 1946, 71. 
217
 Wolter 1946, 59. 
218
 Wolter 1946, 74. 
219
 Wolter 1946, 71.   
220
 Quodl. 14.43 [12]:  “Dico igitur, quod obiectum naturale, hoc ex naturaliter attingibile adaequatum 
intellectui nostro, etsi por statu isto sit quiditas rei materialis,” Oxon. 1. d. 3, q. , n. 24; IX, 148b:  Primum 
objectum adaequatum sibi in movendo pro statu isto sit quidditas rei sensibilis.  See also Wolter 1946, 74. 
221
 Scotus offers several reasons to show that this is the case including the fact that we form concepts that 
are more universal than the sensible quiddity as well as the fact that we have a science of metaphysics 
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The second requirement from above, (2), the adequate object is that which is 
formally or virtually coextensive with whatever the intellect is able to know, means that 
when any object is known fully by the intellect, then everything that can be known about 
the object is actually known.222 The adequate object of the human intellect is that object 
which exhausts the natural power of the intellect, such that the intellect continues 
searching until fully satisfied by the object.223   
Scotus makes a further distinction in regards to the ways in which an object is 
adequate to a faculty.  An object is adequate to a faculty either in terms of the primacy of 
virtuality or the primacy of commonness.224  The example of the primacy of virtuality is 
God’s knowledge of his essence.  The divine essence is the object that motivates the 
divine intellect such that when God knows his essence he knows all that is virtually 
contained in his essence.225 An example of the primacy of commonness would be color as 
the object of sight.  Color is a common concept or ratio that can be predicated of all 
sensible objects capable of motivating sight.226 The object that is adequate then, is that 
object which naturally motivates the intellect and towards which the intellect is inclined, 
and is therefore, coextensive with its power. 
                                                                                                                                                 
which for Scotus is a science of being qua being and the transcendentals, those entities that transcend the 
sensible order.  See Wolter 1946, 74. 
222
 Quodl. 14.2 [1]:  “. . . potentia non impedita, sed suae naturali perfectioni relicta, potest cognoscere 
quodcunque contentum sub suo obiecto, primo, sive adaequato,” Oxon. 1, d. 3, q. 3, n. 5; IX, 98a:  “. . . 
habet primitatem adaequationis. . . propter virtualitem, quia scilicet virtualiter continet omnia in se per se 
intelligibilia. . .” see also Wolter 1946, 72.  In Chapter 4 of this dissertation I will discuss more specifically 
Scotus’ understanding of the distinction between perfect and imperfect intellective knowledge based on his 
discussion in question 14 of the Quodl..  In my discussion I will again return to the notion of the adequate 
object of the intellect and especially that which is able to represent that object in its complete intelligibility 
to the intellect. 
223
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I turn now to the question of being as the adequate object of the intellect.  Scotus 
claims that being is the adequate and primary object of the intellect because in being 
there is both the primacy of commonness and the primacy of virtuality: 
For whatever is of itself intelligible either includes essentially the notion 
of “being” or is contained virtually or essentially in something else which 
does include “being” essentially.227 
 
Scotus further contends that all primary intelligibles, for example, genera, species, 
individuals, the essential parts of genera, the ultimate differences in some of these, as 
well as the Uncreated Being, include being quidditatively.228 With regard to the 
intelligible elements of these primary intelligibles, that is, the qualifying concepts of the 
ultimate differences and proper attributes, being is included virtually.229 Thus, being is 
shown to be the adequate and primary object of the intellect because anything that is 
intelligible either includes being essentially, commonly, or is contained virtually in that 
which does include being essentially. The point to be taken here is that since being is the 
adequate object of the intellect, any object is intelligible insofar as it is. 
 In the case of (b) the claim is that being is univocal to God and creature.  The 
grounds for this claim are found in the discussion of (a) above where Scotus contends 
that being is included quidditatively or commonly in all genera, species, individuals, the 
essential parts of genera, and the Uncreated Being.  Scotus offers two arguments in 
support of this claim that being is predicated commonly of created and uncreated being.  
The first argument rests on the fact that the intellect can be certain about the being of an 
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 Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 3:  “Nam omne per se intelligibile aut includit essentialiter rationem entis, vel continetur 
virtualiter, vel essentialiter in includente essentialiter rationem entis.” Philosophical Writings, trans. Wolter 
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object while at the same time be in doubt about delimiting differences.230 For example, 
Scotus claims that he can be certain that God is a being while remaining uncertain about 
whether he is infinite or finite, created or uncreated.231  Indeed, that we have uncertainty 
regarding such differences presupposes, for Scotus, a prior certainty. 
 The second argument that he offers in support of the claim that being is univocal 
to God and creatures follows from the reasoning that God cannot be naturally known 
unless being is univocal to God and creatures.  In the same way, the human intellect does 
not know substance or its essential parts, form and matter, except by way of being 
commonly predicated of substance and accident: 
We can argue in the same way of substance and accident, for substance 
does not immediately move our intellect to know the substance itself, but 
only the sensible accident does so.  From this it follows that we can have 
no quidditative concept of substance except such as could be abstracted 
from the concept of an accident.  But the only quidditative concept of this 
kind that can be abstracted from that of an accident is the concept of 
being.232  
 
It is precisely because being is univocal or common to substance and accidents that we 
can have a concept of substance at all or even know the essential parts of substance, 
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 Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 3:  “. . . de quocumque enim praedictorum coneptuum quidditativorum contingit 
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later in more detail. 
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namely, form and matter.233 Or to put it differently, from the fact that we have a concept 
of substance, which we cognize indirectly through the sensible accident, we are able to 
reason towards that which commonly underlies subject and accident such that from the 
knowledge of one we can arrive at the knowledge of the other.  Being is precisely that 
which underlies the subject and accident.  It is predicated univocally, commonly, of both.  
In the same way being is predicated univocally of God and creature.  The point to be 
taken here is that Scotus at once founds and makes intelligible his system through his 
understanding of being.  Since being is univocal to the created and uncreated, it is a 
common foundation that comprehends all that Scotus wants to include:  the whole range 
of created beings and the Uncreated being.  In this claim of univocality then Scotus 
makes available all that is, all that partakes of being, to the intellect.234 
Before concluding this discussion on the univocality of being, it is appropriate 
here to discuss briefly how Scotus conceives of metaphysics, his understanding of 
essential order, especially that between the infinite and the finite, and the nonmutual 
relationship between God and creatures.  The reason that it is important to discuss these 
notions here is that while I do think the claims made at the end of the last paragraph in 
regard to the univocality of being are strong and far reaching, I want to indicate the limits 
within which Scotus is working. 
  Following Aristotle, Scotus is in agreement with other Scholastics such as 
Thomas Aquinas, as well as thinkers such as Avicenna, that the subject of metaphysics is 
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being qua being.235  Thus, metaphysics is a science that deals with the nature and 
existence of God, and as Scotus explains, is a transcending science for it is concerned 
with the transcendentals.236  To understand how metaphysics is a science of 
transcendentals and to appreciate the nature of transcendentals themselves, it is helpful 
first to consider Scotus’ concerns about the nature of being prior to its division into the 
ten categories of Aristotle and the concepts that can be formally predicated of God.  As 
already established in the above discussion, Scotus contends that being can be univocally 
predicated of the created and the Uncreated.  However, this is not to be understood as 
suggesting that there is a mutual relationship between God and creatures.237  God always 
transcends every order since God’s being is always of a different order.  So Scotus 
contends that being, before divided into the ten categories of Aristotle, is first divided 
into infinite and finite.238 That there is such a disjunction between the infinite and the 
finite is based on a universal rule whereby given the positing of the less perfect extreme 
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 Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (QMA) Bk. 6, q. 4, 10:  “Tenetur ergo Avicenna.  . . Ergo si 
aliqua scientia supporneret istum conceptum pro subiecto, alia esset prior de ente quae probaret primitatem 
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use is: B. Ioannis Duns Scoti, Quaestiones Super Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, ed. R. Andrews, G. 
Etzkorn, G. Gal, R. Green, F. Kelley, G. Marcil, T. Noone, R. Wood (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.:  The 
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B. Wolter (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.:  Franciscan Institute Publications, St. Bonaventure University, 1998).  
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“Essence and Existence,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman 
Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1982), 390. As 
the subject of metaphysics is being, it treats of the nature of God as well as to prove his existence, see 
Wolter 1946, 162;  According to Richard Cross, the goal of metaphysics is God’s existence, see Cross 
1999, 15. 
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 Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, prol., n. 5:  “Necesse est esse aliquam scientam 
universalem, quae per se consideret ila transcendentia, et hanc scientam vocaus metaphysicam, quae dicitur 
a meta, quod est trans, et physis scientia, quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus.” 
Philosophical Writings, trans. Wolter 1987, 2.   
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 Allan Wolter, “Commentary on the De Primo Principio of Duns Scotus,” in John Duns Scotus, A 
Treatise on God as First Principle, trans. and with commentary by Allan Wolter (Chicago:  Franciscan 
Herald Press, 1966), 165.   
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of some being is posited, it can be concluded that the more perfect extreme is realized in 
some other being.239  Thus, to posit the finite being of the creature is to be able to posit 
the infinite being of God.  This disjunction between the infinite and the finite is an 
example of an essential order.  
An essential order here means that the prior must exist simultaneously with the 
posterior, i.e., the members related by an essential order must coexist.240  Moreover, the  
posterior member is always imperfect.241 Based on the definition of an essential order that 
Scotus gives in the Quodlibetal Questions, Wolter explains that an essential order “stems 
from the very nature or essential constitution of a thing rather than from something 
incidental to it.”242 In the question on the existence of God, Scotus discusses in more 
detail the nature of an essential order.  He explains that an essential or per se cause is a 
cause which naturally produces its effect.243 Peter King explains that a cause is an 
essential or per se cause if “its effect is a per se object of its causal power,” i.e., the per se 
cause produces its effect “by its own nature.”244  
Scotus distinguishes essentially ordered causes from accidentally ordered causes 
in three ways:  1) In essentially ordered causes, the second cause depends upon the first 
in its own causal activity, 2) In essentially ordered causes the higher cause is more 
perfect, 3) All essentially ordered causes are simultaneously required to produce the 
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effect.245 King uses the example of a builder, who in the activity of building is the per se 
cause of the house.  If in building the house, however, the builder causes traffic 
congestion in blocking roads where building houses, this traffic congestion is only 
accidentally caused rather than essentially.246  
The point that I want to emphasize here is a point that Wolter makes, namely, that 
the essential order between disjuncts like infinite or finite, contingent or necessary, prior 
or posterior, substance or accident, to name but a few that Scotus mentions, adds to the 
intelligibility of his system without denigrating either extreme, and this is due to the 
nature of essential order.247 The essential order coheres together Scotus’ metaphysical 
system.  For example, God, as infinite being, is absolutely different from the creature in 
its finite being. God as prior is perfect, creature as posterior is imperfect.  The point is 
that the essential order that exists between the infinite and the finite lessens their extreme 
radicality.  I can now turn to a discussion of the transcendentals. 
Being is the first of the transcendentals. 248  The transcendentals are real concepts 
that can be predicated commonly of God and creatures, prior to the division of the 
categories.249  As a real concept the transcendental refers not to the conceptual order but 
to the metaphysical order of reality.250 In themselves the transcendentals are indifferent to 
the distinction of infinite and finite.  As they apply to God they are infinite, as they apply 
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to creatures they are finite. Scotus does not limit the transcendentals to being, one, true, 
and good, but extends the definition to:  
whatever pertains to being, then, insofar as it remains indifferent to finite 
and infinite, or as proper to Infinite Being, does not belong to it as 
determined to a genus, but prior to any determination, and therefore, as 
transcendent and outside of any genus.251  
 
 In other words, the transcendentals are all notions that can be predicated 
commonly of God and creatures or predicated of God alone, and transcend the 
categories.252 The point that should be taken here is that Scotus endeavors to show and 
account for, how that which is, is fully available to the intellect. 
To sum up the points of these discussions (a) that being is the primary object of 
the intellect and (b) that being is univocal to God and creature, I turn to what Scotus 
claims in his Quodlibetal Questions, “What is ground for being is also ground for 
knowing.”253 Based on the previous discussions this means at least three things for 
Scotus.  First, being is the guarantee of the object’s intelligibility.  Second, whatever is 
knowable in the object can be known by the intellect.  Third, whatever one intellect can 
know, any intellect can know.254  These three points will now guide the discussion on the 
divine essence. 
In Question 1 of the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus directly considers the nature of 
the divine essence.  He attends first to the definition of terms, among them, essence.255  
He first asserts that “in the divine there must needs be some real entity, which is there by 
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the very nature of things and is actually existing.”256 This is so because unless there were 
some being that is “real, first, unique,” and which “requires no prior entity,” none would 
be first nor would there be a posterior.257  It is, then, this real entity that is the essence of 
God.258   
Scotus is guided in his discussion here by Augustine’s arguments in De Trinitate, 
“The name ‘essence’ is derived from ‘to be;’”259 ‘to be’ in Latin is “esse.”  Essence is 
rooted in being and is, therefore, that which concerns the being of an entity in the most 
proper way such that: “God is most truly called “essence” to whom “to be” belongs most 
properly, and truly.”260 Guided still by Augustine, Scotus writes:  
. . . so that perhaps God alone should be called essence.  For he is truly 
unique, because incommunicable, and he revealed this as his name to 
Moses his servant when he said: ‘I am who am.’261 
 
God is what he is in himself absolutely and does not derive his being or essence in 
relation to another.  His essence is the formal reason of his being.  The formal reason of 
his being could not be a relational term such as ‘Father.’ God’s true nature and name 
derives from what he is in himself, and therefore, from his essence which is most 
properly his being.   
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Scotus endorses Damascene’s claim:  “Of all the names given to God, the main 
one is that of ‘He who is.’”262 Scotus’ favorite way of thinking about the essence of God 
in the Quodlibetal Questions, as shown by often he makes reference to it, is the metaphor 
of an infinite sea of being, borrowed from Damascene: “For like some infinite and 
limitless sea of substance, he contains all being in himself.”263  Scotus uses this metaphor 
to explain the nature of God’s essence:  
Therefore, essence is not just that first entity which is somehow distinct 
from the essentials, but is one complete entity which unitively contains all 
the essentials.  The very term “sea” seems to imply this, because of the 
immensity of what the sea contains unitively.264 
 
The image of the sea expresses at once the infinitude and simplicity of the divine essence, 
for Scotus contends that what is infinite cannot itself be made up of parts.265 
Scotus next turns his attention to the nature of pure perfection, a notion that he 
borrows from Anselm.  Scotus claims that the divine essence is “that which includes all 
that is pure perfection.”266 A pure perfection is, according to Anselm, “something it is 
better for anything to have than to have what is not it, i.e., to have anything incompatible 
with it.”267 Scotus’ notion of the supremely perfect being is that being which can have 
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every pure perfection.268  His proof is that anything supremely perfect can lack no pure 
perfection otherwise it would not be supremely perfect.  But no pure perfection is 
incompatible with another pure perfection because if such an incompatibility existed 
between two pure perfections, that would mean that one would be better than the other, 
and vice versa. Such circularity is impossible, Scotus contends, because then “one and the 
same thing would be less perfect than itself.”269  So God as a supremely perfect being is 
replete with every pure perfection.  Infinity is a pure perfection that the divine essence 
enjoys and is of critical importance to Scotus. 
Scotus rejects Aristotle’s claim that there is no actual infinite.  According to 
Aristotle, “The infinite is that whose quantity is such that no matter how much one 
removes from it, there is always more for the taking.”270 Such an understanding of 
infinite precludes perfection because it is only potentially infinite, as Scotus explains, 
“For this reason, no matter how much is removed, what one takes will still be finite and 
will represent only a certain part of the infinite potential whole.”271  In other words, 
Aristotle’s infinite is not actual, never whole, never complete and therefore in lacking 
wholeness, lacks perfection.   
In Quodlibetal Questions 5.6 Scotus changes Aristotle’s notion of the potentially 
infinite in quantity to that of “quantitatively infinite in act,” by which he imagines that 
“all parts that could be taken were taken at once or that they remained in existence 
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simultaneously.”272  Rather than each part being actualized in succession, Scotus argues 
that it can be conceived that all the parts are actualized all at once.  This allows him to 
conceive of the supremely perfect being as the supremely infinite being, “an infinite 
being that cannot be exceeded in entity by any other being” and therefore “will truly have 
the character of something whole and perfect.  It will indeed be whole and complete.”273 
The metaphor of Damascene’s sea, which captures this wholeness in its 
immensity and infinitude, guides Scotus’ conception of the infinitude of the divine 
essence.  What must be made clear here is that Scotus understands ‘infinite’ as an 
intrinsic mode of the divine essence. An intrinsic mode is an essential mode rather than 
an existential mode.274  An intrinsic mode is a qualification of a subject so identified with 
it that is “neither really nor formally distinct from it, yet it is possible to conceive of the 
subject without the mode as a first intention (real concept).”275  Alluntis and Wolter point 
out that Scotus only ever discusses the intrinsic mode in detail in connection with 
magnitude.276  Magnitude, as an intrinsic mode, is “the degree of intensity or measure of 
intrinsic excellence” of a formal perfection like infinity.277  As discussed above, being is 
first divided into infinite and finite, such that infinite is proper to the Uncreated Being, 
whereas finite is proper to created being.   Infinity is not defined overagainst the finite.  
Alluntis and Wolter explain, “Infinity is that mode which transcends every finite mode by 
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a non-finite degree.”278  For Scotus, any hierarchy of being is a finite order, that is, what 
separates the beings in the hierarchy is a finite measure.  This is, again, because for 
Scotus, being is either infinite or finite.  If being is infinite there is here no hierarchy of 
beings because there is only one infinite being.  Where there is a hierarchy there is only 
finite being.  The infinite is what “exceeds the finite in entity beyond any relative 
measure or proportion that can be assigned.”279  For Scotus infinity is neither an attribute 
that accrues externally to the being that is infinite nor is it to be thought in the mode of a 
coextensive property like good or true are to being.  Rather what it expresses is an 
intrinsic, essential mode of that entity, as Scotus explains: 
It is so intrinsic that if we abstract from all its properties or quasi-
properties, we have still not excluded infinity, but it remains integrally 
included in that one single entity itself.  Hence if we consider that entity 
most precisely, namely without any property, it will be true to say it has a 
measure of intrinsic excellence all its own which is not finite, since any 
limitation of degree is repugnant to it.  Therefore it is infinite.  That which 
is infinite, considered precisely, and not under the aspect of some 
attributable property such as wisdom or goodness, can also be aligned 
according to an essential order with something it excels, but its superiority 
will not be measurable in any definite degree for then it would be finite.  
Therefore, the intrinsic mode of anything intensively infinite is infinity 
itself, which intrinsically expresses a being or essence which lacks nothing 
and which exceeds everything finite beyond any determinable degree.280 
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279
 Quodl. 5.9 [4]:  “Ens infinitum est quod excedit quodcunque ens finitum, non secundum aliquam 
determinatam proprotionem, sed ultra omnem determinatum porportionem, vel determinabilem.”  
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virtutis habet sibi intrinsecam, et non magnitudinem finitam quia ipsa repugnat sibi:  ergo infinitam.  Ipsum 
etiam infinitum:  praecisissime acceptum non sub aliqua ratione proprietatis attributalis ut bonitatis, vel 
sapientae potest comparari secundum ordinem essentialiem ad aliqua, quae excedit, et non secundum 
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Allan Wolter explains that for Scotus the infinite or finite disjunction is a transcendental 
disjunction that divides real being.281 Being is either infinite or finite such that the 
infinitude or finitude indicates whether the magnitude of perfection is unlimited or 
limited.282 The being that is infinite is infinite precisely because it is infinite being. As 
infinite being it transcends any finite order.  As an intrinsic mode, Wolter explains, 
infinity is an essential mode that is “bound up with the actually existing perfection.”283  
And it is the case then that “every perfection in God may be said to be formally 
infinite.”284 
The divine essence is supremely perfect and infinite, as such it is the primary and 
adequate object of the divine intellect, which is itself supremely perfect and infinite.  The 
object that is adequate to any intellect must be a really existing object, present to the 
intellect, and moreover, is that which perfects the intellect as the act of the intellect.  Such 
an object is known as the beatific object whether Scotus is considering the divine, 
angelic, or human intellect.  The beatific object is that object that  
as supreme contains in itself the perfection of all objects and has the 
power to perfect the intellect.  Now the beatific object is that which quiets, 
satisfies, and perfects the intellect.285 
  
The divine intellect, however, does not have to seek out its object, the divine 
essence, for its essence is always present to it.  God’s beatitude does not require a 
conceptual relationship between the operation and its object because God’s operation 
“has a true union or identity with the object.”286 Scotus explains further that the adequate 
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object of the divine intellect cannot be “common by way of abstraction from all the 
objects it knows, but rather one that is common to all per se objects by a community of 
virtue.”287 By knowing the divine essence, God knows all that is contained in the divine 
essence.   
The created intellect does not enjoy such a unity of identity with the beatific 
object but rather only the unity of relation.288  It follows then for Scotus that the human  
intellect seeks out and does not rest until it finds that object which perfects it, the divine 
essence that is whole, complete, and infinite: 
For in the most perfect of all objects, which contains in the highest all the 
perfection of every object, this intellective power is to the highest degree 
perfected, satisfied, and quieted, and so beatified.289 
 
To sum up this rather lengthy section, the critical points to be taken are that the primary 
and adequate object of the human intellect is being, being is predicated univocally of the 
created and the Uncreated, being is the ground for knowing, and the divine essence as 
that which has real being, is whole, perfect, and infinite, is that object which perfects the 
human intellect.  The divine essence is the primary and adequate object of the divine 
intellect.  It is the perfect extreme of being.  While being is the primary object of the 
human intellect, it is the perfect and infinite being that perfects it.  The human intellect, in 
its natural capacity, is capable of knowing what is, and what perfectly is.  
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2.2  The Beatific Vision 
 Beatitude is both that which motivates and guides Scotus’ epistemological 
endeavors for it is the terminus ad quem of the human intellect, and as such informs the 
whole of Scotus’ epistemological project.290  Beatitude is the most perfect community of 
the knower and the known that the human intellect can attain.  In God, this is a perfect 
unity because there is an identity of the divine intellection and the divine object. In 
human cognition, this community of the knower and the object is founded on a relation as 
Scotus explains:  
Created beatitude, however, does necessarily require a relationship to the 
object, and this is a real relation.  The reason for this is that the operation 
can have no greater unity with the object than the unity of a 
relationship.291 
  
It is this relationship between the human intellect and the divine essence that I will now 
consider.  At the beginning of question 13 of the Quodlibetal Questions, in which Scotus 
is concerned about whether the acts of knowing are essentially absolute or relative, he 
posits that the “ultimate perfection of the living nature is what such a nature desires 
above all else by natural desire.”292  
To desire is an activity of the will, to know is an activity of the intellect.  The will 
and the intellect are both powers of the soul such that for Scotus there exists only a 
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537.)  I will use the word “term” as an abbreviation for terminus ad quem in this dissertation.  
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formal distinction between them rather than a real distinction.293 Simply put, for Scotus, 
there is no real distinction between the soul and its faculties.294  Although Scotus partially 
agrees with Bonaventure that beatitude is a joint venture between the will and the 
intellect, Scotus considers beatitude to be primarily a function of the will.295  The ultimate 
perfection desired above all else is beatitude which as the final end is “an activity or 
consists in an operation.”296 It is by way of a cognitive act that there is a vision of the 
divine essence.  That there is enjoyment of the essence is by way of the will.  The 
intellect, by the grace of God, cognizes the divine essence in its presence, and the will 
loves it.   
Thus, Scotus contends that the ultimate perfection of a living nature must have a 
real relationship to the most perfect object that it is naturally designed to have.297 It is the 
very nature of beatitude that it “connects or joins the nature with its ultimate end in an 
unqualified sense, namely with the extrinsic object that beatifies.”298 Thus, Scotus agrees 
with Augustine that the true definition of beatitude can be expressed as possession: “He 
alone is blessed who has all he wills and wills nothing wrongly.”299 
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What the intellect naturally seeks out and what the will naturally desires is that 
most perfect object that, in possessing, perfects the intellect and will.  In the beatific 
vision the intellect knows its object as it exists in itself, for as Scotus understands it, it is a 
“face to face vision of this object, since the act of knowing it tends to this object as 
present in itself with its own actual existence.”300   
Thus, beatitude requires that there be a real object, that is, an extramental one, for 
otherwise the intellect would be able to be satisfied with a nonexistent object, which 
Scotus argues is impossible.301 As we saw, Scotus uses Damascene’s metaphor of the sea 
to ground his understanding of the divine essence.  He returns to this metaphor 
throughout the Quodlibetal Questions fully exploiting it not only to reveal the immensity 
and infinity of the divine essence but also to show its actual existence.  In Question 6 of 
the Quodlibetal Questions Damascene is one of the authorities that Scotus appeals to in 
order to support his claim that “the divine essence qua essence has its own real or 
extramental magnitude,” which he infers from a previous claim that the divine essence 
has extramental or real existence.302   
Scotus contends that it is always necessary to assume “the existence of some 
entity which is real, first, unique, and requires no prior entity.”303 If the existence of such 
a prior entity is not assumed, there would be no posterior entity.304  Scotus seems here to 
be appealing again to the law of disjunction between the prior and the posterior.  That the 
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existence of the posterior is posited allows the conclusion that a prior so exists. In any 
case, in the divine there is real existence.   
That Damascene calls the divine essence a sea means for Scotus that it enjoys “a 
kind of priority and contains primarily all divine perfections,” and is therefore infinite.305 
Scotus argues that the essence is infinite extramentally, i.e., really, precisely because the 
essence is absolutely first.   
Reason also shows that this is the case in terms of the nature of infinity as an 
intrinsic mode of the essence.  Since infinity is an intrinsic mode of the divine essence, it 
follows, Scotus argues, that it only belongs to its subject intrinsically in the real or 
extramental order.306 It is the case that a being of any absolute quiddity is either 
intrinsically finite or infinite.  But since it has already been shown that the divine essence 
is infinite it cannot be finite.  Its infinity is real just as the divine essence is extramental. 
 Since beatitude is a face to face vision, it requires a real object.  The divine 
essence is such for Scotus.  But a face to face vision is accomplished by intuitive 
cognition, that is, a cognition of the object that is present as present and the existing 
object as existing.307  Beatific knowledge cannot be abstractive because abstractive 
knowledge is indifferent to the existence or non-existence of its object.308  And so Scotus 
defines beatitude in terms of cognition as an intuitive knowing where the “beatific object 
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is reached immediately and in itself.”309 For Scotus, this claim means that the beatific act 
“is necessarily an intuition of its object” such that “it is knowledge of that object as 
existing and present in its own existence. . . indeed in its real existence as something 
present.”310 
 Scotus further contends that the intellect cannot be perfected or “be perfectly 
satisfied by any object unless it contains the full plenitude of its first object, that is to say, 
unless its primary object finds its highest possible expression in that object.”311  But such 
plenitude can only be infinity.  Thus, Scotus concludes that any power capable of 
beatitude requires an object that is infinite.  Infinitude then is the “per se condition of any 
object that is fully satisfying and therefore beatific.”312  The human intellect, then, is must 
be understood in such a way that it will not rest but will “push on farther” (imo potentia 
ulterius inclinatur) until it knows its ultimate object which is itself infinite.313  The 
intellect is geared toward the infinite.  The nature of the wayfarer is not simply 
metaphorical or merely theologically driven but is an apt description of the human 
intellect that constantly seeks to go beyond even what it may understand as its own limits. 
To be a wayfarer is to be on a journey, but a journey takes place in time, one place to the 
next, moment by moment.  The journey of the wayfarer is fragmented by time.  The 
intellect in the state of the wayfarer does operate under certain conditions, namely, that 
knowledge begins with the senses and that the intellect has recourse to the phantasm in 
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order to know.  While Scotus certainly does not see these limitations as intrinsic to the 
intellect, he does not necessarily regard them negatively.  That is to say, while they do in 
fact constrain the intellect, they cannot ultimately change the nature of the intellect.   
This is an important point for at least two reasons.  First, Scotus is obviously 
interested in maintaining and understanding the psychic unity of the soul in this life.  
Second, since the intellect as such is ultimately perfected by the most perfect infinite 
object, the divine essence, in this life this capacity remains an intrinsic capacity of the 
intellect, though certainly not realized.  Still, it speaks to how the intellect tends to its 
object, be it the divine essence or the sensible object in this life.  Certainly, the sensible 
object is not an infinite object as it is a finite being, but it is endowed with “haecceity,” a 
positive principle that determines it to an individual that is repugnant to further division, 
and thus, is itself a unity over and above the number of its parts.314  What Scotus offers 
here is the true finite disjunct to the infinite.  The infinite is that which is utterly 
indeterminable.  The finite is that which is utterly determined.  Scotus’s understanding of 
the sensible object as non-repeatable individual affords the intellect an object that it can 
truly tend towards.   
 To sum up this section, the most important point to be taken is the nature of the 
beatific vision as that moment in which the intellect cognizes in a face to face vision that 
object which perfects it precisely as it is infinite.  Such a vision requires that the intellect 
be capable of intuitive cognition, knowing an object immediately as it is present and 
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existing.  This face to face vision of the divine infinite object, I claim, is the basis of 
Scotus’ contention that the sensible object endowed with haecceity is intelligible in itself.  
While it is the case that Scotus rejects that haecceity can be known in this life, still, 
because we experience objects as individuals and our intellect intrinsically tends towards 
the infinite, the sensible object is a worthy object of study. 
 
2.3 The Incarnation 
For the Christian thinker in the Latin West, the moment of the incarnation is of 
critical importance and inspiration. While it is certainly a theological notion, it plays a 
role in Scotus’ understanding of the material world. What is of interest to me is how the 
incarnation informs Scotus’ thought and perhaps gives him access to material reality from 
a different vantage point.  In the way that only that which is other or that which lies 
outside of a framework is capable of bringing forth the reflective capacity, the incarnation 
unsettled Aristotelian logic and categories for they are unable to comprehend such an 
event where the divine becomes human.  Scotus modifies Aristotle’s system for his own 
project, and in doing so, he allows theological notions like the incarnation to reveal a 
world that the Aristotelian system cannot.  I will extend here the argument that I began in 
the last section on the beatific vision.   
The nature of the beatific vision revealed the nature of the human intellect as that 
which is intrinsically capable of cognizing the divine essence, indeed, as an intellect that 
tends towards, seeks out, and is perfected by the infinite object.  Such an intrinsic 
capacity is not changed by an extrinsic limitation, merely temporarily constrained.  The 
point being that the intellect naturally seeks out and tends toward the infinite.  The 
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opposite extreme of the infinite is the most specialized species, the fully determinate 
individual.  The intellect is naturally equipped, if not to fully cognize the individuality of 
the object, to appreciate it and to push farther into knowing it.  But is the object worthy of 
such care and concern?  Certainly it is the case for the beatific object.  But I argue that it 
is also the case for the material object by way of Scotus’ understanding of the 
incarnation.  It is this understanding that gives him the vantage point of loving the object, 
thus realizing even the material object as something capable of being studied and worthy 
of being attended to.  Certainly one could argue that Aristotle goes a long way in rescuing 
the material object from the status of appearance that Plato gives it.  Whereas for Plato 
the material object is but an appearance or copy of the form, subject to change, and 
unintelligible in itself, Aristotle gives intelligibility to the material object by placing the 
form in it and explaining it by way of the categories of being and the four causes.  The 
material object is what it is in relation to the system and workings of nature.  And while 
this goes a long way to appreciating the object in its own existence, the material object is 
still ultimately understood as an individual in the species.  The principle of individuation 
is matter according to Aristotle.  While Thomas Aquinas follows Aristotle on this point, 
Scotus, as seen above, contends that there must be a positive principle other than matter 
that is the principle of individuation.315 Scotus argues that matter cannot account for the 
individuality of the object nor account for its unity.   
 It is the backdrop of the incarnation that gives Scotus the space to look at the 
object in a new way.  To show how this is the case, I will draw extensively from the 
profound reading of Scotus’ understanding of the incarnation that Louis Mackey presents 
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in his chapter, “The Theological Circumstance of Scotist Speculation,” as well as from 
Richard Cross’ works, Duns Scotus and The Metaphysics of the Incarnation.  I will attend 
to Mackey’s argument first. 
Mackey points out that while most theologians, including Aquinas, understood the 
incarnation as “God’s response” to the sinfulness of humanity, Scotus joined a minority 
tradition that rejected the notion that the incarnation was “mandated by the fall” of human 
beings.316 In fact, the way Scotus sees it, according to Mackey, is that the incarnation was 
“immediately intended by God as an end from all eternity.”317  
Mackey lists the logical order of divine previsions, that is, God’s fore-ordained 
knowledge: 
1) God knows himself as the highest good; 
2) he knows all the things that are to be created; 
3) he predestines some to grace and glory;  
4) he foresees those that are to fall in Adam; and 
5) he preordains or foresees their redemption through the passion of his 
Son.318 
 
Mackey points out that though in the above logical order the redemption comes after the 
fall, what is important is that the glorification of the human being (3), is prior to the sin of 
the human being.  The human being is already destined to glory before she sins.  It is 
because she is destined for glory, that is, already endowed with a capacity for glory, that 
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she is able, even can be, redeemed.  In the same way, that which is loved is already able 
to be loved.  Scotus explains: 
Christ in the flesh, just like all the elect, was foreseen and predestined to 
grace and glory before the passion of Christ was foreknown a medicine 
against the fall.319 
 
In fact, Mackey observes that for Scotus, the fall of humanity is not the cause of the 
predestination of Christ, rather, Christ “would have been predestined to be the Son of 
God even if rational creatures had not fallen, “even if,” Scotus says, “none were to have 
been created save Christ himself.””320 Mackey emphasizes that there is a divine order 
based on divine love, love being a center-post of Scotus’ decidedly Franciscan 
understanding of reality: 
1) God first loves himself; 
2) he loves himself in others; 
3) he wills to be loved by another who is able to love him supremely; 
4) he wills the union with himself of that nature that ought to love him 
supremely, even if no one falls; and 
5) after the fall, he foresees the mediator coming to suffer and to redeem 
his people.321 
 
It is the case that Christ comes as mediator and sufferer in response to the sin of 
humanity, but Christ as a whole, body and soul, is already glorified. He is already 
glorified because it is his nature to love supremely God and thereby be in union with 
God.   
These two lists that Mackey offers are meant to show Scotus’ motivations.  The 
first motivation concerns the liberty of God, an important claim of Scotus.  Certainly, 
Mackey argues that the only way to make sense of the suffering of Christ is the fall. Still, 
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God does not act in a constrained way but rather from “an absolutely original intention of 
the divine will.”322  Mackey explains this divine intention eloquently: 
Occasioned by our lapse, it was not coerced thereby.  Comprehending sin, 
it was simply a more comprehensive reaffirmation of the primordial 
volition.  Having willed to assume and glorify our humanity, God also 
willed the cost of its reparation.  Christ’s passion is not a concession to sin 
but the projection through sin of the original divine ordinance of 
incarnation.  It follows not from the fall—nothing follows from sin except 
the death of the sinner—but from the gracious liberty of God.323 
 
The liberty of God is not the only motivation that emerges from a study of the above lists.  
The second motivation is grace.  God creates freely, but if, as Mackey has observed 
Scotus as saying, “the incarnation is effected in the divine will prior to the creation,” then 
“the world is sacralized from the beginning.”324 The way Mackey understands this is that 
the  
divinization of the creature precedes its making:  deificari anticipates 
creari. . . since the grace of the sanctifying union goes before the gratuity 
of creation and motivates it, the order of nature is subsumed into the order 
of grace from all eternity.325 
 
What this means is that since the incarnation was preordained prior to the fall as an end, it 
informs the teleological structure of the created world as a world that is already capable 
of being loved, of being glorified. Again as Mackey contends, the world for Scotus was 
“created in order that the union of the creature with God . . . might be realized in and for 
the creature.”326  The incarnation is the point of, as well as the beginning and end,  all 
created things.  The incarnation reveals not only the divine essence but also the essence 
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of the created object.  Mackey reads Scotus as contending that “the purpose of the 
creation is the full manifestation and accomplishment of the Incarnation.”327  
Cross shows that Scotus offers an argument based on natural reason that 
concludes that the incarnation would have happened irrespective of the Fall of Adam.328 
The two principles that Scotus uses to reach this conclusion are: 
 (a)  In any well-ordered action, the end is willed before the means; 
 (b) In any well-ordered action, a greater good is willed before a lesser one.329   
Based on these two principles, Cross claims that Scotus establishes the following order in 
God’s actions: 
 1.  God predestines Christ’s soul to glory. 
 2.  God predestines Christ’s human nature to depend on the Word. 
 3.  God predestines some other creatures to glory. 
 4.  God foresees the Fall of Adam. 
 5.  God predestines Christ to redeem fallen humanity.330 
Cross argues that the order of the above divine actions is based on the two principles (a) 
and (b).331  For example, God must have predestined Christ’s human nature before any 
other nature because the glory of Christ’s human nature is a greater good than the glory 
of any other nature. In like manner, Cross works out fully the above order. What is 
interesting in Cross’s argument is not only that he shows that Scotus uses natural reason 
to support his theological claim that the Incarnation was pre-ordained before the fall, but 
also that Cross observes that this argument “ties in neatly with his [Scotus’] relatively 
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lowly view of unfallen humanity.”332 Cross had earlier pointed out that Scotus’ account 
of original sin is much weaker than Augustine’s, and moreover, the supernatural gifts lost 
in the fall by humanity were minimal, and, thus, their loss “has only the smallest effect on 
human existence.”333   
 In sum, the points to be taken from this discussion on the incarnation is that the 
incarnation for Scotus is not a response to the fall but something pre-ordained by God.  
Thus, in terms of the argument that Mackey offers, what clearly emerges is the 
worthiness of the created world.  That the world can be redeemed means that it is 
intrinsically capable of being so redeemed.  Thus, the act of redemption is not something 
that is an external act to the world for as such it could not have redeemed the world.  The 
point is, for Scotus, that the world is already capable of being loved, and is therefore, 
worthy of being attended to as a cognitive object.  In terms of the argument that Cross 
makes, the point to take is that the order of the incarnation prior to the fall of man is a 
rational order.    
 
Conclusion 
 I conclude this chapter by emphasizing that the nature of the divine essence, the 
nature of the beatific vision, and the incarnation guide Scotus in his cognitive project.  
Scotus is interested in the intellect and its object, both at the level of the natural capacity 
of the intellect and the object, and at the level of the wayfarer.  The theological notions 
reveal the natural capacity of the intellect and its object.  This in turn reveals how the 
intellect seeks out and attends to the object in this life, constrained by limitations, but not 
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changed by them.  Moreover, the material object, according to the argument concerning 
the incarnation, is an object capable of being loved, intelligible in itself, worthy in itself 
of attention.  
 In Chapter 1, the fundamental framework and principles of the Aristotelian 
framework were discussed in order to show the structure of Scotus’ cognitive theory.  In 
chapter 2, critical theological concepts that influence Scotus’ cognitive theory were 
discussed in order to emphasize the critical concerns that Scotus has in working out his 
cognitive theory.  While the discussion in this chapter pertains most directly to the natural 
capacities of the intellect and the object that ultimately perfects it, it sheds light on the 
nature of the intellect and its object pro statu isto.  Three critical claims of Scotus 
emerged.  First, while the intellect in this life is constrained, its ultimate nature is 
unchanged.  Second, Scotus does not view the dependence of the intellect on the senses 
in a negative way but rather observes that there is a harmony and unity in the human 
being’s psychic life.  Third, the beatific vision requires the presence of the divine essence 
to the intellect itself, and thus, the intellect is intrinsically capable of attending to the 
presence of an object.  This third claim is important because, while in this life the 
intellect enjoys only the presence of an internal object, it nonetheless fully capable of 
attending to the presence of an extramental object.  This is not only the case due to the 
beatific vision, but also as will be shown, because the intellect as a superior cognitive 
faculty is able to know whatever the inferior faculty is capable of, that is, the sense 
faculty’s knowledge.  Not only is the intellect capable of attending to a present object, it 
requires the presence of an internal object, and thus, in this life, requires the activity of 
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the senses.  Thus, the relationship between the sense faculty and the intellective faculty 
comes front and center as what both informs and underlies Scotus’ cognitive project.  
       
 
 89
  
  
Chapter 3  The Relationship of the Soul to the Body 
 The aim of this chapter is to examine how Scotus understands the relationship of 
the soul to the body. This relationship is the framework by which and in which cognition, 
both sensitive and intellective, occurs in this life. What complicates understanding the 
nature of this relationship, and thus how cognition works in this life, is that the body is 
material and the soul is immaterial.  Materiality and immateriality are complex and not 
easily defined and thus further complicate this issue.  Given the immateriality of the soul 
and the materiality of the body, the unity of the human being comes into question not 
only in terms of how to account for the wholeness of the particular human being, but in 
terms of her own cognitive activities which require such an underlying unity.  Since the 
aim of this dissertation is to show how Scotus understands how the immaterial intellect is 
able to act with the material phantasm in cognition, it is critical to show how Scotus 
understands the body-soul relationship as it is this relationship that makes possible the 
activity of the intellect with the phantasm.  This chapter is divided into five parts.  In part 
3.1, I examine Scotus’ complex and profound understanding of unity with the aim of 
making clear that unity which is proper to the human being. In part 3.2, I discuss the 
unity of the human being giving particular attention to the problematics of Scotus’ claim 
that within this unity exists a plurality of substantial forms.334  In part 3.3, I turn to 
Question 9 in the Quodlibetal Questions where Scotus considers the nature of the 
substantial or informing form, and I use this question to frame an extensive discussion of 
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the following three notions: per se being, the nature of the accident, and the immateriality 
of the intellective soul.  In part 3.4 I offer a particular reading of Scotus’ claim that the 
human being, due to her intellectual nature, is a person.  I propose here that the notion of 
person is that which best comprehends and guarantees the unity of the human being.  I 
conclude this chapter with some critical remarks that both serve to summarize the main 
points of this chapter and to introduce the discussion of sense cognition in chapter four.  
 
3.1 Unity 
 Scotus understands unity or “the one” to be that which is indivisible in itself and 
divided from all else.335  Unity is one of the transcendentals, those attributes of being 
prior to the division of being into infinite and finite, and is therefore co-extensive with 
being.336  Posterior to this division of infinite and finite being, uncreated and created 
being, there are different grades of being, and, thus, different grades of unity such that 
each grade of being has its own proper unity.337 Wolter explains that the most perfect 
grade or form of transcendental unity, that which is most deservedly called unity, is the 
unity of singularity (unitate singularitatis), that unity exhibited in the ultimate reality of 
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the individual being, and this singularity is a numerical unity.338  Numerical unity, Wolter 
explains, is a real attribute that “expresses a formal perfection of the individual.”339 
As a point of contrast to the unity of singularity, there is the unity that Wolter 
calls a “unity of kind,” a unity that exists between individuals that share a common nature 
(natura communis).340 Influenced by Avicenna, Scotus argues that the common nature, 
really in individuals, is itself indifferent to singularity or universality, “horseness is just 
horseness.”341  The common nature is less than numerical, less than the unity of 
singularity which properly designates the existing individual as such.342  As Wolter 
explains it, the common nature is “prior by nature to any determination.”343  But, it is the 
unity of singularity that is itself somehow “coextensive with all real being” and, thus, is 
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the highest expression and realization of unity.344  It is important to understand fully the 
unity of singularity as it is the standard by which all other kinds of unity are measured.   
The unity of singularity, for Scotus, is that unity that is impossible to be divided 
further. It expresses the ultimate reality of the individual and is realized in Scotus’ notion 
of “haecceity” which is his principle of individuation.345  Scotus does not often use the 
term “haecceity,” but he understands by it that which ultimately accounts for the unity of 
the individual. In a discussion in book 7, question 13 of the QMA, Scotus gives his 
argument.   
The individual is that which is “not divisible into many, and is distinguished from 
all others according to number.”346 Scotus explains that this means that to be divided into 
subjective parts is repugnant to the individual, and this repugnance can be accounted for 
only by something in the individual.347 One of the proofs that he offers for this is based 
on his contention that the division into subjective parts is an imperfection and, therefore 
is not found in God.348  From this, Scotus concludes, a repugnance to being divided into 
subjective parts is due to a perfection in the individual.349 Haecceity is just such a 
perfection for Scotus conceives of haecceity as a positive nature that makes something 
intrinsically one that is whole and perfect of itself.350 Since being and unity are 
coextensive, an individual being exists insofar as it remains a unity.  Haecceity, together 
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with the common nature, accounts for the individuality of the particular being.351  
Mackey explains that, for Scotus, the individual must be understood as the “negation of 
the “dividual” (dividuum).”352  Thus the unity of singularity is a unity of indivision, and 
Mackey understands this to mean, in a Scotistic positive sense, integrity or a “fully 
determinate and irrefragable uniqueness.”353  The most perfect expression of unity is that 
which can neither be determined further nor divided further. Thus, unity is not simply 
negative, indivision, for Scotus; the unity of singularity is a perfection that is to be 
understood positively as a fully determined and complete wholeness. 
Based on the coextension of unity with being, Scotus distinguishes at least six 
different degrees of unity:  (1) the unity of a collection or aggregate, (2) the unity of 
order, (3) the unity of accident, (4) the unity of a composite, i.e., substantial unity, (5) the 
unity of simplicity, and (6) formal identity.354  In addition to these six degrees of unity, 
Richard Cross also identifies a seventh, the unity of homogeneity.355  Scotus organizes 
this list from lesser to greater unity. Thus, as he points out, the unity of order is greater 
than the unity of a collection, and so on.  An example of a unity of a collection is a heap 
or a bundle, a series of efficient causes is a unity of order, a white man is an accidental 
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unity, a human being is a substantial unity, and the human soul is a unity of simplicity.356  
As this chapter concerns the unity of the human person, I will examine here in more 
detail, the unity of accident, the unity of substance, and the unity of simplicity.  
 The accidental unity results from the union of an accident and a substance, like 
white and man. Following Aristotle, Scotus understands that the accident qualifies  
the substance in some way.  What is of import to this discussion is how Scotus 
understands the accident itself and the manner of its relationship with a substance.  
Scotus understands the accident itself as a singular thing, an entity that is individuated 
independently of the subject to which it is united.357 Richard Cross points to a passage in 
the Ordinatio in which he contends that Scotus explicitly claims that an accident is to be 
understood as an individual item: 
In every categorial hierarchy there can be found something intrinsically 
individual and singular of which the species is predicated—or at least 
there can be found something not predicable of many.358 
 
Cross also quotes a passage from the Quodlibetal Questions where he explains that 
Scotus is less explicit but nonetheless supports this same claim: 
In the second sense of this first member [i.e. ‘being’ or ‘thing’ taken in its 
broadest sense], however, we say a thing is what can have entity outside 
the soul.359 
  
In both of these passages it is clear that the accident as that which exists as a category and 
also as that which exists extramentally can be understood as a singular, individual thing.  
When it is united to a substance which is itself an individual, it is a unity of two 
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individual things that is somehow greater than the unity of collection or aggregate.  How 
is this possible?   
In terms of the manner of the relationship of accident to substance, according to 
Cross, Scotus modifies Aristotle’s distinction between substance and accident.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, accidents are distinct from substances because, whereas 
according to Aristotle, substances exist in themselves, accidents exist in another.  Cross 
argues that Scotus replaces this Aristotelian distinction with the notion of inherence.  
Cross contends that an accident, for Scotus, is an entity that has a natural tendency to 
inhere in a substance; a substance has no such natural tendency.360  Inherence is what 
explains how an accidental unity thus differs from the unity of a collection.   
 A substantial unity exists where there is a composite made of that which is 
intrinsically actual, form, and that which is intrinsically potential, matter.361  A material 
substance is made up of prime matter and a substantial form.362  Scotus does not 
understand prime matter as pure potentiality, but rather, in order to account for 
substantial change which requires that some basic stuff remain constant, Scotus claims 
that matter has an actuality all its own, that is, has its own properties, its own nature.363  
Matter, for Scotus, can exist (theoretically) and be understood independently from form.  
Both matter and form are essential parts of the material substance.364  Indeed, every 
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essence or quiddity is made up of matter as such and form as such, whereas, the 
individual substance is made up of this matter and this form.365   
 A substantial form as one essential part of a material substance is itself an 
individual, that is, for Scotus, the substantial form is individuated independently of the 
prime matter to which it is united and is individuated independently of the composite of 
which it is a part.366  While Aquinas, too, understands form as an individual, form is not 
an individual in its own right, rather it is by way of its instantiation in matter that it is 
individuated.367  That Scotus understands that the substantial form is an individual in its 
own right amounts, Cross contends, to a rejection of Aquinas’ understanding of form, and 
therefore of the notion of form simply as the structure of matter.368 Cross argues that 
Scotus recognizes that form understood as the structure of matter is not enough to explain 
how different structures of matter yield different sorts of material substances.369 Scotus 
understands form as playing an explanatory role; it must explain how a particular 
substance is a natural kind.370 Scotus sees the substantial form as an individual that has an 
essence and thus certain essential properties.371  Moreover, the substantial form is the 
formal cause of the composite of which it is a part.  Rather than inhering in matter, 
Scotus understands the substantial form to inform matter.372  The substantial form 
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naturally tends to be a component part of a composite.373  When an accident inheres in a 
substance, the substance is qualified in some way; when a form informs matter, it 
communicates actuality to matter such that a new individual substance comes into being 
that is “an absolute entity really distinct from all its parts.”374  
 Scotus understands this new absolute entity, this material substance as a whole 
over and above its component parts.  Richard Cross offers a detailed analysis of Scotus’ 
views on material substance in which he delineates four conceptions of material 
substance, all of which Scotus ultimately rejects:  material substance is not identical to its 
parts, it is not a mere aggregate of its parts, it is not an aggregate of matter and form, and 
it is not the aggregate of matter, form, and the relation between them.375   
 Since Scotus recognizes a relation as a thing, Cross contends that Scotus is 
committed to the claim that a relation of two things “adds some further entity over and 
above the absolute parts.”376  The substantial unity or unity of the composite has 
properties different in kind from the properties of its parts.377  The wholeness of the 
material substance accomplished by the substantial unity is not reducible to its parts.  It is 
a whole new entity with its own form, the form of the whole.  In the QMA Scotus 
considers the nature of the form/matter composite: 
First, we can think, without any contradiction, of matter side by side with 
form, each existing in itself and there would be no composite.  Or to put 
this in another way,--according to Bk. VII near the end—the composite 
has some cause of its unity in itself that does not stem from just having 
[matter and form] as its part—which parts though of as non-united can be 
understood to exist in themselves without contradiction.  Therefore, from 
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the end of Bk. VII, there is something in the composite besides matter and 
form, whereby it is one.378  
  
Here Scotus refers to Aristotle’s explanation of the syllable “ba” such that it is not simply 
its components, “b” and “a,” that can account for its being as “ba,” there must be 
something else.379 The point is that the syllable “ba” possesses characteristics that are 
unique to it and not possessed by its components.  When conjoined, the “b” and the “a” 
exist in a unity that is its own being and has its own wholeness.  The form of the whole is 
not the form that is a component of the substantial unity but is the form “in virtue of 
which the composite is a quidditative being.”380 
 The unity of simplicity is a unity of true identity.  Scotus explains: “for whatever 
is there is really the same as whatever else is there, and is not merely one by union as is 
the case in the other modes.”381   The human soul enjoys a unity of simplicity, as 
abovementioned, though it is itself composite and its parts are formally distinct.382 Like 
Aquinas, Scotus contends that the nutritive, sensitive and intellective souls are really 
identical and numerically one.383 The formal distinction for Scotus is a distinction that 
lies between a real distinction and a merely conceptual one.  Two realities or aspects of a 
thing are formally distinct if in reality they are truly identical, in fact, not even God could 
separate them, and yet, they are defined independently of each other, for example, 
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whiteness and color.384  The unity of simplicity then, is not a union of thing and thing as 
we see in the unity of collection, order, accident, or composite, rather, it is a unity of the 
real identity of formally distinct realities.385  
What we can take from this section on unity is that since unity is coextensive with 
being, there is a proper unity to every level of being.  Since the created world is a 
reflection of the uncreated, the creature is an expression of the creator, the unity of 
singularity reflects the divine unity as it expresses the most perfect realization of the 
created unity.  All other unities are understood as they relate to the highest expression of 
unity. What defines accidental unity is the notion of inherence.  What defines substantial 
unity is the act of informing such that it brings about a new, whole, individual being.  The 
unity of simplicity is a unity of formally distinct entities.   
 
3.2 The Unity of the Human Being 
 The human being is a composite of a material body and an immaterial intellective 
soul joined together in a substantial unity resulting in one essence, nature, or substance.386  
The intellective soul is the specific form or proper form of the human being.387 Scotus 
contends, however, unlike Aquinas, that the intellective soul is not the only form within 
the human composite, which also contains a form of the body (forma corporeitatis) as 
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 Cross 1998, 8.  See also Scotus, Ordinatio 1.8.1.4, n. 193; Oxon., bk. 1, d. 2, q. 7; Grajewski, The 
Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus:  A Study in Metaphysics,The Catholic University of America 
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well as forms for each of the organs.388 According to Aquinas, it is not possible for there 
to be more than one substantial form in any given substantial composite.389  Moreover, it 
is the substantial form or the human soul that gives being to the human composite for, as 
Cross explains, “one form is a necessary condition for the presence of exactly one 
existence.”390  Thus, by way of the substantial form, which communicates being to the 
body, the human composite is a unified whole.391  For Scotus, the unity of the person is 
more complicated because he does contend that a plurality of forms is found in the 
human composite, but in such a way that he can preserve the unity of the human person.  
To understand how he preserves this unity we must first understand why Scotus rejects 
Aquinas’ view and maintains that there is a plurality of forms, and second, show how he 
understands this unity. 
 Richard Cross shows that there are several reasons, both theological and 
empirical, that Scotus offers in support of the plurality of forms.  Cross, along with 
Bonansea, contends that the main reason Scotus rejects Aquinas’ view that there is only 
one substantial form per composite substance has to do with the empirical fact that once 
the animating soul has left the body, the body remains intact, albeit temporarily.392  As 
both Cross and Bonansea explain, Aquinas is unable to account for the continued 
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 Oxon. 4, d. 2, q. 3, n. 54:  “Universaliter in quolibet animato necesse est ponere illam formam qua 
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existence of the body after death.393  Scotus posits the form of the body to explain the 
continued existence of the body after the animating soul leaves.  Given this plurality of 
forms, how does Scotus account for the unity of the individual human person? 
 The convertibility of unity and being functions as a guiding principle and the 
degrees of unity function as a roadmap to understanding how Scotus addresses this 
question.  There are several answers given in the literature that I will consider before 
offering my own understanding of this issue.   
 As pointed out above, Scotus considers that the intellective soul is the specific or 
proper form of the human being.  D. E. Sharp points out that the intellective soul, for 
Scotus, is also the animating soul, which is the formal principal of being and operation.394 
She explains that Scotus defends himself on the charge that a plurality of forms destroys 
the unity of the human being by claiming that forms of the organs and the form of the 
body, in relation to the intellective soul, are only partial actualities.395  The intellective 
soul is, for Scotus, that form by which the whole composite comes together as this one 
being.396  The forms of the organ and the form of the body are inferior forms in relation 
to the intellective soul, which functions in an ultimate way.  Sharp explains that since 
there is but one ultimate form in the human composite, by which the other forms are fully 
actualized, the unity of the human being is preserved.  Bonansea follows closely Sharp’s 
reading of Scotus pointing out that Scotus is in close alignment with the Augustinians 
such that it is by way of the subordinate relationship between the lower forms and the 
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intellective soul that the unity of the human being is achieved.397 Cross gives a detailed 
analysis of Scotus’ position in which he explains Scotus’ response both to Aquinas and 
Henry of Ghent.  In this analysis Cross emphasizes that Scotus consistently distinguishes 
between the form of the body which accounts for the “form and layout of the body and its 
parts,” and the animating form (the intellective soul), which is responsible for bodily 
functions in every animate being.398 Given this plurality of forms, Cross has a different 
reading from Sharp or Bonansea on how Scotus maintains the unity of the human being.  
Cross appeals to Scotus’ third degree of unity, substantial unity, within the metaphysics 
of potency and act to explain how Scotus maintains the unity of the human being.399  
Cross argues that, according to Scotus, in the case of a composite with two substantial 
forms, “matter and the lower substantial form constitute a composite.”400  A lower-order 
composite, matter with the form of the body, then, stands in relation to a higher 
substantial form, the intellective or animating form, as potentiality to actuality.401 While 
there is clearly a relationship of subordination here, Cross sees it as a “pattern of 
hierarchically arranged composites” each of which satisfies a “unity requirement.”402  
Since these unities are themselves each substantial unities, there is one part that stands in 
potentiality to the other.  Cross contends that this part is a material cause and given this, 
shows that Scotus understands the relationship of the forms within the composite to be 
one of essential order.403  The forms within the composite are hierarchically and 
essentially ordered to the ultimate substantial form, the intellective soul, thus 
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guaranteeing the unity of the human being.404 Mackey offers yet another reading of the 
Scotistic account of the unicity of the human being, based on the formal distinction.405  
By way of the formal distinction, Mackey argues that Scotus is able to account for “an 
integral entitative unity” which is over and above a unity of order.406  There is 
consistency in the literature that Scotus understands that the whole is greater than its 
parts, such that a substantial union brings about a whole being which has properties 
different from its components.  The question is whether these various readings of how 
Scotus understands the unity of the human being can account for the wholeness of the 
individual human being?  I appreciate Cross’ analysis of substantial union and Mackey’s 
reading of the formal distinction as going further than a relationship of subordination in 
accounting for wholeness.  I contend, however, that Scotus has a response to all of these 
readings found in his discussion of per se being in question nine of the Quodlibetal 
Questions.  I will now discuss this question.    
 
3.3 On Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions:  Can an Angel Be Made into an 
Informing Form?  
In this section I will examine three notions:  per se being, the nature of the 
accident, and the immateriality of the soul.  I will follow Scotus’ discussion in Question 9 
of the Quodlibetal Questions where he asks whether God can make the angel become an 
informing form.407  An examination of these notions is important because from it I will be 
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able to show both how Scotus secures the unity of the human being as person and how 
through the particular emphasis he gives, he also offers a guide to his readers as to how 
he grounds and explains the cognitive activity between the immaterial intellect and the 
material sense.  What is at issue in Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions is the 
intricate nature of the informing form itself and what kinds of relationships it has with 
matter.  Scotus uses the case of the angel as a way into this question.  The angel is an 
immaterial form, an incorporeal being with an intellect and a will such that each 
individual angel is its own species.  As its own species, the individual angel is a 
subsistent individual.  Can such a being inform matter?   
Since Scotus is interested in the case of the angel, before discussing the arguments 
in Question 9, it is helpful to consider his remarks in Question 2 of the Quodlibetal 
Questions where he clarifies that the angelic nature is an immaterial form. As an 
immaterial form, the angel is a “this” of itself, not dependent on matter for individuality, 
which, of course, Scotus rejects as the principle of individuation.  Against those who 
claim that matter is what individuates, Scotus responds that “every immaterial form is a 
“this” of itself or by reason of what it is.”408  Moreover, it is not by way of its quiddity or 
essence that the immaterial form is a “this” or a singular individual.409  Thus, Scotus 
contends that the angel, as such a specific nature, cannot be  
realized in multiple instances because such a unique singular and 
individual form would contain in itself intensively and extensively the 
total entity of that form, as is clear from the case of the sun.”410  
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A specific nature is intrinsically repugnant to being multiplied into many or predicated of 
many.  If one conceives of a specific nature in such a way that it can be several, Scotus 
argues that one would be in contradiction.411  To further clarify the nature of an 
immaterial form, Scotus examines the intellective soul of the human being.   
Scotus argues that the intellective soul, in its nature and prior to being conjoined with 
the body, is the end product of a creative act, i.e., generation.412  Earlier, in line with 
Aristotle, Scotus explained that the end product or term of generation is a substance or 
substantial being.413 He now further clarifies that the end product of a creative act is an 
individual or a this.414 What this means is that the soul, as an immaterial form, is 
individuated independently from its union with the body.415  Each soul is distinct and 
unique by its own nature, apart from its being in matter.  Scotus considers that one might 
argue, then, that rather than matter, it is the soul’s aptitude to exist in matter that 
individuates it.416 But the aptitude to exist in matter is posterior to the soul’s absolute 
nature, and interestingly, Scotus contends that:  “this soul has this aptitude to be in this 
body, and this aptitude for just this body is repugnant to another soul which has the 
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aptitude to be in another body.”417  The aptitude to exist in matter is particular to the 
individual intellective soul, which has an aptitude to exist in a particular body and no 
other.  But an aptitude is not an absolute entity.  The aptitude to exist in a particular body 
is had by a soul that is already singular by its own nature such that it is its singularity that 
determines the aptitude to exist in a particular body.  Neither matter nor the aptitude to 
exist in a particular material body can account for the singular individuality of the 
intellective soul.   
What we can take from this discussion is that the intellective soul, like the angel, is 
the end product of a creative act and as such is an individual ‘this’.  That the intellective 
soul, like the angel, is a specific nature, means that its intrinsic singularity is repugnant to 
being multiplied.  So the question that Scotus asks in Quodlibetal Questions 9, whether 
an angel can be made into an informing form, can shed light on how it is that the 
intellective soul, which is similar to the angel, is able to be conjoined to the body.  With 
these remarks in mind, I now turn to that question. 
Scotus claims that there exists a hierarchy of forms, which is itself arranged 
according to degrees of perfection.418  The angel represents in this hierarchy a perfection 
over and above the intellective soul.  Like the angel, the intellective soul can exist 
independently from a material body. But the intellective soul, when it is not joined to the 
body, does not enjoy the same level of perfection that the angel intrinsically has.  The 
intellective soul enjoys a union with the body.  That it has this capacity is naturally 
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intrinsic to it, for Scotus argues, if its nature is not essentially able to be independent then 
it can never attain such independence.419  The capacity to exist in union with a material 
body distinguishes the intellective soul from the angel.  How is this capacity to be 
understood? 
  In the hierarchy of forms, lower forms are distinguished from higher forms 
according to their relationship with matter, that is, their dependence or independence 
from matter. The way a lower form actualizes matter must be different from that form, 
the intellective soul, which can both actualize matter and exist independently from 
matter.  In Article II of Question 9 Scotus considers four arguments that demonstrate that 
the angel cannot be an informing form.  While he says that only the first two are 
conclusive, I will discuss each one here since there are interesting points to take from all 
four arguments.  The first argument is based on per se being, the second is based on the 
ability to actualize matter, the third is based on remoteness from matter, and the fourth is 
based on the intellective function.   
 
3.3.1. First Argument - Per se Being 
In the first argument, Scotus claims: “What is simply subsistent per se cannot be 
the form of matter.”420  Just as matter needs itself to be of a certain structure (all actually 
existing matter is already formed) or to have a certain capacity to receive a certain form, 
forms that inform matter must themselves be intrinsically capable of existing in matter.  
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Not all forms have such a capacity.  Moreover, this capacity to exist in matter does not in 
itself prevent the form from existing separately from matter.  Scotus argues that the angel 
is a being that subsists per se and therefore cannot be a being that informs another being.  
In order to clarify what it means to subsist per se, Scotus offers three different meanings 
of per se being. I will address each separately. 
 
3.3.1.a. First meaning of per se being - Accident 
The first meaning of per se being which Scotus offers designates “something 
which exists in isolation or apart from a subject.”421  The example he gives is curious:  
“an accident can be a per se being when it does not inhere in a subject.”422  When does an 
accident not inhere in a subject?  According to Aristotelian metaphysics, accidents by 
their nature exist by way of the subject in which they inhere, for accidents are said of the 
subject.423  How can it be that an accident ever exists apart from the subject?  One case in 
which an accident can exist apart from a subject is the theological doctrine of 
transubstantiation, to which Scotus alluded at the beginning of question 9, “God causes a 
material accident to exist without its subject in the sacrament of the altar.”424    
In the sacrament of the altar, the material accidents of bread and wine exist even 
when the substance of bread is replaced by the substance of the body of Christ. The 
accidents of bread remain even though the substance of bread does not.  This happens, 
though, only by divine intervention. Thus, it is not something easily recognized or 
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explained by reason.425  However, it is clear that the case of transubstantiation influences 
the way he understands the nature of accident such that he is able to give careful 
consideration the notions of essence and accident.  Since I am here concerned to show 
why Scotus can argue that the accident is an example of the first sense of per se being, 
i.e., something that can exist in isolation or apart from its subject, it is helpful to consider 
passages from Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle (QMA ) where he is concerned 
with the nature of the accident as well as a passage from a mature work, Quodlibetal 
Questions.  I will consider the passage from the QMA first in which he asks whether it is 
of the essence or nature of the accident to inhere in a subject.  In his discussion he makes 
several distinctions, the first involving two different senses of accident:  
Reply:  to begin with one must distinguish what is meant by “accident.” 
For “accident”:  [a] if it refers to what the name signifies per se, as the 
concept on which the name is imposed per se, i.e., “accidentality” itself, 
“inherence” would seem to be synonymous with this, and in this sense no 
question would arise.  [b] If it refers to something that is called “accident” 
concretely, for example, quantity, then there [is] room for a question, 
hereafter it will be understood in this sense.426 
 
The distinction between the above two senses of “accident” is based on its different 
significations, the mental entity or concept and the extramental entity or thing.  On the 
one hand, there is the conceptual meaning of accident and here ‘accident’ and inherence 
are synonymous.  On the other hand, when the actual concrete accident is considered, the 
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relationship of accident to inherence is not clear.  Scotus considers an accident a thing 
that has its own existence such that when considered in this way it is considered not only 
apart from the substance in which it inheres but apart from inherence at all.427  This is in 
line with the previous discussion, which according to Cross, it is clear, for Scotus, that 
accidents count as individual things, as beings that can be known.428  Cross explains that 
for Scotus, since accidents are principles of acting, that is, principles for knowing a 
substance, as they are themselves objects of sense cognition, therefore, they are things 
that exist both as mental entities and extramental things.429   
Accidentality as a mental entity is the common nature of accident under the garb 
of universality.  So indirectly, the word “accident” refers to the extramental common 
nature in referring to the concept.430  If “accident” simply refers to the concept, then it is 
the essence of accidentality that is its sense, i.e., its definition.  But since an accident is a 
thing, it has its own essence and essential properties.  When “accident” is understood as 
the actual accident, inherence is not strictly synonymous with it.   
Said in another way, the definition of accident includes the notion of inherence 
such that in this sense accident and inherence are synonymous.  To say that an accident 
inheres in a subject is an analytic statement.  It simply clarifies the nature of accident.  
This is certainly in line with the way that Aristotle understands accident.  But there is 
another sense [b], where “accident” signifies an accident in a concrete sense, that is, as a 
particular thing that is understood as an accident, for example, quantity or quality.  Scotus 
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nature. 
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claims that in this sense, accident is not necessarily synonymous with inherence.  Since 
an accident is a thing, it has an essence and essential properties.  Thus, when considering 
the accident as a thing, inherence becomes one of its essential properties.  It seems that 
there are at least two motivations behind this second sense of accident.   
First, a particular instance of an accident can be considered apart from the 
substance that it might really inhere in.  And when considered simply as itself, inhering is 
a property of it, not its meaning.  In the case of transubstantiation an accident really does 
exist apart from its substance.  That this can happen is not simply due to a miracle.  The 
accident itself must be intrinsically capable of existing independent of the substance or it 
would never be able to so exist.  The notions of accident and substance remain the same, 
but as they are manifested in reality in the sacrament of the altar, accidents exist apart 
from the substance that is no longer present.  The framework of signification at the level 
of name to concept and concept to essence remains intact but cannot speak to what 
happens in the eucharist, in terms of inherence.   
Second, another motivation of Scotus concerns the fact that substance is never 
directly or immediately experienced.431  What moves the sense is not the substance but 
the accident.432 Accident is directly known, substance is indirectly known.  While it 
might be the case that substance is more primary than accident since accident is said of 
substance, it is the particular accident that is perceived.  The fact that Scotus distinguishes 
                                                 
431
 Wolter 1946, 63-64.  Wolter writes, “Scotus never tires of pointing out that we have no immediate 
knowledge of substance as such.”   
432
 QMA. bk 7, q. 3, [2]:  “Quod species substantiae non sit in intellectu, probatio:  quia tunc species 
substantiae prius esset in sensu et sic posset substantia cognosci a sensu, cuius oppositum est manifestum, 
quia omnia sensibilia sunt quantittes vel qualitates.. . . Aliter dicitur quod non est in intellectu nisi species 
accidentis, et immediate causatur illa species ab accidente, et mediate a substantia.  Et primo repraesentat 
accidens, et secundario substantiam. . . Quia illa cognitio quam habemus de substantia est perfectior 
cognitio cum attingitur quam cognitio accidentis; tunc, licet accidens sit primum cognoscibile respectur 
intellectus nostri generatione, . .” 
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this second sense of accident, conceived as a thing, is motivated not only by a theological 
concern, but also the way substance is experienced.  
 Scotus now examines the nature of inherence and claims that it has two different 
meanings: 
[a] one is the actual union of an existing accident with its existing subject 
as a kind of act with the potential. [b] The other is an essential order or 
dependence of the accident upon substance according to the essential 
natures of each.433 
 
Scotus claims that while [a] is evident because it concerns actual existence, [b] abstracts 
from existence and therefore needs proof.434 What should be noted about [a] is that 
Scotus understands the relationship of accident to substance as a “kind of act with 
potential” and is thus referring here to accidental unity, which, like substantial unity, is 
grounded in a metaphysics of potency and act. But the union of accident and substance 
does not result in a subsistent per se being. The accident qualifies the substance. Scotus 
further argues that usually the two senses of inherence would be “actual or aptitudinal” 
but he rejects this distinction because it cannot account for the separated accident.435  It is 
necessary in transubstantiation that the accidents of bread and wine remain as accidents 
in order to signify the body of Christ.  But their being as accidents cannot be founded on 
their actual inherence in a subject, since there is no subject in which to inhere, so it must 
be founded on something other, namely, the essential order that exists between the 
essential natures of accident and subject.  This latter kind of inherence applies to both the 
                                                 
433
 QMA, bk 7, q. 1, 9[2]:  “Tunc distinguitur secundo de inhaerentia, quod inhaerentia est duplex.  Una est 
actualis unio accidentis exsistentis cum subiecto xsistente, ut actus aliqulis cum potentiali  Alia est 
dependentia sive essentialis ordo accidentis secundum quiditatem suam ad substantiam secundum 
quiditatem suam.”  
434
 QMA, bk. 7, q. 1, 9[2]:  “Prima patet.  Secunda probatur, quia demonstratio abstrahit ab exsistentia et a 
consequentibus rem in quantum exsistit.” 
435
 QMA, bk. 7, q. 1, 10[2]:  “Hoc forte consuevit dici de inhaerentia actuali et aptitudinali.  Prima non 
semper inest accidenti; secunda semper inest, sive exsistenti sine subiecto sive non exsistenti.  –Contra:  
aptitudinalis in accidente separato non verificat aliquam praedicationem denominativam sicut secunda hic.” 
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concept of accident and to the separated accident, which remains accident even if not 
inhering in a subject.436   
 Scotus takes his examination of the notion of inherence a step further as he 
considers the distinction between “to be of the essence of A” and “to be A itself.”  Scotus 
argues, 
Thirdly, there is a clarification of “to be of the essence.”  For “to be of the 
essence of A” is not the same really or essentially as “to be A itself.”  The 
first indeed implies the second but the converse is not true, for what is of 
the essence of A is precisely that which is included per se in the 
quidditative concept of A and therefore, is posited in the essential notion 
of its quiddity, and not as something added.  Something can be really 
identical with A although it lies outside its concept, for example, unity, 
truth, etc. are outside the concept of being, which is prior to these [proper 
attributes], according to Avicenna, V [of his Metaphysics].  However, this 
does not say these are really distinct things other than being.437 
 
Unity and truth lie outside of the concept of being in the sense that they are formally 
distinct from being but really identical with it.  In light of this distinction, Scotus writes 
that Avicenna calls, in an extended sense, unity and truth “accidents” in relation to the 
concept of being for they are not part of the concept.  The other example that Scotus 
gives is that of the intensification of whiteness.  If a minimal whiteness is intensified in 
its whiteness it is identical to it in reality but the degree of intensification is something in 
addition to the  concept of whiteness itself.438   
                                                 
436
 Of course the real problem here is that the accidents of bread no longer signify bread but the body of 
Christ.  Still their presence as accident is required.  Somehow their natural signification is nulled, but they 
are still able to signify. 
437
 QMA bk. 7, q. 1, 11[2]:  “Tertio exponitur illud quod dicitur ‘de essentia’.  Non enim idem est esse de 
essentia a et esse idem essentialiter vel realiter ipsi a.  Primum quidem infert secundem, sed non e 
converso.  Quia de essentia a praecise est illud quod includitur per se in conceptu quiditativo a, et ideo 
ponitur in ratione eius quiditativa, non ut additum.  Potest autem esse idem realiter ipsi a licet sit extra 
conceptum eius, puta ‘unitas’, ‘veritas’ etc. extra conceptum entis qui prior est illis, secundum Avicennam 
V.  Non tamen ista dicunt rem aliam ab ente.”  
438
 QMA, bk 7, q. 1, 11[2]:  “Exemplum hic de gradu addito albedini remissae quando intenditur:   
secundum unam OPINIONEM est idem realiter, non tamen de essentia eius.” 
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 There are at least three points to be taken from this discussion.  First, the accident 
can be understood as a per se being not simply because it can be considered in itself apart 
from the substance but because the accident is actually a thing in its own right, 
independent from substance.  Moreover, when the accident is considered as a concrete, 
extramental being, what Scotus observes is that neither kind of inherence is a part of its 
essence.439 
 The second point concerns the distinction between “being of the essence of A” 
and “being A itself.”  Since inherence is not strictly of the nature of an accident, the 
example of the accident speaks to the very problem at issue for Scotus in Quodlibetal 
Questions 9, namely, the nature of the informing form.  If it is the case that an accident is 
in a sense in its nature indifferent to inhering, then it is easy to see how a substantial form 
in its nature can be indifferent to informing.  The issue is of course how the intellective 
soul which is an informing form can exist separately from the body.   
 The third point has to do with the nature of cognition.  The relationship of the 
intelligible species to the intellective soul is not one of form to matter, but one of accident 
to substance.440  The intelligible species itself is an accident such that it is that which has 
a representational content that signifies the extramental common nature.  As an accident 
                                                 
439
 QMA, bk 7, q. 1, 12[3]:  “Ad quaestionem igitur primo dico quod neutra inhaerentia est de essentia 
accidentis secundo modo sumpti, scilicet accipiendo ‘accidens’ pro eo quod hoc nomine denominatur, 
ut’quantum’, ‘quale’ et huiusmodi.” 
440
 Perler 2003, 167.  See also QMA, bk. 5, q. 7 where Scotus asks about the possibility of some accidents 
which are only numerically different existing in the same subject.  He is here concerned about the nature of 
the existence of both the sensible species and the intelligible species in the sense organ or intellective soul, 
respectively.  It is clear that he understands the species as accidents. For example at  3 [1]: Scotus writes, 
“Ergo videtur quod species sit accidens reale.”  Etzhorn and Wolter provide a nice explanation for the 
meaning of the word species in footnote 1 where they also write, “ In all cases it [the species] is an 
accidental quality in the subject in which it exists, whether that be the object itself, the medium, or the soul 
of the knowing subject.” (438) 
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itself, in its nature, the intelligible species is indifferent to inhering and that this is the 
case will help explain its presence to the intellect, which will be discussed in Chapter 4.   
Based on the above discussion concerning the nature of accident and the nature of 
inherence, Scotus clearly distinguishes between the concept of accident and the concrete 
accident in itself.  What determines the nature of the accident is not its relationship to 
substance.  This relationship lies outside the nature of the particular accident.  The point 
is that the mode of its existence is not what determines what it is. It is in this way that the 
accident can be understood as a per se being in the first sense.   
 
3.3.1.b. The Second Sense of Per Se Being   
 Scotus delineates a second sense of per se being:  
A per se being is contrasted with one that exists in another, and in this 
sense it is a thing which neither actually inheres in another nor has an 
aptitude to do so. Every substance, not only one that is composite, but 
matter and form as well, are all beings per se in this sense, for though a 
substantial form is in the matter it informs, it does not inhere in it like an 
accident, for “to inhere” says that it does not inform its subject per se.  
What inheres is neither an act simply, but only in a qualified sense, nor 
does it form one thing per se with the subject in which it inheres.  What 
informs per se has the opposite characteristics.441 
 
Per se being in the second sense is found in the distinction between the acts of inhering 
and informing.  All substances, then, not only the composite substance, but also matter 
and form themselves, have this type of per se being, namely, their being does not inhere 
in another nor has the aptitude to do so.  Even though a form is said to be in the matter, it 
                                                 
441
 Quodl. 9.7 [3]:  “…ens per se prout distinguitur contra ens in alio, et sic per se ens est idem quod non 
inhaerens actualiter, nec aptitudinaliter, et hoc modo quaecunque substantia non tantum composita, sed 
etiam materia, et forma est ens per se, quia forma substantialis, licet in sit materiae informando non tamen 
inhaeret, qui inhaerere dicit non per se informare:  qui inhaerens nec est actus simpliciter, sed actus 
secundum quid, nec cum illo, cui inhaeret facit per se unum, opposita conveniunt ei, quod per se informat.”  
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is in the matter not by way of inhering in it but rather by informing it, actualizing a 
potentiality.  Form is not in this matter as an accident is in a subject.  Rather by informing 
the matter, the form is the act of the matter.  The accident is not an act simply nor does it, 
in inhering in a subject, form one thing with that subject.  As per my discussion on 
substantial unity, that which informs is, by contrast, a simple act, such that in informing a 
subject, it becomes one with it bringing about a new, whole individual with properties 
unique to its wholeness and thus different from its components.   
 
3.3.1.c. Subsistent Per Se Being  
Scotus claims that there is an even higher degree of per se being.  He finds this 
third degree of being per se expressed in the suppositum.  The suppositum is a fully 
subsistent individual that is incommunicable and whose nature is repugnant to being 
divided. It is this kind of per se being that enjoys the highest degree of singularity and is 
that which I contend can ultimately guarantee the unity of the human being for Scotus.   
What drives Scotus’ understanding of a suppositum is a theological concern, the 
backdrop of which is the incarnation.  If the incarnation not only reveals God as father 
and son but further reveals the holy spirit, each of these three as essentially divine must 
be able to be considered in themselves, that is, have per se being.  If this is the case, that 
each has per se being, then each would have to be a suppositum, a subsistent individual.  
Alluntis and Wolter explain that suppositum is a Latin word used to translate the Greek 
word, hypostasis, which Greek theologians used to indicate one of the persons in the 
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Trinity.442  The theological doctrine of the trinity, that there are three distinct persons, 
moves Scotus beyond the categorical definition of a substance as that which merely 
enjoys independent existence and does not inhere in another.  In order to explain the 
distinction between the diverse persons in the trinity, there must be something more to a 
substance than merely the capacity to exist independently.443  Moreover, as has already 
been shown, something other than matter has to serve as that which individuates the per 
se being of the substance, not only because God is immaterial but because matter in its 
indeterminateness alone is incapable of grounding the understanding of per se being as a 
suppositum, a being whose nature is incommunicable.  The suppositum is a subsistent per 
se being in the most proper sense, as Scotus explains: 
Third, a per se being may refer to one which has its ultimate actuality, so 
that it is simply unable to be ordered per se to some ulterior act beyond 
that which it has, where the ulterior actualization would belong to it per 
se, either in a primary or participated sense. A per se being in this sense is 
called a suppositum, and if it is of an intellectual nature, it is called a 
person.  Only this third is properly said to be subsisting, in the sense the 
Philosopher has in mind when he says:  “Matter is only potentially ‘a this’ 
and the form is that in virtue of which a thing is called ‘a this,’ but that 
third being compounded of both matter and form is simply ‘a this.’  In 
other words, something subsisting per se has its ultimate actualization so 
that it is unable to be ordered per se to some ulterior act.444 
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 Alluntis and Wolter 1975, 536.  Alluntis and Wolter explain that suppositum is a Latin translation of 
hypostasis, the term that Greek theologians used to designate a divine person of the Trinity.  Theologians,  
being particularly interested in understanding the union of human nature and divinity in the second person 
of the Trinity, were forced to develop a clear idea of a person – human, angelic or divine.  Along  these 
lines they retained the word, suppositum, to designate any fully subsistent individual, rational or not, 
though Boethius had defined the a person as “an individual substance of a rational nature.” Richard of St. 
Victor, according to Alluntis and Wolter, seems to have had a direct influence on Scotus’ own 
understanding and use of suppositum.  A suppositum “would seem to be the incommuicable existence of 
any nature, and a person would be an intellect suppositum. 
443
 Cross 1999, 67.  Cross explains that for Scotus any independent substance exhibits three features:  
existence per se, individual unity, and non-repeatability (incommunicability).  It is haecceity that endows 
the substance with these features.  Moreover, a divine person also exhibits these three features. 
444
 Quodl. 9.7 [3]:  “Tertio modo ens per se dicitur illud, quod habet actualitatem ultimam, ita quod non est 
per se ordinabile ad aliqueactum simpliciter, ultra istum, quem habet, qui quidem actus ulterior possit esse 
actus eius per se: et hoc, vel primo, vel participative: quod hoc modo est per se ens communiter dicitur 
suppositum, et in natura intellectuali dicitur persona: hoc modo intelligitur maior de ente per se.  Istud 
solum dicitur proprie subsistens, sicut Philosophus loquitur secundo de Anima dicens, quod materia est 
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That which has ultimate actuality is what cannot be ordered to another, and this is the 
subsistent individual. 
Scotus explains further that “a substantial form is ordered per se to the being of 
the whole composite.”445 The substantial form is a per se being in the second sense.  
Since it can be ordered to the being of another, it is not a per se being in the third sense.  
The substantial form is ordered to the being of the whole composite, which Scotus 
explains is the act of the composite primarily and of the form participatively.446 The 
substantial form as part of the whole has only incidental being whereas the whole is said 
to have primary being.447  It is clear, then, why the angel as an immaterial form and a per 
se being in the third sense cannot be an informing form.  The angel exists in a primary 
way and cannot be ordered to the being of another. But what about the intellective soul of 
the human being?   
 The immaterial intellective soul is the specific form of the human being.  While it 
is capable of independent existence it is still ordered per se to the being of the individual 
human being.  The question arises as to whether the being of the intellective soul is 
identical to the being of the composite human individual.  Scotus argues that it is not.  As 
an immaterial form that is capable of informing matter, the intellective soul in relation to 
the composite has being only participatively.  The being of the intellective soul is simply 
                                                                                                                                                 
potentia hoc aliquid, species autem, secundum quam aliquid dicitur hoc aliquid: tertium quod est ex ipsis, 
quod simpliciter est hoc aliquid, scilicet per se subsistens habet actualitatem ultimam non ordinabilem per 
se ad aliquem actum ulteriorem.” 
445
 Quodl. 9.8[4]:  “. . . forma substantialis per se ordinatur ad esse totius.” 
446
 Quodl. 9.8 [4]:  “Illud autem esse est actus simpliciter, compositi quidem per se primo sed formae 
paticipative.” 
447
 Quodl. 9.8[4]:  “. . . quia pars dicitur esse per se, per accidens, hoc est per se participative, totum autem 
primo quod igitur est per se subsistens nec potest ordinari ad aliquod esse per se, illud non potest esse per 
se forma.” 
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not the being of the composite because it is part of the composite.448   The intellective 
soul enjoys the first sense and the second sense of per se being but not the third; it cannot 
be understood as a person.449    
For the human being to be considered in the third sense of per se being, she must 
be considered at the level of her substantial unity, the unity of form and matter, for it is 
this unity that is the ground of her humanity and her personhood, not her soul alone.  Two 
questions need to be considered.  First, how is the human soul both capable of informing 
the body and existing independently?  Second, what property does the intellective soul 
have such that when it is joined to the body, the human being is understood as a person?  
The first question will be considered in the following two sections.  I will consider the 
second question in section 3.4 of this chapter. 
 
3.3.2 Second Argument - Informing Form Communicates Actuality  
The second argument in question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions in which Scotus 
explains that the angel cannot be an informing form reads “whatever can be a substantial 
form has the immediate ability through its essence to give actuality in an unqualified 
sense to matter itself.”450  But, Scotus argues, if it is impossible for a being to be such an 
“act of matter,” then it enjoys a greater perfection as a form.  Since the essence of the 
angel does not include the ability to inform matter, it is therefore repugnant to it to do so.  
                                                 
448
 Quodl. 9.43 [15]:  “Videtur ergo ista neganda quod esse animae est idem, quod esse totius:  quia anima 
habens esse, videtur pars totius habentis esse.” 
449
 Quodl. 9.12 [4]:  “Hinc etiam patetquare anima separata non est persona.” 
450
 Quodl. 9.13 [5]:  “Quicquid potest ese forma substantialis hoc sibi competit immediate per essentiam 
suam, scilicet posse dare actum simpliciter ipsi materiae.”  Scotus here appeals to Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
104a23-30 and continues: “. . . quia patet quod non est alia ratio, quare hoc posset facere per se unum cum 
materia:  nisi quia hoc est per se actual, et illud per se potentia et huius non est aliqua ratio ulterior: nisi 
propria ratio huius et illius; ergo cui repugnat esse actum materiae, hoc praecise repugnat sibi per rationem 
propriam.” 
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Thus, the angel cannot be an informing form.  The human soul, by contrast, is a 
substantial form and therefore is essentially able to communicate actuality to matter.  
Scotus considers this second argument to be a conclusive one showing that it is 
impossible for the angel to be made into an informing form.  The ability to inform matter 
or the repugnance to do so is an essential property.  Thus, if the angel would be made into 
an informing form it would be essentially destroyed, i.e., no longer the angel.  An 
important point to take from this argument is that what something is, is determined 
intrinsically and not extrinsically.   
 
3.3.3 Third Argument - Remoteness from Matter 
 The third argument in question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions that Scotus 
considers is based on the order of perfection in forms.451  The more perfect a form is, the 
more removed from matter it is.452  But according to the intellectual soul’s own nature, it 
has the ability to exist independently of matter.  The angel is more perfect than the 
intellectual soul, therefore it should be even more remote from matter than the intellectual 
soul is.453  Scotus observes, however, that the degree of difference between the human 
soul and the angel is small.   Unless it were impossible for the angel to exist in matter 
then it would be hard to see how the intellectual soul, which in its nature is able to exist 
independently from matter, would be different from the angel.   
                                                 
451
 Quodl. 9.15 [6]:  “Tertia ratio posset poni talis:  ordo perfectionis in formis.” 
452
 Quodl. 9.15 [6]:  “. . .videtur esse per recessum earum a materia, sicut actus perfectior plus recedit a 
potentia;” 
453
 Quodl. 9.15 [6]:  “. . . sed anima intellectiva tantum recedit a materia, quod naturae sua relicta, potest 
habere esse suum proprium sine ea:  ergo Angelus, qui est perfectior quacunque anima intellectiva, plus 
recedit a materia, sed non videtur quod plus possit recedere, nisi sibi repugnet inesse materiae.” 
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Scotus contends that this argument does not prove much, for there are many ways 
to show that one act excels another, i.e., that one act is more perfect than another, other 
than the remoteness from matter.  Moreover, the intellectual soul essentially possesses the 
dual capability of being able to exist independently from matter, and at the same time, 
like an inferior form, being able to exist “perfectly united with matter.”454  Both of these 
abilities are had by the intellectual soul essentially.  These abilities, to exist 
independently from matter and to be united with matter are defined independently of each 
other and are not contradictories.  Thus, Scotus claims, that in like manner, one could 
argue that while it is true that the angel can exist without matter more perfectly than the 
intellectual soul, that the angel is able to do so would not in itself preclude it from 
existing in matter.  As the second argument above showed, the ability to exist in matter or 
not is an intrinsic ability part of the essence of a being.  The angel, by its very nature, is 
essentially unable to exist in matter.  What distinguishes the intellectual soul from the 
angel is an essential difference that defines their relationship to matter, in this case, how 
remote each is from matter.  Thus, the remoteness of matter does not in itself offer 
conclusive evidence to show that the angel cannot be an informing form.  An interesting 
point that emerges from Scotus’ treatment of this argument concerns the distinction 
between being dependent on matter and being united with matter.  Whereas the 
dependency on matter is imperfection, Scotus contends that it is not clear that the ability 
to be united with matter or to communicate actuality to matter is.  The angel clearly, in no 
way, depends on matter.  However, that the angel would be able to communicate 
                                                 
454
 Quodl. 9.16 [6]:  “. . . imo anima intellectiva, licet possit esse sine materia:  tamen ita perfecte potest 
uniri materiae sicut aliqua forma inferior; . .” 
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actuality to matter is not necessarily an imperfection. 455  The intellectual soul being able 
to exist independently from matter is also able to be perfectly united with matter.   Not 
only is it the case that the perfection of the form that is able to exist independently of 
matter is in no way diminished by the ability to “communicate actuality” to matter, but 
the distinction between dependency on matter and being united with matter that Scotus 
draws out here provides a way into understanding how the intellectual soul does exist in a 
perfect unity with the body.   
What Scotus offers here goes beyond Aristotle’s treatment of the intellective soul.  
Aristotle, as seen in Chapter 1, holds that the intellectual soul is separable from the body 
and does not depend upon the body for its operations.  But Aristotle does not show how 
the intellectual soul is then capable of existing united with the body, the nature of that 
existence, or how in being separable and independent of the body is able to work with the 
body especially in terms of the fact that Aristotle claims that without the images provided 
through sensation there would be no thought.    
To solve these issues, Scotus focuses his attention on the nature of the essence 
and essential properties.  At a very fundamental level of the being of any individual entity 
exists a more definite structure than Aristotle understood.  That Scotus works so hard to 
show that the fact that an angel cannot be made into an informing form because by its 
nature it is essentially repugnant to being united with matter, shows that Scotus sees that 
at a fundamental level lies an intricate structure and it is this structure that must be 
understood in order to explain the unity of the individual being, and in particular, the 
soul-body composite. 
                                                 
455
 Quodl. 9.16 [6]:  “. . . non tamen est evidens, quod posse communicare actualitatem suam materiae sit 
imperfectionis;. . .” 
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3.3.4 Fourth Argument – Intellective Function 
The fourth argument in question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions that Scotus 
considers concerning whether an angel can be an informing form derives from the 
characteristic function of the angel, which is understanding.456  The argument claims that 
since the act of understanding is itself an immaterial potency, then that which 
understands, the intellectual nature, must itself be immaterial.457 To prove that the 
activity of understanding is immaterial, Scotus argues that the nature of the agent’s 
faculty as the proximate ground of the activity determines the nature of the activity.458  If 
the faculty is material, then its activity cannot be immaterial.459 The angel’s faculty is 
immaterial, thus, its activity is immaterial.  The problem that emerges here concerns the 
nature of the immateriality of the intellectual soul.  If it is the immateriality of the angel, 
due to its intellectual nature, that precludes it from being united with matter, then how 
can it be shown that the intellectual soul, which as an intellectual nature engages in the 
same immaterial act of understanding, is able to be united with matter?  Scotus analyzes 
three ways in which the intellectual soul can be understood as immaterial. 
 
                                                 
456
 Quodl. 9.17 [7]:  “Quarta ratio videtur sumi, secundum aliquos, ex operatione Angeli, quae est 
intelligere;” 
457
 Quodl. 9.17 [7]:  “. . . intelligere est operatio immaterialis: ergo intellectus est potentia immaterialis:  et 
ulterious, ergo natura intellctualis est natura immaterialis.” 
458
 Quodl. 9.17 [7]:  “. . . operatio enim inest operanti secundum potentiam propriam, ut secundum rationem 
proximam operandi” 
459
 Quodl. 9.17 [7]:  “. . . et per consequens, si potentia sit materialis, illa operatio non est immaterialis.” 
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 The first argument that Scotus considers is based on the claim that the intellectual 
soul does not require a bodily organ to carry out its operations. 460  In this way, 
intellection differs from sensation which is organic, i.e., each sense requires a particular 
bodily organ, a distinct part of the body structured in a specific way.461  Scotus claims, 
however, that the fact that intellection requires no organ does not in itself support the 
claim that intellection is immaterial.462  Scotus offers fire as a counterexample.  Fire is a 
material form whose operation is non organic, “provided it be uniformly in the whole and 
in each part thereof,” (dum tamen sit uniformis in toto et in qualibet parte).463 
Scotus, however, then considers the nature of the soul as the principle of organic 
life.   As the principle of organic life, the soul does require not a particular or determined 
part of the body, but a body as whole which is able to carry out diverse actions.464  As the 
principle of organic life, the soul is somehow unlimited in its actions.  It requires a body 
that has unlike parts by means of which these actions can be exercised.  Alluntis and 
                                                 
460
 Quodl. 9.26 [9]:  Ibid.  While it is my interest here to offer a reading of Scotus’ arguments in the 
Quodibetal Questions, it should be noted that Scotus gives arguments for the immateriality of soul in the 
Oxon. See Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2. Scotus here argues that intellective knowledge transcends every form of 
sense knowledge and offers three proofs to support this claim:  first, intellective knowledge is non-organic,  
second, we possess some immaterial knowledge, and third, we are able to will in such a way that we can 
determine ourselves freely. In the second proof he considers three definitions of immateriality that are in 
some way parallel to the three that he offers in question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions:  first, immateriality 
means non-organic, second immateriality means non-extended, and third, immateriality refers to the object 
which is itself immaterial.  I will return to this third definition of immateriality in section 3.4 of this 
chapter.  See Cross 2003, 263-267 for a clear discussion where these two texts are compared.      
461
 Quodl. 9.26 [9]:  “Uno modo per oppositum ad operationes sensitivas, quae dicuntur organicae, quia 
exercentur per organa determinata et sic materiales, quae requirunt determinatam partem corporis 
determinate complexionatam et per oppositum intellectio est operatio non organica.”  
462
 Quodl. 9.26 [10]:  “Sed ex isto intellectu antecedentis non videtur sequi immaterialitas formae .” 
463
 Quodl. 9.26 [10]:  “Forma enim pure materialis, dum tamen sit uniformis in toto et in qualibet parte, non 
dicitur operari per organum, sicut ignis non dicitur operari per organum.” 
464
 Quodl. 9.26 [10]:  “Virtus autem formativa non agit per membrum proprium, et ratio huius est, quia illa 
sola forma dicitur principium operandi organice, quae scilicet quodammodo ilimitata in agendo otest esse 
principium difformium actionum, quae tamen non possunt elici, nisi mediantibus partibus dissimilibus, et 
ideo requiritur, quod perfectibile a tali forma habeat partes dissimiles, per quas operationes illae organicae 
exerceantur, et talis forma est priorie sola ania, quae propter sui perfectionem, ultra formas inferiores potest 
esse principium plurium operationum per ipsam convenientium suo toti, et ideo requirit pro suo perfectibili 
adaequato corpus habens partes maioris dissimilitudinis, quae coveniunt pluribus operationibus 
dissimilibus, quarum potest esse principium.” 
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Wolter note that there is an addition in all three manuscripts here.  In this addition, Scotus 
observes that it can be argued that intellection is just as material a function as vision.465  
Whereas vision is a function of part of the body, intellection would be a function of the 
whole.  Now if the soul is the principle of intellection insofar as it perfects the parts rather 
than the whole, then it could be said that the finger understands.  Consequently, if the 
whole is just as material as its parts, it follows that this function, which pertains to the 
form as it is in the whole, is just as material as a function that pertains to a form as it is in 
a part. Scotus replies that the intellectual soul, which has understanding insofar as it is 
this sort of unlimited form, actualizes not a part but the whole.  Thus, based on this 
reasoning, the intellectual soul, though it does not require an organ to operate, in 
actualizing the whole being can be understood as material. 
 It is clear that Scotus does not consider the inorganic argument to be successful in 
establishing that because the intellect does not function by way of a specific bodily organ, 
it is therefore immaterial.  But his concerns go beyond this argument to the question of 
how we could understand the activities of the intellective soul to be immaterial.  Cross 
points out that in both the Oxon. and the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus is responding to 
Aquinas’ claim that the immateriality of the soul is proved by the immateriality of the 
                                                 
465
 I here cite the entirety of the addition to Quodl. 9.26 [10] In the Latin text this addition is italicized:  
“Imo ex isto intellectu antecedentis videtur posse argui, quod intellectio est operatio aeque materialis, sicut 
visio:  quia visio potest exerceri per partem materialem determinatam:  intellectio autem non per aliquam 
partme, sed est totius primo:  non enim manus intelligit, sed homo:  sed si anima non ut perficiens totum 
possit esse principium intelligendi ergo ipsa ut perficiens quamcunque partem aeque posset esse 
principium intelligendi, sicut ipsa, ut perficiens totius, et tunc dici posset ita digitus intelligere, sicut homo, 
quia ita digitus esset in actu per formam, et et principium intelligendi. Si ergo totium ex aeque materiale 
sicut pars, vel magis sequiritur quod ista operatio, qua non competit formae unisi ut est in toto sit aeque 
materialis, sicut illa qua sibi competit ut est in parte.  Respondeo ad hoc, operatio quae competit formae, ut 
est quodammodo illimitta perfectio, si communicetur materiae el toti, communicatur ei, quod estin actu per 
formam sic illimitatam tale est totum et non aliqua pars eius respectu anima intellectiva cui ut sic illimitata 
est competit intellectio. 
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operation of the soul.466  Cross observes that Scotus recognizes an ambiguity in Aquinas’ 
use of the word “immateriality” and thus responds in both texts by offering several 
different meanings.  But it seems to me that it is not Aquinas, nor the ambiguity in the use 
of immateriality that primarily motivates Scotus here.  Rather, there seem to be at least 
two problems at issue:  first, how the intellect as immaterial is able to be united with the 
material body, and second, how the intellect functions with the body, i.e., is able to 
access the images provided by way of sensation and imagination.   
For example, Scotus considers the argument based on angels’ characteristic 
function, namely, understanding.  From this it is argued that understanding is an 
immaterial function, and therefore the intellect is immaterial.467  Scotus points out that 
our soul is not purely intellectual, like the Angel, for it does depend on matter for some of 
its operations.468  Considering Scotus’ counterexample of the soul as the principle of life 
in the inorganic argument, as well as the argument in the addition,  both make clear that 
even given that the intellect does not operate through a specific bodily organ, it is hard to 
see how the soul does not function by way of the whole human composite.  By no means 
does Scotus here reject the immateriality of the soul, but his concerns about its 
functioning with the body are certainly revealed.   
He considers two additional ways in which immateriality could be understood.  
The second way in which understanding could be understood as immaterial concerns the 
object of understanding.  The process of understanding is intentional in that it “tends 
                                                 
466
 Cross 2003, 263-264. 
467
 Quodl. 9.17 [7]:  “secundum aliquos, ex operatione Angeli, quae est intelligere; et hoc sic:  intelligere 
est operatio immaterialis:  ergo intellectus est potentia immaterialis.”  Scotus here cites Aquinas, ST I, q. 
50, a. 2. 
468
 Quodl. 9.19 [7]:  “non sic manifeste tenet de natura, quae est diminute intellectualis; et cum hoc 
sensitiva quantum ad aliquam potentiam sicut ex anima nostra quia illa dependet a materia in operando, 
saltem aliqua operatione, sed natura mere intellectualis nulo modo depdnedet a materia in operando.” 
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towards an object abstracted from matter.”469  Since the object of understanding is that 
which itself is abstracted from matter, the understanding itself must be immaterial 
according to what Scotus earlier argued: 9.21:   
. . . every act gets its specification and perfection from its object.  But the 
object of intellect qua intellect abstracts from matter, because the forms in 
matter are all individual but the intellect does not grasp them as 
individual.470  
  
Scotus rejects this argument.  He argues that the immateriality of the object is not enough 
to prove that understanding itself is immaterial.471  Scotus observes that everyone agrees 
that that the object of understanding is indeed the quiddity of the material object.472  But 
Scotus argues:   
. . . if all that is required [to prove the claim “to understand is immaterial”] 
is to have immateriality in the object, i.e., abstraction from individual 
matter, then the operation of our intellect is immaterial terminatively, 
because it is indifferent to singular material objects.473 
 
  Scotus argues that if it is to be shown that understanding is immaterial then what truly 
has to be proved is that the operation by which the universal is thought is an operation 
that cannot be communicated to matter.474  He offers no such argument here. 
 The third way in which understanding might be shown to be immaterial pertains 
to the nature of that which receives the object of intellection.  What is the proper recipient 
subject of intellection is the form and not the matter.  Moreover, Scotus clarifies, it is not 
                                                 
469
 Quodl. 9.27 [11]:  “. . . hoc est, tendit in obiectum abstractum a materia” 
470
 Quodl. 9.21 [7]:  “. . . quia ab obiecto actus quilibet recipit speciem, et perfectionem; nunc autem 
obiectum intellectus, inquantum huismodi, a materia abstrahitur; quia formae in materia sunt individuales; 
quas non apprehendit, secundum quod huiusmodi.” 
471
 Quodl.  9.27 [11]:  “. . . sed ista probatio non concludi immaerialitatem simpliciter, etiam terminative, 
sive obiective,” 
472
 Quodl. 9.27 [11]:  “. . . quia secundum omnes quiditas rei materialis potest esse per se obiectum 
intellectus nostri.” 
473
 Quodl. 9.27 [11]:  “. . . sed tantummodo, si requiritur in obiecto immaterialitas, hoc st, abstrio a materia 
individuali, et ex hoc sequitur quod operatio sit immaterialis terminative, hoc est, indifferens ad obiecta 
singularia materialia,” 
474
 Quodl. 9.27 [11]:  “. . . et tunc ad habendum conclusionem intentam, oprotet probare quod operatio, 
quae respicit universale pro obiecto, non posset aliquo modo communicari materiae.” 
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the form of the whole, that is, the form of the composite human being, but the form of the 
part, that is, of the soul, which participates in the whole that receives the object of 
understanding.475  The intellective soul, and not something material, is what receives the 
object of understanding.   
In this way it is clear how sensation and intellection are different cognitive 
activities.  In sensation, what receives the form of the sensible object is what is composed 
of both matter and form, i.e., the sense organ.  The sense organ is the bodily organ 
endowed with a sense power.  The example that Scotus gives is of the eye and the power 
of sight.  In order to see an object it is not enough to have an eye but that eye must be 
endowed with the power of sight.  Thus, Scotus explains, it is “the form of the organ as a 
whole which is the proximate ground for receiving the vision, like humanity is the form 
of man as a whole.”476  A sense organ endowed with the sense power is the proximate 
ground of sensation because as such it is “composed of the soul as the principle of the 
operation and of a part of the body structured in a certain way.”477  The power of 
sensation, in other words, is by its very nature dependent on the material sense organ.  So 
when it is said that the power of sense is the recipient of the form of the sensible object, 
what is meant is the power of sense as it is the form of the organ as a whole, both the 
specific material structure and the soul (form) that actualizes it.     
                                                 
475
 Quodl. 9.28 [11]:  “. . . intellectio non est primi aliotrius materialis tanquam proximi receptivi, sed eius 
receptivum proximum et proprium est form, non illa totius, quae est quiditas, sicut est humanitas, sed illa, 
quae est  simplex, et altera pars compositi.” 
476
 Quodl. 9.28 [11]:  “. . . sed forma totius organi eo modo quo humanitas est forma totius hominis, est 
proxima ratio recipiendi visionem.”  
477
 Quodl. 9.29 [11]:  “Ex hoc patet, quod si organum dicatur illa pars totius animalis, in qua tanquam in 
proximo receptivo, recipitur sensatio, organum dicetur esse aliquid compositem ex anima, ut est principium 
talis operationis, et ex parte corporis sic mixta. . .” 
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 In terms of intellection, however, what receives the object of understanding is 
itself immaterial:   
In the case of understanding, however, we have just the opposite, for its 
proximate subject and formal ground for its reception is the soul or some 
portion of the soul which has no matter.”478 
   
What makes understanding immaterial is not simply that it is not organic nor that its 
object is immaterial but rather that only part of the human composite receives the 
intellective object.  What appears to guide Scotus here is the fact that the intellective soul 
can exist apart from the body such that when it is separate from the body, it is still able to 
understand.  If the soul can understand when it is separated from the body, then 
understanding itself does not depend on the material body.479  Thus, the proximate 
recipient of intellection must be immaterial.  Scotus considers this argument the one that 
comes closest to the truth.480 But he qualifies even this.  Much of what this third 
argument establishes is that since understanding is immaterial, and the human being 
understands, then we find a dual commonality shared by the intellective soul and the 
angel, namely, they share the same sort of intellection from which it can be inferred that 
they have the same sort of immateriality, namely, being able to exist independently from 
matter.481  However, Scotus observes that this argument does not justify that the 
intellective soul, given its immateriality, cannot inform matter.482   
                                                 
478
 Quodl. 9.29 [11]:  “Per oppositum est de intellectione, quia receptivum eius proximum, et proxima ratio 
formalis recipiendi eam est anima, vel aliquid ex parte animae praecise, non includendo aliquam materiam. 
. .” 
479
 Quodl. 9.30 [12]:  “. . . intelligere est operatio immaterialis quia proximum receptiuum habet non 
includens materia, saltem corporalem, et ideo sine tali materia potest ipsa operatio haberi, nunc autem 
potens habere operationem sine materia potest habere esse sine materia, ergo natura illa, cuius est ista 
operatio propria, potest habere esse sine materia.” 
480
 Quodl. 9.30 [12]: “Secundum etiam istum tertium intellectum, qui plus continet veritatis. . .” 
481
 Quodl. 9.30 [12]:  “Et hoc ergo medio, scilicet operatione, potest concludi ipsius naturae talis 
immaterialitas, hoc est, a materia in essendo separabilitas: non autem illa immaterialitas ulterior, quae est 
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In Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus concerns himself with the 
question of whether the angel can be an informing form.  Through the four arguments 
that have been examined, it is clear that the Angel cannot be such a form.  By way of this 
examination of the case of the Angel, Scotus is able to show the complexity of the case of 
the intellective soul.  Against the similarities shared by the soul and the Angel, their 
distinctiveness is made clear.  The issue for Scotus is how to reconcile the seemingly 
opposite characteristics of being able to exist in the material body and being able to exist 
apart from it.  What lies at the crux of the matter is the nature of immateriality and how 
the soul relates to the body in terms of function.  What we can take from this discussion 
concerning the three ways in which immateriality can be conceived is while Scotus seems 
not to be wholly satisfied with any of them, he offers valuable insights that will serve the 
discussion of cognition in Chapter 4.  I will now attend to the question of the personhood 
of the human being, not only as that which most fully expresses the unity of the human 
being, but that which makes cognition possible. 
  
3.4  The Nature of the Human Being as Person  
 In his discussion on the third sense of per se being, the suppositum, Scotus makes 
the interesting claim, in two different places, that a subsistent individual that has an 
intellectual nature is a person.483 It is clear that what Scotus has in mind are the divine 
persons of the Trinity, the angel, and the body-soul composite of the human being.  As 
                                                                                                                                                 
impossibilitas informandi materiam, et hoc est rationabile, quod est intellectione, quae est medium, et 
commune animae et Angelo, possit concludi immaterialitas communis utrique.” 
482
 Ibid. 
483
 Quodl. 9.7 [3]:  “. . . et in natura intellectuali dicitur persona. . .” and 9.12 [4]:  “. . . in natura autem 
intellectuali dicitur persona. . . “ 
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we saw, the intellective soul alone is not a person, the subsisting individual human being 
is.  He clarifies what he means by person: 
Thus a person is incommunicable, because it is repugnant to him that he 
be communicated not only as a universal is communicated to its singulars 
but also as a form is communicable to the matter to be actualized through 
it.484  
 
Certainly a person is incommunicable because she possesses all of the characteristics of a 
suppositum, the third sense of per se being.  She is incommunicable because she is a 
subsisting, whole, individual.  What does she possess that makes her a distinct kind of 
suppositum, a person?  What feature does the intellective soul possess such that when 
joined to the body, the human being is understood as a person?   
 To answer these questions on the unity of the human being and the feature of the 
intellective soul that endows the human composite with personhood, I will turn to two 
passages, one in the Quodlibetal Questions and the other in the Oxon.  In both passages, 
Scotus attends to the cognitive activity of intellectual awareness.   
In Question 6 of the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus explains the intellectual 
awareness that an Angel has.  He writes: 
Such knowledge of the existent qua existent and present is 
something an angel has about himself.  For Michael does not know 
himself in the way he would know Gabriel if Gabriel were annihilated, 
viz., by abstractive cognition, but he knows himself as existing and as 
existing in a way that is identical with himself.  He is also ware of his 
intellection in this way if he reflects upon it, considering it not just as any 
object in which one has abstracted from existence or non-existence in the 
way he would think of another angel’s knowledge, if such did not actually 
exist; rather he knows himself to be knowing, that is to say he knows his 
knowledge as something existing in himself.  This knowledge possible for 
                                                 
484
 Quodl. 9.12 [4]:  “. . . et sic est persona incommunicabilis quia sibi repugnat communicari, non tantum 
ut universale, singularibus, sed ut forma materiae actuandae per ipsam.” 
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an angel, therefore is also simply possible for our intellective power, 
because we have the promise that we shall be like angels.485 
 
The knowledge that Scotus is concerned about here is the knowledge of self.  The angel, 
and thus, the human being, is able to know herself to be knowing.  This activity is unique 
and peculiar to intellectual natures.  This is the feature of the intellectual nature that 
endows the divine person, the angel, or the human being with personhood.   
 In the Oxon. where Scotus discusses the different meanings of immateriality, he 
argues that immateriality can be understood in reference to the object, “inasmuch as this 
knowledge considers the object under immaterial aspects, as for instance, abstracting 
from the “here and now” and such like, which are said to be material conditions.”486 
While Scotus claims that this proof is based on the object, it is the activity of conscious 
reflection that grounds it.  The proof rests on the fact that “we experience ourselves 
reflecting on this act of knowledge.”487 Reflection is activity exclusive to an immaterial 
nature, as Scotus contends that what has quantity is unable to reflect.488  The proof that he 
gives amounts to a listing of all the objects that transcend sense knowledge.  But what is 
striking about the list is not the eight objects, it is the fact that Scotus begins each listing 
                                                 
485
 Quodl. 6.19[8]:  “. . . talem autem actum cognitionis de existente, ut existens, et praesens est, habet 
Angelus de se.  Non tantum enim intelligit Michael se, eo modo, quo intelligeret Gabrielem, si Gabriel 
annihilaretur intellectione, scilicet abstrativa:  sed intelligi se, ut existentem, et ut existentem eundem sibi:  
sic etiam intelligit suam intellectionem, si reflectatur supeream, non solum considerando intellectionem, 
sicut quoddam obiectum abstractum ab existentia, et non existentia:  quia sic intelligit intellectionem 
alterius Angeli, si nulla intellectio eius esset, sed intelligit se intelligere, hoc est, intellectionem sibi 
inexistentem:  ergo ista intellectio possibilis Angelo est possibilis simpliciter intellectivae nostrae:  quia 
promittitur nobis, quod erimus aequales Angelis.” 
486
 Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2:  “Tertio modo potest intelligi immaterialitas eius in comparatione ad obiectum, ut 
scilicet respiciat obiectum sub rationibus immaterialibus, utote in quantum abstrahitur ab hic et nunc et 
huiusmodi, quae dicuntur conditiones materiales.” Philosophical Writings, trans. Wolter 1987, 141. 
487
 Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2:  “. . .experimur nos reflecti super actum istius cognitionis, . .” Philosophical 
Writings, trans. Wolter 1987, 141.  
488
 Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2:  “. . . quantum non est super se reflexivum. . .” Philosophical Writings, trans. 
Wolter 1987, 141. 
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of each object with “We experience. . . (Experimur).”489  He ends this litany of reflective 
experience with the contention that if anyone denies that she has such experiences, she 
ought to be told that she is a brute animal.490  A brute animal is not a person.  It is by way 
of internal perception (perceptione interiori) that we experience these acts in ourselves.491  
I want to argue that the feature that endows the intellectual nature with personhood is the 
activity of reflection, the knowledge of the self.  How does the activity of reflection, in 
particular, secure the unity of the human being?  In both of the passages discussed above, 
what allows the reflection to occur is the presence of some object to the intellect.  Such a 
presence is the occasion by which the intellect knows of its knowing and thus knows of 
itself.  In terms of the human being, in this life, it is only by way of sensation that there is 
an object that can be made present to the intellect.  Through the sensitive and intellectual 
activities of the soul, which are formally distinct, the unity of the human being is realized.  
Wolter observes that, for Scotus, the human being, in this life, enjoys a psychic unity.  
What underlies this unity is the harmonic cooperation between the soul and body.492  
                                                 
489
 Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2. 
490
 Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2:  “Si quis autem proterve neget istos actus inesse homini, nec se experiri istos actus 
in se, non est ulterius cum eo disputandum, sed dicendum est sibi quod est brutum; .  .” Philosophical 
Writings, trans. Wolter 1987, 141. 
491
 Oxon. 4, d. 43, q. 2:  “Ita quod quodam sensu, id est, perceptione interiori, experimur istos actus in 
nobis.” Philosophical Writings, trans. Wolter 1987, 141. 
492
 Wolter 1940, 293.  In a footnote where Wolter explains that while Scotus might at some level agree with 
Augustine that the union of the soul with the body, in this life, is a result of sin, Scotus argues that this 
union of the soul and the body is “demanded by the very nature of our soul’s varied and complex faculties 
taken as a whole.”  Scotus claims, “non solum ex peccato sed natura potentiarum pro statu isto.” Oxon. 2,  
d. 3, q. 8, n. 13; XII, 195.  This is in accord with what Scotus says in Question 9 of the Quodlibetal 
Questions as discussed above.  Wolter further explains, “To permit the intellectual soul to function in 
complete independence of the senses would destroy the harmony and unity of man’s psychic life.”  It seems 
to me that this emphasis on the harmonic cooperation between the soul and the body, or between the 
faculties of sensation and intellection is evidence of the deep influence of Aristotle on Scotus. Wolter 
quotes again from Scotus, Oxon. 4, d. 45, q. 2, n. 14; XX, 306:  “. . .etsi cognition posit acquire per usum 
sensuum et per alium modum ab anima separate, non frustra fit unio . .  Unio animae ad corpus non est 
finaliter propter perfectionem totius consistentis ex istis partibus; et ideo licet nulla perfectio posit 
accrescere huic parti vel illi, quae non posset haberi sine tali unione, tamen non fit frustra unio, quia 
perfectio totus, quae principaliter intenditur a natura, non posset haberi nisi illo modo.”   
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Thus, it is the idea of the knowing self that best explains the notion of person and 
expresses and secures at the same time the unity of the human being. 
 
Conclusion 
 The points to be taken from this discussion are as follows.  First, unity is 
coextensive with being such that every level of being has its own proper unity.  The unity 
of singularity is the highest expression of unity and is that by which all other unity is 
measured.  The unity of the singularity seals the integrity of the individual being.  
Second, the unity of the human being is a substantial unity, that is, a unity made up of 
form and matter.  When form informs matter a whole new individual being is brought 
about with characteristics different from its components.  Scotus contends that a plurality 
of forms exists in the individual human being, the intellective soul, the form of the body 
and the forms of the bodily organs.  This plurality of forms does not threaten the unity of 
the human being, rather it makes it possible in that the human being is a person, a 
suppositum with an intellectual nature.  The intellective part of the soul has formally 
distinct parts that require a diverse and complex body.  When the soul is conjoined to the 
body, it is the activity as a whole composite, the harmonic cooperation between sensation 
and intellection, that secures the unity of the person.  Moreover, the intellective part of 
the soul acts through the whole individual. Third, in his discussion of accident, Scotus 
shows that inherence is not of the essence of the accident.  Not only does this help to 
show how the sensible and intelligible species as accident can be present in the bodily 
organs or the intellect, but it also provides a way to understand the complexity of the 
intellective soul, which can exist independently from the body and exist conjoined to it.  
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Fourth, the immateriality of the soul--that it can exist independently from the body--does 
not preclude its existence in the body.   What emerges from this discussion is that Scotus 
is thoroughly Aristotelian in his understanding of the unity of the soul and the body, even 
given the fact that the immaterial intellect definitely can exist apart from the body.  The 
distinction between the soul and the body and materiality and immateriality should be 
understood in terms of the underlying unity of the whole substantial being.  Thus, the 
problem of the immaterial intellect working with the material sense faculties is not 
Descartes’ mind-body problem.   
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Chapter 4 Sense Cognition 
In Chapter three I examined Scotus’ understanding of the relationship of the body 
and soul.  My discussion focused on Scotus’ understanding of the human being as a 
person.  The notion of person is reserved for per se beings with an intellectual nature.  
Given that the human being is a composite of a soul and a body, through the notion of 
person, Scotus is able to account for the intimate connection and the cooperation of the 
body and soul.  In this chapter I will now turn to the question of how phantasm is an 
entity that the agent intellect is able to access, that is to act with in order to make the 
intelligible species present to the intellect.  I am not concerned here with the nature of the 
activity of the agent intellect with the phantasm, i.e., with the process that has come to be 
known as abstraction.  I am concerned with what happens prior to this activity in the 
process of sensation in order to come to understand the nature of the species or phantasm 
and the manner in which it exists in the bodily organ.   
Since Scotus accepts that knowledge begins in the senses, that the intellect is 
unable to think without the phantasm but that the phantasm itself cannot be an object for 
the intellect as it exists in material conditions, i.e., in a bodily organ and under the aspect 
of singularity, the question arises as to the nature of the phantasm as a species such that 
the agent intellect is able to attend to it, not as its object, but as that which it can act with 
to produce the intelligible species. The phantasm is a species or likeness of an object that 
comes to exist in a bodily organ, the internal sense memory, by way of the activity of the 
senses, both external and internal.  But the phantasm alone is not able to account for the 
universality of intellectual knowledge, so the agent intellect must somehow work with the 
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phantasm to produce an intelligible species.493  Since the phantasm is primarily produced 
by way of sensation, it is Scotus’ account of sensation that is the primary concern of this 
chapter.   Since Scotus has been seen as basically endorsing the traditional account of 
sensation, there is not much in the literature that details his account of sensation. This 
chapter is divided into two parts.  In part 4.1, I will discuss Thomas Aquinas’ account of 
sensation.  I use Aquinas’ account as a point of comparison and contrast to Scotus, thus, 
in this first section I will give a detailed analysis of Aquinas’ distinction between natural 
and spiritual change.  In part 4.2, I will discuss Scotus’ account of sensation.  The 
organization of my discussion on Scotus is based on the questions that emerge from my 
discussion on Aquinas.  In addressing these questions I will be able to show not only the 
ways in which Scotus is like and unlike Aquinas, but more importantly, I will able to 
detail unique elements of Scotus’ account of sensation helpful in understanding the nature 
of the phantasm..      
 
4.1 Thomas Aquinas’ Account of Sensation 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Aristotle claims that the cognitive process begins with 
the senses.  He explains sensation in the context of his metaphysics of potency and act 
such that the process of sensation, as well as intellection, is a kind of being affected.494 In 
sense perception, that which is actual acts upon the sense bringing about a some kind of 
change.495 The sense is that potency or power which receives the sensible form without 
                                                 
493
 Tachau 1988, 59.  Tachau explains here that Scotus rejects Henry of Ghent’s view that there is no need 
for the intelligible species.  Henry of Ghent thought that the phantasm was sufficient.   
494
 De Anima 424a1:  “Sentire enim est aliquod pati quoquo modo.” 
495
 De Anima 416b33-35:  “Dicamus igitur quod sentire accidit secundum motum et passionem, sicut 
diximus; existimatur enim quod est aliqua alteratio.” 
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the matter.496 Aristotle uses the example of wax receiving the impression of a signet ring 
without the bronze to explain sense perception.497  Thus, for Aristotle, what defines the 
nature of sensitive cognition is passivity.  
This passivity that defines Aristotle’s cognitive process became a subject of 
debate in the late 13th and early 14th century, stemming from Boethius’ claims that 
cognition is active.498  According to Robert Pasnau, a disagreement arose concerning 
whether or not Aristotle’s cognitive framework could account for such an activity as 
Boethius argues for on the part of the senses and intellect.499  To frame his own 
discussion of Thomas Aquinas, Pasnau presents the positions of Peter John Olivi and 
William of Ockham as the extreme sides of this debate, although they are not the only 
ones who argued these positions.500 According to Pasnau, Olivi, siding with Augustine 
that there must be an active focus by the cognizing power on its object, explicitly attacks 
the Aristotelian dictum that cognition is a kind of being affected.501  Olivi argues that the 
mere reception of the form by the sense or the intellect cannot itself account for 
cognition. Rather, Olivi contends that the sense and the intellect must be doing something 
                                                 
496
 De Anima 424a16-19:  “Et dicendum est universaliter de omni sensu quod sensus est recipiens formas 
sensibilium sine materia;” De Anima 425b24: “ . . . sentiens enim recipit sensibile extra materiam quidlibet 
quodlibet.” 
497
 De Anima 424a19-23:  “. . . quod cera recipit formam anuli sine ferro aut auro, et recipit signum quod 
est ex cupro aut ex auro, sed non secundum quod est cuprum aut aurum.” 
498
 Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge:  Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 125. 
499
 Pasnau, 1997, 125. 
500
 For example, Pasnau points out elsewhere that Godfrey of Fontaines also argued for the complete 
passivity of the whole cognitive process. According to Godfrey, the phantasm is what causes cognition; the 
possible intellect merely receives the impression. See Pasnau 2003, 291.  See also, Godfrey of Fontaines, 
Quodlibeta 8.2, 9.19, 10.12, 13.3; John Wippel, “The Role of the Phantasm in Godfrey of Fontaines’ 
Theory of Intellection” in L'homme et son univers au moyen age. Actes du septième congrés international 
de philosophie médiévale (30 août--4 septembre 1982), vol. 2 (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1986), 573-582. 
501
 Pasnau 1997, 130-131. Pasnau cites the following texts:  Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum 
librum Sententiarum, ed. Jansen, three volumes, 1922-26, q. 58 ad 14; II, 482:  “Aristoteles nulla sufficienti 
ratione, immo fere nulla ratione probat suum dictum, sed absque ratione creditur sibi tanquam huius 
saeculi;” Augustine, I Soliloquies ch. 6: “ . . . ut oculos sanos habeat, ut aspiciat et ut videat.”  It is 
interesting to note here that Olivi points out that Augustine is often inconsistent in his views on cognition.  
Nevertheless, Scotus makes the same appeal to Augustine in terms of the activity of sensation.   
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more than receiving for cognition to occur.502  It is not passivity that explains cognition, 
but an attentive activity on the part of the sense or intellect that can account for cognition.  
William of Ockham, according to Pasnau, argues within the Aristotelian framework for 
the other extreme, namely, that cognition is entirely passive.503 Pasnau contends that 
Scotus is influenced by Olivi and attempts “a broadly Aristotelian resolution” that is a 
compromise between these two extreme views.504 Before turning to Scotus, it is helpful 
as a point of similarity and contrast to Scotus, to consider Thomas Aquinas’ position in 
some detail since his position is, like Scotus’, an intermediate position between the 
extreme positions of Olivi and Ockham.505  
In his Commentary on De Anima, Aquinas readily accepts Aristotle’s 
characterization of all sensation as the reception of the sensible form without the 
matter.506  However, he notes that the reception of form without matter is not unique to 
sensation: 
But this seems to be common to all patients.  In fact, all patients receive 
something by the agent according to what the agent is.  The agent, however, acts 
through its form, and not through its matter.  Therefore, all patients receive the 
form without the matter.  And so it is the case with the sense. Air does not receive 
the matter from fire as an agent, but its form.  Therefore, it seems that the 
reception of the species or form without matter is not proper to the sense.507  
  
                                                 
502
 Pasnau 1997, 132-134. 
503
 Pasnau 1997, 126.   Pasnau points out here that Ockham is not the only thinker who had such a view, 
Godfrey of Fontaines also understood cognition as passive.   
504
 Pasnau 1997, 125-126. 
505
 Pasnau 1997, See chapters 2 and 4 for Pasnau’s extended argument, pp. 63-85 and 125-160, 
respectively. 
506
 Aquinas, Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 24, n. 1:  “Dicit ergo primo quod hoc oportet accipere, 
universaliter et communiter omni sensui inesse, quod sensus est susceptivus specierum sine materia, sicut 
cera recipit signum anuli sine ferro et auro.”  All Latin quotes taken from: Sancti Thomae de Aquino, 
Sentencia libri De anima,Textum Taurini 1959 editum.   
507
 Aquinas, Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 24, n. 1:  “Sed hoc videtur esse commune omni patienti. Omne 
enim patiens recipit aliquid ab agente secundum quod est agens. Agens autem agit per suam formam, et non 
per suam materiam: omne igitur patiens recipit formam sine materia. Et hoc etiam ad sensum apparet: non 
enim aer recipit ab igne agente, materiam eius sed formam: non igitur videtur hoc proprium esse sensus, 
quod sit receptivus specierum sine materia.” (my translation) 
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Aquinas finds the difference between the change involved in sensation and other change 
in terms of the way in which the form is received (in modo recipiendi) by the patient.508  
In some cases, the form is received by the patient according to the same mode of being 
(eumdem modum essendi) that the form had in the agent.509  Aquinas explains that, in this 
case, the matter of the patient comes to be disposed in the same way as the matter of the 
agent.510  Thus, Aquinas says that this should not be understood as a reception of form 
without matter.511  He does not mean that matter is received along with the form by the 
patient.  Rather, what he means is that in some cases, the matter of the patient is itself 
affected by the reception of the form such that, as Burnyeat explains, the patient 
“becomes like the agent both in matter and in form.”512  Thus, a natural change (passione 
naturali) is a material change, matter comes to be disposed in a different way.  Aquinas 
offers as an example of a natural change the warming of air.513 
                                                 
508
 Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 24 n. 2:  “Dicendum igitur, quod licet hoc sit omni patienti, quod recipiat 
formam ab agente, differentia tamen est in modo recipiendi.”  See also Burnyeat 2003, 148.  Burnyeat 
contends that the task of Aristotelian psychology is “to differentiate [cognitive assimilation] from ordinary 
alteration while staying within the framework of Aristotelian physics.”  Burnyeat sees Aristotle taking a 
negative approach.  For instance, in order to define perception Aristotle simply subtracts the underlying 
material process.  He contends that Aquinas adopts this same approach in order to demarcate an unordinary 
physical change, which is perception.  I think this is a helpful way to understand Aquinas’ project.  Aquinas 
differentiates between the way in which the form is received in order to show how in perception the form is 
received in a manner different from ordinary change.    
509
 Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 24, n. 2:  “Nam forma, quae in patiente recipitur ab agente, quandoque 
quidem habet eumdem modum essendi in patiente, quem habet in agente. . .” 
510
 Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 24, n. 2:   “. . .et hoc quidem contingit, quando patiens habet eamdem 
dispositionem ad formam, quam habet agens: quodcumque enim recipitur in altero secundum modum 
recipientis recipitur. Unde si eodem modo disponatur patiens sicut agens, eodem modo recipitur forma in 
patiente sicut erat in agente. . .” 
511
 Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 24, n. 2:  “. . .et tunc non recipitur forma sine materia.” 
512
 Burnyeat 2001, 140.  Burnyeat characterizes this change as receiving form with matter.  Aquinas only 
says that this is not the reception of form without matter.  Burnyeat is emphasizing that the case of natural 
change, the matter of the recipient comes to be disposed in the same way as the matter of the agent.  The 
matter of the agent is not being received by the patient.   
513
 Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 24, n. 2:  “Licet enim illa et eadem materia numero quae est agentis, non 
fiat patientis, fit tamen quodammodo eadem, inquantum similem dispositionem materialem ad formam 
acquirit ei quae erat in agente. Et hoc modo aer patitur ab igne, et quicquid patitur passione naturali.” 
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In other cases, however, the form is received by the patient according to a 
different mode of being (alium modum essendi) than it had in the agent: 
Sometimes a form is received in the thing affected in keeping with a manner of 
existence different from the agent’s, because the affected thing’s material 
disposition for receiving is not like the agent’s material disposition.  And hence a 
form is received in the thing affected without matter insofar as the thing affected 
is made like the agent with respect to form and not matter.  And a sense receives a 
form without matter in this manner because the form has a different manner of 
existence in the sense and in the sense object:  for in the sense object it has a 
natural existence, whereas in the sense it has intentional or spiritual existence.514   
 
This change in which the patient is made like the agent in form only is the change 
peculiar to sensation as characterized by Aristotle as the reception of form without 
matter.  The matter of the patient does not become similarly disposed to the matter of the 
agent.  The form is received by the patient in a way other than a natural change because 
the existence that it has in the patient is not a natural existence (esse naturale) but an 
intentional or spiritual existence (esse intentionale et spirituale).  The reception of the 
form according to intentional existence seems not to affect the matter of the patient.  
Intentional existence is traditionally associated with cognition or awareness and usually 
defined as “the existence of being known.”515  Aquinas understands the change in which 
the form is received by the patient according to intentional existence as a spiritual 
change.516  The distinction between natural change and spiritual change allows Aquinas 
to show how the change involved in perception, while fundamentally the same as other 
change because all change involves the reception of form without matter, is nonetheless, 
                                                 
514
 Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 24 n. 3:  “Quandoque vero forma recipitur in patiente secundum alium 
modum essendi, quam sit in agente; quia dispositio materialis patientis ad recipiendum, non est similis 
dispositioni materiali, quae est in agente. Et ideo forma recipitur in patiente sine materia, inquantum patiens 
assimilatur agenti secundum formam, et non secundum materiam. Et per hunc modum, sensus recipit 
formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu, et in re sensibili. Nam in re sensibili 
habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale et spirituale.”  Trans. Pasnau 1997, 39-40. 
515
 Sorabji 1991, 243. 
516
 Pasnau 1997, 49. 
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not an ordinary change because the sensible form is received according to intentional 
being.  Turning now to a well-known passage in the ST, Aquinas explains sensation: 
Sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible.  
Hence, the exterior cause of such immutation is what is per se perceived by the 
sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive 
powers diversified.517  
 
It is clear from this passage that Aquinas is thoroughly Aristotelian in his understanding 
of sensation.  He maintains Aristotle’s claim that sensation is fundamentally passive and 
that sensation is a kind of being affected. 518   The diversity of sensible objects requires a 
diversity of senses such that each sense has its own proper object.  Of note here is that 
Aquinas says here that it is the sense as a passive power that is acted upon or changed by 
the external sense object.  Aquinas clearly regards the power of sense as a power that 
requires a corporeal organ in order to operate: 
But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs, as 
seeing by the eye, and hearing by the ear.  And so it is with all the other 
operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts.  Therefore, the powers which are 
the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in 
the soul alone.519 
 
                                                 
517
 Aquinas, ST, I, q. 78, a. 3:  “Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata est immutari ab 
exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod per se a sensu percipitur, et secundum cuius 
diversitatem sensitivae potentiae distinguuntur.” Trans. Pegis 1945, 328.  All Latin quotes from the ST are 
taken from:  Sancti Thomae de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, Textum Leoninum, Romae 1889 editum. 
 
518
 See Edward P. Mahoney, “Sense, Intellect, and Imagination in Albert, Thomas, and Siger,” in The 
Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan 
Pinborg (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), 605.  According to Mahoney, Aquinas 
“maintains that sense is primarily a passive power, one which is naturally suited to be modified or changed 
by an external sensible object.” See Aquinas, ST 1a, 17.2, ad 1:  “. . .sensum affici est ipsum eius sentire. . 
.” and  Aquinas, III Sent. 14.1.1.2c:  “Sed quia sensus non sentit nisi ad praesentiam sensibilis, ideo ad eius 
operationem perfectam sufficit impressio sui activi per modum passionis tantum. . “; Summa Contra 
Gentiles II.82.1641:  “Non enim sentire est movere, sed magis moveri;”  
 
519
 Aquinas, ST, I, q. 77, a.5:  “Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa 
corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus 
nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto 
sicut in subiecto, et non in anima sola.” 
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 What is not clear in the claim that the power of sense is acted upon by the external 
sensible object, is what is being acted upon or changed.  Since the sensitive soul is 
conjoined to the corporeal organ, then it would seem to follow that the sense organ as 
composite is what is acted upon.  But in the passage from the Commentary on De Anima, 
Aquinas distinguishes between a natural change and a spiritual change in order to show 
how the change involved in sensation is different from ordinary change, he designates the 
spiritual change that is involved in sensation.  Thus, when the external sensible object 
acts upon the power of sense such that this is a spiritual change where the sensible form 
is received according to intentional existence, is this a change that happens to the 
corporeal organ.  It is helpful to consider another passage where Aquinas attends to the 
kind(s) of change involved in sensation using again the distinction between natural and 
spiritual that he used in his Commentary on De Anima: 
Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual.  Natural 
immutation takes place when the form of that which causes the immutation is 
received, according to its natural being, into the thing immuted, as heat is received 
into the thing heated.  But spiritual immutation takes place when the form of what 
causes the immutation is received, according to a spiritual mode of being, into the 
thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not 
thereby become colored.  Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual 
immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in 
the sensile organ.  Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the 
sense’s action, all natural bodies would have sensation when they undergo 
alteration.520  
 
Aquinas explains that a natural change occurs when the form is received by the changed 
thing (immutato) according to natural being (esse naturale).  Again, he uses as an 
                                                 
520Aquinas, ST, I, q. 78, a. 3:  “Est autem duplex immutatio, una naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis 
quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in 
calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse 
spirituale; ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus 
requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola 
immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent dum alterantur.”  Trans. 
Pegis 1945, 328-329. 
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example of natural change the heating of a thing.  A spiritual change occurs when the 
form is received by the changed thing (immutato) according to spiritual being (esse 
spirituale).  When the pupil receives the form of color, the pupil does not thereby become 
colored, nonetheless, the form of color comes to exist in the pupil when before it did not 
exist in the pupil, not according to natural being, but spiritual being.  In this passage, 
Aquinas does not use the word “intentional” to describe change, but only spiritual, 
whereas in the passage from the Commentary on De Anima he uses both words.  Rather, 
he says that the spiritual change is a change in which the “intentio formae sensibilis” 
comes to be in the sense organ.  The word “intentio” is of course of the same root as 
intentionale, and as noted above, “intentionale” is traditionally associated with awareness 
or cognition.  Certainly, in using the words “spirituale” and “intentionale” and “intentio,” 
Aquinas seeks to distinguish the change involved in perception from ordinary change as 
cognitive, and this is the point that I want to make here.  However, it should be noted that 
these words have a rich history and are therefore, not easily defined, in particular, 
because their traditional association with cognition is complex.521  Thus, I will discuss the 
nature of intentional existence and the intentio in more detail later.    
What can we take from this passage?  First, Aquinas is concerned here with two 
kinds of changes:  natural and spiritual.  A natural change occurs when the sensible form 
is received by the patient and comes to have natural existence in the patient.  A spiritual 
change occurs when the sensible form is received by the patient and comes to have 
                                                 
521
 There are many interpretations of “intentio.”  For example, see Hamlyn 1961, 46.  Hamlyn translates 
intentio as an apprehension.  Sorabji 1991, 243-244.  Sorabji explains that intentio is usually understood as 
cognitive or as that which causes knowledge.  But the problem with understanding intentio as cognitive is 
that Aquinas contends that an intentio can exist in the medium outside of the cognizer, so intentio cannot be 
understood as only a mental entity.  As Sorabji points out later in the same article, that there were only 
mental entities that had no extramental existence is credited to Franz Brentano who characterized such 
entities as having intentional inexistence. (247)    
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spiritual existence in the patient.  Second, in each of these changes Aquinas says that the 
form is received in the thing changed (recipitur in immutato).  In the case of sensation, 
the patient, or thing changed, is the corporeal sense organ.  Thus, the question arises, do 
both the natural change and the spiritual change involve a corporeal or material change?  
Since both natural and spiritual changes involve the reception of form in the thing 
changed, it appears that they are not to be understood in terms of a distinction between 
corporeal and incorporeal change.  Third, Aquinas explicitly claims that all sensation 
requires spiritual change.  The question arises whether sensation involves natural change 
as well, and Aquinas addresses this question here:   
But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in sight, while in others 
we find not only a spiritual but also a natural immutation, and this is either on the 
part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ.  On the part of the 
object, we find local natural immutation in sound, which is the object of hearing; 
for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of the air.  We find natural 
immutation by alteration in odor, which is the object of smelling; for in order to 
give off an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat.  On the part of the 
organ, natural immutation takes place in touch and taste; for the hand that touches 
something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of 
flavors.  But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective 
operations by any natural immutation, except accidentally. 
 Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or 
in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all 
the senses.  After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a 
natural immutation on the part of the object;  while local motion is more perfect 
than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves.  
Touch and taste are the most material of all (of their distinction we shall speak 
later on).  Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a 
medium united to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as 
happens as regards these two senses.522 
                                                 
522
 Aquinas, ST, I, q. 78, a. 3:   “Sed in quibusdam sensibus invenitur immutatio spiritualis tantum, sicut in 
visu. In quibusdam autem, cum immutatione spirituali, etiam naturalis; vel ex parte obiecti tantum, vel 
etiam ex parte organi. Ex parte autem obiecti, invenitur transmutatio naturalis, secundum locum quidem, in 
sono, qui est obiectum auditus, nam sonus ex percussione causatur et aeris commotione. Secundum 
alterationem vero, in odore, qui est obiectum olfactus, oportet enim per calidum alterari aliquo modo 
corpus, ad hoc quod spiret odorem. Ex parte autem organi, est immutatio naturalis in tactu et gustu, nam et 
manus tangens calida calefit, et lingua humectatur per humiditatem saporum. Organum vero olfactus aut 
auditus nulla naturali immutatione immutatur in sentiendo, nisi per accidens. Visus autem, quia est absque 
immutatione naturali et organi et obiecti, est maxime spiritualis, et perfectior inter omnes sensus, et 
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Sight, being the most spiritual and most perfect of all the senses, involves a spiritual 
change only.  Hearing and smelling involve a natural change, but only on the part of the 
object, the sense organ is not naturally changed.  Hearing and smelling are the only two 
of the senses that seem to require a natural change of the object.  In order for an object to 
have an odor it must be changed by heat, and in order for there to be sound, there must be 
a percussion and commotion of air.  The natural change here makes the object 
perceptible.  Touch and taste, being the most material and being united to a medium, 
involve a natural change.   But that the natural change occurs, the hand becomes hot, the 
tongue moistened, seems to be due to the fact that the sense organ is united to its 
medium.  Whereas in hearing and smelling the natural immutation of the object makes 
something perceptible, the natural immutation of the organ in touch and taste seems to be 
coincidental.  The natural immutation clearly is not involved in sensation per se because 
in sensation the sensible form is received not according to natural existence, but a 
spiritual or intentional existence.  It is the spiritual change that is sensation.523  What then, 
does the natural immutation, as described above, accomplish? 524  In a passage in the ST 
where Aquinas discusses the various powers of the soul, he writes: 
                                                                                                                                                 
communior. Et post hoc auditus, et deinde olfactus, qui habent immutationem naturalem ex parte obiecti. 
Motus tamen localis est perfectior et naturaliter prior quam motus alterationis, ut probatur in VIII Physic. 
Tactus autem et gustus sunt maxime materiales, de quorum distinctione post dicetur. Et inde est quod alii 
tres sensus non fiunt per medium coniunctum, ne aliqua naturalis transmutatio pertingat ad organum, ut 
accidit in his duobus sensibus.” 
523
 I want to be careful here in the language that I use.  I do not want to say that the spiritual change 
constitutes sensation in the sense that some change in the sense organ gives rise to sensation.  The spiritual 
change in the sense organ just is the sensation.   
524
 See Burnyeat 2001, 134.  Burnyeat discusses this same passage and concludes that Aquinas holds that 
the sense organs undergo only a spiritual change in perception.  The natural change that is involved in 
terms of the object and the medium is, Burnyeat contends, a “mere accompaniment” rather than any kind of 
material change that underlies perception.  Burnyeat is in particularly responding to and rejecting Sorabji’s 
claim that there is a physiological change in the organ, i.e., the eye jelly becomes red when the eye sees red.  
See Sorabji 1991.  I will discuss Burnyeat’s position in more detail later. 
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Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed performed 
through a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the 
operation of the sensitive soul.  For though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other 
such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they are not 
required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place by the power of 
such qualities; but only for the proper disposition of the organ.525 
 
In this passage Aquinas discusses sensation as the act of a corporeal sense organ.  He is 
careful to distinguish here between the operation of the sensitive soul which is performed 
through the sense organ, sensation, and the activities of corporeal qualities such as hot 
and cold, wet and dry.  The corporeal qualities constitute the corporeal organ, but it is not 
by their power that sensation occurs.  Rather the powers of the corporeal qualities ensure 
the “proper disposition of the sense organ.” Perhaps in terms of touch and taste where the 
hand is warmed and the tongue is moistened, the natural immutation occurs to ensure a 
proper disposition, although this remains.  Be that as it may, I do think that the distinction 
between the activity of sensitive soul performed through the sense organ and the activity 
of the corporeal qualities is an important and helpful distinction in understanding 
Aquinas’ account of perception.  
A natural change is one in which the sensible form is received by the patient such 
that it comes to have natural existence in the patient, that is, the matter of the patient 
comes to be similarly disposed to the matter of the agent.  Only in touch and taste does  
such a natural change occur where the matter of the organ (at least the organ united to the 
medium) becomes like the matter of the agent.  If we read this passage in line with the 
previous passage where Aquinas determines which senses need natural change and in 
                                                 
525
 Aquinas, ST, I, q. 78, a. 1:  “Est autem alia operatio animae infra istam, quae quidem fit per organum 
corporale, non tamen per aliquam corpoream qualitatem. Et talis est operatio animae sensibilis, quia etsi 
calidum et frigidum, et humidum et siccum, et aliae huiusmodi qualitates corporeae requirantur ad 
operationem sensus; non tamen ita quod mediante virtute talium qualitatum operatio animae sensibilis 
procedat; sed requiruntur solum ad debitam dispositionem organi.”  Trans. Pegis 1945, 322. 
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what way this natural change occurs, either of the object or of the organ, then it seems 
fair to say that, to the extent that a natural change is involved, its involvement in no way 
brings about or is required for sensation per se, but to ensure the necessary material 
conditions for sensation to occur.526   
Three points can be taken from this discussion.  First, while not all the senses 
involve a natural change, all sensation requires a spiritual change.  Second, in the cases 
where there is a natural change, the natural change seems to have nothing to do with 
sensation per se.  Third, if there is a change to the sense organ involved in sensation, it is 
not a natural change.  Whether a change to the sense organ is the spiritual change or is 
something in addition to the spiritual change remains unclear.  What needs to be 
understood then is the nature of spiritual change and whether it is a corporeal or 
incorporeal event. 
 For Aquinas the cognitive process includes both sensation and intellection.  
Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that both sensation and intellection are fundamentally 
passive, both are a kind of being affected.  Both sensation and intellection require an 
object, sensation requires an external object whereas intellection requires an internal 
object.  In both sensation and intellection a likeness of the object is received by the 
cognitive power.  In sensation the sensible form is received according to intentional 
existence, and in intellection the intelligible form is received by the possible intellect.  
                                                 
526
 See Burnyeat 2001, 145.  Burnyeat contends sensation, for both Aristotle and Aquinas, requires no 
underlying material process.  That said, he does contend that there are necessary material conditions that 
must be present for sensation to occur:  “According to Aristotle, the eye must contain transparent liquid, the 
ear still air, and the organ of touch must be a mean of temperature and hardness.  But these are static, 
standing conditions, not processes or events underlying the act of perception.  Aquinas is as usual less 
detailed on physiological matters, but he clearly take the same line.  Provided the sense organ has the 
proper disposition, it is ready for the spiritual change which is perception.”  See also Burnyeat 1992. 
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That the sense and the intellect are capable of receiving a form of another thing, in 
addition to their own, is what makes them cognitive activities: 
The cognizant are distinguished from the noncognizant in this respect, that the 
noncognizant have nothing but their own form alone, whereas a cognizing entity 
is suited to have the form of another thing as well.  For the species of the thing 
being cognized is in the one cognizing.527 
 
In order for there to be cognition at all, a form or species must come to exist in the one 
doing the cognizing.  But as we have seen, the change that is required to effect such an 
existence of the form in the cognizer, is not a natural change, but a spiritual change in 
which the form exists in the cognizer according to a spiritual or intentional existence.  
Thus, something is cognizant if and only if it is able to have, in addition to its own form, 
intentionally existing forms of other things.528  How are we to understand intentional or 
spiritual existence, and are we to understand that they are immaterial?  Aquinas uses the 
terms, ‘intentional,” “spiritual,” and “immaterial” almost interchangeably.529  Aquinas 
agrees with Aristotle, however, that, whereas intellection does not require a bodily organ, 
sensation is an act of a corporeal organ such that the sense organ is a composite of the 
body and soul.530 Since sensation is the act of a corporeal organ, and Aquinas contends 
                                                 
527
 Aquinas, ST, Q. 14, a. 1:  “. . .cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur, quia non 
cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei 
alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. . .”  Trans. Pasnau 1997, 32. 
528
 Pasnau 1997, 34.  I think that Pasnau is correct in this claim.  In the ST, q. 78, Aquinas claims that all 
sensation requires a spiritual change.   
529
 Pasnau 1997, 38-39.  Pasnau notes that it is hard, in fact, to find passages where Aquinas does not 
discuss one of these terms without another of them. 
530
 Aquinas, ST,  I q. 77, a. 5:  “Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod 
sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed coniuncti. Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto 
sicut in subiecto. Non ergo sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum suarum. Respondeo dicendum 
quod illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens operari, omne enim accidens denominat 
proprium subiectum. Idem autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod eius sit 
potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia. 
Manifestum est autem ex supra dictis quod quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo 
corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut 
in subiecto. Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per 
oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et 
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that “nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal.,” how are we to 
understand a spiritual change in terms of sensation as the act of a corporeal sense 
organ?531  This is a complicated question that has given rise to much and varied debate. I 
will discuss briefly here some of the arguments in the literature, not only to clarify how 
Aquinas understands the spiritual change in terms of sensation as the act of a corporeal 
sense organ , but even more to allow the complexities of the issues involved to emerge.   
The received understanding Aquinas’ account of perception is given by Hamlyn: 
[Aquinas] views sense perception primarily as a form of change in which the 
sense-organ is altered.  But this cannot be all that is involved, for along with the 
physical change there goes the reception of a sensible form without matter.  The 
latter Aquinas takes to be not something that happens to the sense-organ, but 
something that happens to the faculty of soul or mind.  It is, in his words, a 
spiritual change.532  
 
Hamlyn contends that “along with” the physical change to the sense organ, there is a 
spiritual change that happens to the soul or mind.533  This is in line with what Aquinas 
                                                                                                                                                 
ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima 
sola.” 
 
531
 Aquinas, ST, I, q. 84, a. 6:  “Et quia incorporeum non potest immutari a corporeo. . .” Trans. Pegis 1945, 
394. 
532
 Hamlyn 1961, 46.  Hamlyn’s interpretation of Aquinas’ account of perception is discussed and 
referenced in much of the recent  literature concerning the nature of the spiritual change in Aquinas’ 
account of sensation.  While I can here only consider some of the key arguments made in several of the 
articles, there are many more that weigh on this topic.  See, for example, Mortimer J. Adler, “Sense 
Cognition:  Aristotle vs. Aquinas,” in New Scholasticism 42(1968): 578-591; Burnyeat 1992; Burnyeat 
2001, 130, Gerard Casey, “Immateriality and Intentionality,” in At the Heart of the Real, ed. Fran 
O’Rourke (Dublin, 1992); Sheldon M. Cohen, “St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of 
Sensible Forms,” in The Philosophical Review, XCI, n. 2 (1982):  193-209; John Deely, “The Immateriality 
of the Intentional as Such,” in New Scholasticism 42 (1968):  293-306;  John J. Haldane, Aquinas on Sense-
Perception, in The Philosophical Review, Vol. 92, No. 2 (1983):  233-239; Paul Hoffman, “St. Thomas 
Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being,” in The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCIX, No. 1 (1990):  
73-92; Anthony Kenny, Aquinas on Mind (New York, 1993); Nussbaum and Putnam 1992, Sorabji 
1991;Martin M. Tweedale, “Origins of the Medieval Theory That Sensation is an Immaterial Reception of 
a Form,” in Philosophical Topics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1992):  215-231; 
533
 Hamlyn here uses the word “physical” to describe a change other than the spiritual change.  As seen 
above, Aquinas contrasts the natural change with the spiritual change.  A natural change, it is true, is a 
material change, but it is more precisely, a change in which the form is received according to natural 
existence, where the matter is informed in the way the matter of the agent is informed, that is, the form 
exists in the patient in the same manner as it exists in the agent.  As a material change, it is not inaccurate to 
describe it as a physical change, if one understands that the physical change is defined by the physics that is 
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says in It is not clear what the physical change is nor what its relationship to the spiritual 
change is, but Hamlyn contends that it is the spiritual change that produces the phantasm 
which he characterizes as a particular mental entity.534   
Sheldon M. Cohen rejects Hamlyn’s interpretation arguing that Aquinas regards 
the reception of form without matter, whether natural or spiritual, always as a physical 
event, and claims, moreover, that the phantasm is not a mental entity but a physical 
likeness.535 One of the points that Cohen makes is that sense organ must be viewed as a 
composite of body and soul.  To be fair, Hamlyn recognizes this as well, but Cohen takes 
issue with Hamlyn’s claim that the spiritual change is something that happens in the soul, 
making the soul the recipient of the phantasm.  Cohen explains that while the intellective 
soul is a subsistent form, the sensitive soul is a substantial form which cannot exist 
outside of matter.536  The sensitive soul itself cannot therefore, be the recipient of 
anything, for it is always conjoined to the bodily organ.  The composite of sensitive soul 
                                                                                                                                                 
embrace.  Since Aquinas embraces Aristotle’s physics, and Aristotle’s physics includes both matter and 
form, then the natural change is a physical change, and change in which matter is informed.  Thus, without 
keeping the physics in mind, it can be misleading to cast the distinction between spiritual change and 
natural change as one between the physical and nonphysical or mental.  This point is of course at issue in 
the debate in the literature.  Often the word ‘physical’ us used to refer to the corporeal and as I pointed out 
above, the distinction between the spiritual change and the natural change is not necessarily a distinction 
between the incorporeal and the corporeal.  Corporeal means bodily and in terms of Aristotle’s 
understanding of the relationship between the soul and the body, ‘body’ always refers to the living body.  
Thus, corporeal does not simply mean material, as it is already a composite of form and matter, it refers to a 
body that is organic and has life.  The word “physical” is problematic when discussing any theory of 
sensation based on Aristotle’s physics and metaphysics and therefore, some clarification is in order.  
Hamlyn is not alone in the use of this word, others use it as well, including Pasnau, whose use of this term I 
will discuss later.  The word “physical” and “physics” share the same root.  See Burnyeat 1992 and 
Burnyeat 2001.   Burnyeat stresses the difference between Aristotle’s physics and ours and contends that 
Aristotle’s physics is “deeply alien” to us and therefore should be “junked.”  While I do not agree with 
Burnyeat on this point, I do appreciate his contention that we need to be careful in our use of the word 
“physical” when working in the Aristotelian framework. 
534
 Hamlyn 1961, 48. 
535
 Cohen, 1982, 193. 
536
 Cohen 1982, 203. 
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and the particular bodily organ receives the form and thus, for Aquinas, “sensation is not 
a per se act of the soul, but an act of the composite.”537 
Paul Hoffman sees Cohen’s point to be that Aquinas understands that “the 
immaterial reception of sensible forms is always a physical event,” but criticizes Cohen 
for not taking into consideration Aquinas’ claim that corporeality and materiality come in 
degrees.538  Hoffman points out that since senses are the powers of corporeal organs, 
whatever is received by them must be received corporeally and materially, and therefore 
with individuating conditions.539  Hoffman here cites a passage from Aquinas’ 
Commentary on De Anima in which Aquinas contends that since “everything is received 
in mode of the recipient,” (unumquodque autem recipitur in aliquo per modum sui) the 
sense necessarily receives the sensible form materially and corporeally.540 Hoffman 
explains that Aquinas must say that the sense receives the sensible form immaterially and 
materially: 
In order for sensible forms to play their essential epistemological role of securing 
cognition of particulars, he is led to say that they are received corporeally and 
materially.  Yet he also asserts that they are received immaterially, as it seems he 
                                                 
537
 Cohen 1982, 205.  See also Tweedale 1992, 216.  Tweedale thinks that Cohen’s argument that the 
sensible form is received by the organ and not the sensitive soul is correct.   
538
 Hoffman 1990, 73, 79.   
539
 Hoffman 1990, 83. 
540
 Hoffman 1990, 84.  See also Aquina, Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 12, n. 5:  “Circa ea vero quae hic 
dicuntur, considerandum est, quare sensus sit singularium, scientia vero universalium; et quomodo 
universalia sint in anima. Sciendum est igitur circa primum, quod sensus est virtus in organo corporali; 
intellectus vero est virtus immaterialis, quae non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Unumquodque autem 
recipitur in aliquo per modum sui. Cognitio autem omnis fit per hoc, quod cognitum est aliquo modo in 
cognoscente, scilicet secundum similitudinem. Nam cognoscens in actu, est ipsum cognitum in actu. 
Oportet igitur quod sensus corporaliter et materialiter recipiat similitudinem rei quae sentitur. Intellectus 
autem recipit similitudinem eius quod intelligitur, incorporaliter et immaterialiter. Individuatio autem 
naturae communis in rebus corporalibus et materialibus, est ex materia corporali, sub determinatis 
dimensionibus contenta: universale autem est per abstractionem ab huiusmodi materia, et materialibus 
conditionibus individuantibus. Manifestum est igitur, quod similitudo rei recepta in sensu repraesentat rem 
secundum quod est singularis; recepta autem in intellectu, repraesentat rem secundum rationem universalis 
naturae: et inde est, quod sensus cognoscit singularia, intellectus vero universalia, et horum sunt scientiae. 
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must if he is to maintain a distinction between the cognitive and non-cognitive 
reception of forms.541 
 
In order to reconcile these apparently opposing claims that forms are received 
immaterially and materially, Hoffman contends that Aquinas posits a “halfway state of 
sensible being” that shows that Aquinas thinks that immateriality and materiality admit of 
degrees.542 Hoffman infers that the activity of the senses is neither wholly corporeal nor 
wholly incorporeal.  Thus, whereas Cohen understands the spiritual reception of sensible 
forms as a “wholly physical process,” Hoffman contends that it is corporeal to the extent 
that the forms are received materially (under individuating conditions) and incorporeal to 
the extent that the sensible forms are received immaterially.543  While the immaterial 
reception of the sensible form is a corporeal event, Hoffman is careful to distinguish it 
from a corporeal change.  In other words, the spiritual change is an incorporeal change 
that takes place in a corporeal organ.544   
                                                 
541
 Hoffman 1990, 84. 
542
 Hoffman 1990, 85.  See also Aquinas, Sentencia De anima, lib. 2, l. 5 n. 4-6: “Huiusmodi autem 
viventia inferiora, quorum actus est anima, de qua nunc agitur, habent duplex esse. Unum quidem 
materiale, in quo conveniunt cum aliis rebus materialibus. Aliud autem immateriale, in quo communicant 
cum substantiis superioribus aliqualiter.  Est autem differentia inter utrumque esse: quia secundum esse 
materiale, quod est per materiam contractum, unaquaeque res est hoc solum quod est, sicut hic lapis, non 
est aliud quam hic lapis: secundum vero esse immateriale, quod est amplum, et quodammodo infinitum, 
inquantum non est per materiam terminatum, res non solum est id quod est, sed etiam est quodammodo 
alia. Unde in substantiis superioribus immaterialibus sunt quodammodo omnia, sicut in universalibus 
causis. Huiusmodi autem immateriale esse, habet duos gradus in istis inferioribus. Nam quoddam est 
penitus immateriale, scilicet esse intelligibile. In intellectu enim res habent esse, et sine materia, et sine 
conditionibus materialibus individuantibus, et etiam absque organo corporali. Esse autem sensibile est 
medium inter utrumque. Nam in sensu res habet esse sine materia, non tamen absque conditionibus 
materialibus individuantibus, neque absque organo corporali. Est enim sensus particularium, intellectus 
vero universalium.” 
 
543
 Hoffman 1990, 86. 
544
 Hoffman 1990, 86.  Hoffman further contends that Aquinas distinguishes between the corporeality of 
activities and the corporeality of change.  The corporeality of activities admits of degrees, while the 
corporeality of change does not.  If by “event” Cohen means change, then Hoffman contends that Cohen’s 
claim that the spiritual reception of sensible form is a physical event is false.   
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Burnyeat largely agrees with Cohen that the reception of form without matter in 
sensation is a “peculiar kind of physical event.”545 Burnyeat contends that Aquinas 
understands a spiritual change as a kind of bodily change.546  He argues that Aquinas 
follows Aristotle in understanding that the reception of the form without matter is simply 
perceptual awareness and requires no underlying material process.547 While there are 
necessary bodily conditions for perception to occur, it is not the case that these material 
conditions in any way either give rise to or account for perception, nor is it the case that 
these necessary conditions are material changes in the sense organ.548  As discussed 
above, Burnyeat emphasizes that Aquinas claims that the corporeal qualities are only 
necessary for the proper disposition of the organ.  As Aquinas maintains that the activity 
of sense is primarily passive, the sense organ must be properly disposed to receive the 
sensible species.  The spiritual reception of the species is clearly a corporeal event for 
Burnyeat, but not a material change to the sense organ.  Still, Burnyeat contends that the  
presence of the sensible form in the sense organ is a physical fact.549      
I would like now to enter into an extended discussion of Pasnau’s reading of 
Aquinas’ account of sensation because I feel it is a useful means of illustrating the 
complexity of the issues involved.  As will become clear in my discussion, I feel that 
Pasnau seriously misstates Aquinas’ position through the introduction of extraneous 
modern terms that have no place in Aquinas’, and for that matter, Aristotle’s system.  The 
goal of this discussion is to come to a clearer understanding of the key issues and 
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 Burnyeat 2003, 130. 
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 Burnyeat 2003, 146.   
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 Burnyeat 2003, 143-146. 
548
 Burnyeat 2003, 143 
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 Burnyeat 2003, 149. 
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elements of Aquinas’ account of sensation and to highlight any difficulties that Scotus 
will need to address. 
Pasnau offers, on his own account, a controversial reading of Aquinas, 
controversial, he says, due to uncertainty about the meaning of the terms “physical” and 
“material.”550  He contends that while there is a natural presumption that favors a literal 
reading of Aquinas that “sensation involves not natural but spiritual alteration,” there is 
textual evidence to override this presumption.551  It is hard to know exactly what Pasnau 
means here because he accepts the difference between a natural change and a spiritual 
change, according to Aquinas, as a difference in the manner in which a form is received 
by the patient.552  In fact, he begins his argument with the observation that, for Aquinas, 
cognition requires that the form of the cognized object be in the cognizer, not according 
                                                 
550
 Pasnau 1997, 35.  In his effort to clarify what he means when he uses the term “physical” Pasnau 
appeals to a contemporary understanding that even he admits is confused.  The real problem of Pasnau’s 
reading, as I see it, is not due to any contemporary confusion, for even if there were none, the use of 
modern terminology would still fail to appreciate the medieval use of Aristotle’s physics.  Moreover, 
Pasnau’s own use of “physical” is not always clear.  I will give two examples.  First, he contends that, 
according to Aquinas, the human being is not wholly physical due to the rational soul.(36) But on the very 
same page he says that, while he is inclined to believe that nonhuman animals are wholly physical, for 
Aquinas, he is not arguing this point, nor will he take a position on it.  But if what makes the human being 
not wholly physical is the rational soul, and nonhuman animals do not have the rational soul, then why is it 
not immediately clear that nonhuman animals are wholly physical?  Second, Pasnau contends that Aquinas 
says that sense organs are “entirely physical” (45) and that the sense powers are entirely physical powers 
because they use corporeal organs (36, 43).   But then he notes that it is the nonphysicality of the intellect 
that makes us qualitatively different cognizers than other beings that can cognize, that is, on Pasnau’s 
account, receive forms according to intentional existence.(55)  The degree of immateriality, for Aquinas, 
determines the degree of cognitive ability and “immateriality” is identified with “intentional,” meaning the 
ability to receive a form without taking on the characteristics of that form. (56)  But Pasnau uses the word 
nonphysicality interchangeably with immateriality.  Earlier Pasnau explained that he uses the word 
“physical” to refer to objects that are wholly material (in the modern sense), that is objects that lack 
spirituality.  If the word physical means material, and the sense organ is wholly physical, then how could it 
ever be cognitive if it is only cognitive to the degree that it is immaterial, that is, nonphysical?  At times 
Pasnau wants to identify immaterial with intentional where intentional is not incompatible with physicality.  
But at other times he identifies immaterial as nonphysical and argues that something is cognitive to the 
degree that it is nonphysical.  He criticizes Hoffman however for making sensation partly nonphysical. (45)  
Pasnau claims that sensation is a wholly physical process while allowing that nonphysicality is what 
determines cognition.   
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 Pasnau 1997, 42-43.   
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 Pasnau 1997, 33. 
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to natural existence, but according to intentional existence.553  As we have seen, Aquinas 
understands spiritual change as the reception of the sensible form according to intentional 
existence, and on Pasnau’s own account, it is just such a reception that distinguishes the 
cognizant from the noncognizant.554  What Pasnau argues is that sensation does involve a 
spiritual change, but spirituality, and for that matter, immateriality, “are not what they 
seem to be.”555  Sensation, for Aquinas, according to Pasnau, is a “wholly physical 
event.”556  A spiritual change, though different from a natural change, is nonetheless a 
physical change. 
 Pasnau contends that Aquinas defines intentional existence only in negative 
terms:  “All we are told is what it is not:  it is not natural existence,” and if we want to 
know further what intentional existence is, “Aquinas remains silent.”557  Forms received 
according to intentional existence come to exist in the patient without the patient 
becoming the sort of thing that the agent is, that is, “the form of p exists in the recipient 
without the recipient’s taking on p.”558  And because the sensible form is received in the 
physical sense organ according to intentional existence, this reception is a “physical” 
event:  “for a body, such as a physical organ, to receive a form is simply for that body to 
be altered from one physical state to another.”559   
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 Pasnau 1997, 32. 
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 Pasnau 1997, 32. 
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 Pasnau 1997, 37. 
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 Pasnau 1997, 35-37. 
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 Pasnau 1997 41.  See also Burnyeat 2001, 142.  Burnyeat makes the same point in terms of the negative 
definition of intentional existence.  Burnyeat observes that both Aristotle and Aquinas explain the change 
involved in sensation in terms of what is not.  Sensation is not an ordinary alteration.  Aristotle says that the 
form is received without the matter.  Aquinas says that the form is received according to intentional 
existence.  The use of the terms “intentional” or “spiritual” do little more than remind us that perception 
involves a different kind of change, that what is being discussed is “perceptual cognition.”  Still, Burnyeat 
contends that the terms “intentional” and “spiritual” are good labels. 
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 Pasnau 1997 41. 
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At the heart of Pasnau’s argument that sensation is a wholly physical event is his 
contention that “Aquinas sees no incompatibility between intentionality and 
physicality.”560  Pasnau contends that Aquinas almost always uses the terms 
“intentional,” “spiritual,” and “immaterial” interchangeably.561  However, he also 
observes that Aquinas “associates the mental with the nonphysical.”562  Aquinas 
understands the intellect as immaterial, thus, if Aquinas uses the terms “intentional,” and 
“spiritual,” and “immaterial” interchangeably, intentionality and spirituality would be 
associated with the mental (intellectual) as well.  But Pasnau contends that Aquinas does 
not restrict intentionality to the mental.563  Since intentionality is not restricted to the 
mental, Pasnau concludes that intentionality and thereby cognition, “can occur in wholly 
corporeal or physical entities.”564 Pasnau understands a “wholly physical” entity as an 
entity that is wholly material, lacking in anything spiritual, and moreover, claims that the 
sense organ is a “wholly physical entity.”565 Thus, on Pasnau’s reading that sensation is a 
wholly physical event, the spiritual or intentional existence of the sensible form in the 
sense organ is not “some kind of ghostly, incorporeal state of existence.”566  
One of the problems that arises from the claim that something is cognitive insofar 
as it is suitable to receive a form intentionally, concerns the fact of the medium that exists 
between the external sense object and the sense organ.  In embracing an Aristotelian 
account of sensation, Aquinas holds that the likenesses or species of an external object 
are transmitted to the sense organ through the medium, for example, the species of a 
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color is transmitted through the air to the pupil.  The species of the color exists in the air 
according to intentional existence.567  Thus, the “species in medio” is an intentio.  Does 
this make air cognitive?   
Aquinas’ contends that what distinguishes the cognitive from the noncognitive is 
the suitability to receive forms intentionally.  Pasnau claims that what Aquinas means is 
“something is cognitive iff it is suited to have not just its own form but also the 
intentionally existing forms of other things.”568  It seems clear that Aquinas contends that 
what is cognitive must be able to receive forms intentionally.  But it is not clear that if 
something is able to receive forms intentionally, it is thereby cognitive.  Air is able to 
receive forms intentionally.  Somehow the species of color is in the air without coloring 
the air.  Pasnau clearly states that air is not cognitive.569 But because he wants to insist 
that cognition is simply a matter of being able to receive forms intentionally, he is in a 
predicament, for which he finds a way out in the claim that, according to Aquinas, “being 
cognitive is a matter of being (literally) informed.”570  Pasnau reads Aquinas as 
identifying being “informed” with “taking in or receiving.”571 Thus, he says:  “air and 
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 Pasnau 1997, 48.  Pasnau quotes from Aquinas, Questiones disputatae de veritate  (QDV) (Leonine v. 
22):  “Unde species coloris est in aere per modum intentionis. . .” 
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 Pasnau 1997, 34. 
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other media exhibit the same capacity as the sense organs, intellect and even God:  all 
contain intentionally existing forms.”  In fact, he claims that each “receives information” 
from the external world.   
Aquinas understands immateriality and materiality as being of degrees, the more 
immaterial the recipient, the more cognitive the recipient.  In ST, I, q. 84, a. 2, Aquinas 
explains that in order to know material things, these material things must exist 
immaterially in the knower.572   The intellect does not have immediate access to external 
sensible objects so in order to know them an immaterial likeness must be in the knower.  
Aquinas contends that since knowledge is in inverse ratio to materiality, only that which 
is able to receive forms immaterially can come to have knowledge.573 Thus, he explains 
both sensation and intellection in terms of the immaterial reception of forms: 
Consequently, things that are not receptive of forms, save materially, have 
no power of knowledge whatever—such as plants, as the Philosopher says.  But 
the more immaterially a being receives the form of the thing known, the more 
perfect its knowledge.   Therefore the intellect, which abstracts the species not 
only from matter, knows more perfectly than the senses, which receive the form 
of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions.  
Moreover, among the senses themselves, sight has the most perfect knowledge, 
because it is the least material, as we have remarked above.  So too, among 
intellects, the more perfect is the more immaterial.574 
 
Aquinas understands immateriality and materiality, and thereby, cognition, in terms of 
degrees, there is a hierarchy of immateriality, of cognition.  Since air can receive a form 
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 Aquinas ST, I, q. 84, a. 2:  “Relinquitur ergo quod oportet materialia cognita in cognoscente existere non 
materialiter, sed magis immaterialiter.” 
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 Aquinas ST, I, q. 84, a. 2:  “Unde manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex opposito se habet ad 
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according to intentional existence, whereas a plant cannot, it seems as if it is in some 
sense cognitive, though less so than the sense organs which are less cognitive than the 
intellect.  Pasnau argues that the real difference that separates one cognizer from another 
is not the manner in which the form is received, but rather “the kinds of forms that a thing 
receives and, in particular, the degree of their universality.”575  Air can only receive 
forms that are entirely particular and unstructured.  Human beings, in contrast, are able to 
have truly universal intellectual representations.  But the kind of forms that can be 
received is determined by the suitability of the receiver, and this is finally what shows 
that air is not cognitive according to Pasnau.  Whereas human beings are suited to have 
universal concepts, air is so poorly suited to receive intentionally existing forms that it is 
not cognitive.  Air is simply not suited to receive species in the way that senses or the 
intellect can.576  Pasnau then wonders why Aquinas invokes the notion of intentional 
existence at all, given the problems that arise on his reading, and contends that the truly 
critical and determining feature of the cognitive is that “they are suited to contain a great 
deal of information about their environment.”577 
 What can we take from this lengthy discussion of Pasnau’s reading of Aquinas?  
There are several issues to consider.  First, Pasnau’s use of modern terminology often 
confuses the issues and misconstrues the problems.  Aquinas is working in an Aristotelian 
framework and thus embraces the Aristotelian physics, where there is nothing that is 
wholly material.  The fundamental components of Aristotle’s physics are form and 
matter.  Moreover, Aquinas embraces Aristotle’s hylomorphic understanding of the body 
and soul relationship.  Thus, the sense organ is not “wholly physical” but is a composite 
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of soul and body.  The fact that the sense organ is able to do what it does is precisely 
because it is ensouled, alive. 
Second, in order to show that sensation is a “wholly physical event,” Pasnau 
claims there is no incompatibility between spiritual or intentional and physicality.  He 
then argues that cognition is defined as the suitability of receiving forms according to 
intentional existence, and this is a suitability that something entirely physical, for 
example, a sense organ has.  But since even air receives forms intentionally, but air is not 
cognitive, Pasnau must look for another way to define cognition, and he finds this in the 
hierarchy of immateriality and cognition, where the kinds of forms that are received and 
the suitability of the recipient become the distinguishing features of the cognitive.  But 
even these features only differ by degrees such that Pasnau claims that Aquinas’ account 
implies that media theoretically participate in the same sorts of operations as do the 
“properly cognitive” faculties of sense and intellect.578  I would argue that Aquinas’ 
account, only on Pasnau’s reading, implies such a thing.  The sense organ is a highly 
structured organ that is connected to the living body and therefore has the ability to 
operate as an animate being unlike the air which is inanimate.  
Third, the claim that, for Aquinas, something is cognitive iff it is suitable to 
receive forms intentionally is fallacious, even with the modifications that Pasnau makes.  
Pasnau himself points out that Aquinas agrees with the Augustinian contention that 
“attention is required for the act of any cognitive power.”579 In the Summa Contra 
Gentiles, Aquinas claims, “the cognitive power doesn’t actually cognize anything unless 
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an attention (intentio) is present.”580 The meaning of intentio, for Aquinas, Pasnau argues, 
implies “a certain order of one thing to another.”581 Pasnau argues thus, intentio means 
the same thing as conversio, a turning toward the object.582  Not only does Aquinas claim 
that the intellect must turn towards (conversio) the phantasm in order to cognize but he 
also claims that: 
A power can cognize something only by turning itself to its object—as sight 
cognizes something only by turning itself to a color.583 
 
That a power can only cognize something by tending towards it (convertendo) seems to 
be necessary condition for cognition according to Aquinas.  Thus, even if something is 
cognitive if it is suited to receive an intentional form, the suitability to receive an 
intentional form does not make something cognitive. What does make something 
cognitive, in addition to receiving an intentional form, is the ability to tend towards the 
object.  It seems then, that Aquinas holds that any definition of cognition must include 
the ability to attend to the object, and this is something that air clearly cannot do, and 
therefore, air is not cognitive precisely because it cannot participate in the same 
operations that the sense and the intellect do, theoretically or not.  Given that Aquinas 
associates intentio with conversio, it also seems clear why he would invoke intentional 
existence in terms of the reception of the form in sensation.  Aquinas clearly claims that 
sensation requires a spiritual change.  It is true that he does not fully explain exactly how 
the spiritual change occurs.  And this gives rise to the debate about whether it is a 
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corporeal or incorporeal change.  That the sense organ is an ensouled entity connected to 
the living being determines its capacity to sense or perceive.  It seems that the reception 
of the sensible form according to intentional existence by the sense organ must involve 
cognitive attention. 
While it is clear that though Aquinas has some notion of cognitive attention, 
Pasnau still observes that a real tension exists for Aquinas between the passivity of 
sensation and an activity of cognitive attention.584  According to Pasnau, while Aquinas 
does not give an account of what cognitive attention is, he does explicitly and often 
maintain that the senses are primarily passive.585  For example, Aquinas claims that, 
“things outside the soul are related to the exterior senses as a sufficient agent with which 
the patients do not co-operate but only receive.”586  In yet another passage Aquinas writes 
that, “for a sense’s complete operation the impression of its active [object] in the manner 
of passion alone suffices.”587 Based on his reading of Aquinas, Pasnau does not find 
resolution of this tension in Aquinas.588  
The points to be taken from this discussion on Aquinas are as follows:  1)  
Aquinas embraces Aristotle’s account of sensation and interprets Aristotle’s claim that 
the form is received with matter by his distinction between the natural change and the 
spiritual change.  Sensation requires the spiritual change, the reception of the form 
according to intentional existence in the sense organ, 2)  It is not clear exactly how this 
spiritual change happens nor whether it is a corporeal event itself or an incorporeal event 
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in a corporeal organ, 3) It is not clear how the sensible form exists intentionally in the 
sense organ, that is, in ordinary change, the patient is informed, that is, receives the form 
in the manner in which the form is in the agent.  Such a change is in line with Aristotle’s 
framework.  But how can the presence of a form that does not inform its patient in this 
ordinary way, be explained?  4) Aquinas maintains that the senses are primarily passive, 
and thus, a problem arises in accounting for cognitive attention. 
 
4.2 John Duns Scotus’ Account of Sensation 
 Along with Aristotle, Scotus contends that all our knowledge arises from sense 
perception.589  Even more importantly however, is Scotus’ understanding, in line with 
Aristotle, that the sense requires the presence of an external sensible object whereas the 
intellect requires the presence of an internal intelligible object.  The intellect does not 
have direct access to the external object in this life and therefore, depends upon sensation 
to provide an object by way phantasm.  Such a dependency requires an intimate 
cooperation between the sense faculty and the intellective faculty.  Thus, it is important to 
understand Scotus’ account of sensation as it is the origin of knowledge.  It is noted in 
several places in the literature that Scotus does not spend much time delineating his 
account of sensation.  Tachau points out that the process of sensation and the 
multiplication of species theory seemed “well-established and largely uncontroversial” to 
Scotus.590  In his chapter on Scotus’ account of cognition in The Cambridge Companion 
to Duns Scotus, Pasnau makes the same point explaining that a substantial consensus on 
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the basic elements of cognition existed by the end of the 13th century, and Scotus mostly 
endorses this view.591 Scotus’ treatment of sensation varies throughout his texts, for 
example, he discusses it in more detail in his questions on Aristotle’s De Anima (QDA), 
as is to be expected, but rarely mentions it in his Quodlibetal Questions.  Moreover, his 
treatment of sensation in the Quodlibetal Questions differs from his treatment of 
sensation in the QDA. 
Scotus basically embraces Aristotle’s, and thereby, Aquinas’, account of 
cognition, including the distinction between sensation and intellection, that sensation is 
an organic process whereas intellection is an inorganic process, that there are five 
external senses as well as the internal senses of the brain, and the understanding that what 
is material cannot act on what is immaterial, thus, the senses cannot directly act on the 
intellect.592  My understanding of Scotus is that he is thoroughly Aristotelian in his view 
of the cognitive processes such that, while there are elements in his own account of 
cognition that find their source in Augustinianism or his own theological beliefs, it is my 
contention that these influences serve to enhance and deepen his understanding of 
Aristotelian metaphysics which in turn provides the cohesiveness of his own thought.593 
In my discussion of Scotus’ understanding of sensation I am interested to see if 
there are elements in his account that can address the questions that emerged from the  
discussion of Aquinas’ account of sensation.  The organization of this section follows 
these questions:  4.2.1) Does Scotus accept the distinction between natural change and 
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spiritual change where the spiritual change demarcates sensation?  4.2.2) Is the change 
that is involved in sensation a corporeal change or an incorporeal change?  4.2.3)  Can 
Scotus account for the presence of the sensible form in the sense organ, and how does he 
understand the nature of this form, that is, what is its ontological status?  4.2.4)  Does 
Scotus maintain, as Aquinas does, that the senses are primarily passive or does he offer a 
different account in which he accords an activity to the senses such that he is in a better 
position to account for the activity of attending to the object?  I will address each 
question in order beginning with the first.  
 
4.2.1  Scotus’ Account of Natural Change and Spiritual Change 
In his Quaestiones Super Secundum et Tertium De Anima (QDA), Scotus 
discusses Aquinas’ distinction between natural change and spiritual change in regards to 
sensation in Questions 4 and 6.594 In both questions he claims that in a natural change the 
form is received by the patient according to real being (esse reale) and according to the 
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disposition of matter as in the agent, the example being, warming.  A spiritual change is 
one in which the form is received according to intentional being, and the example that he 
uses is vision.  He agrees with Aquinas that vision only involves the reception of  the 
form according to intentional existence, and therefore is the most noble of all the 
senses.595  He also recognizes that the other senses involve natural changes in respect to 
the object or the organ in the same way as Aquinas.596 
In Question 5, Scotus considers whether the sense is receptive of the species 
without matter.  In his response he basically follows Aquinas’ account in terms of the 
natural change, which he clearly sees as change involving matter.  Scotus claims that in 
some cases the patient receives the form according to the same mode of being that the 
form has in the agent.597  This is a natural change (actione naturali) in which the “agent 
and the patient communicate in matter.”598   
In Question 5, Scotus does not call the change that is involved in sensation a 
spiritual change here nor does he explain it in terms of intentional change (he does in 
Question 6), though in addressing the principal arguments, he refers to the an intentional 
change in terms of touch.599  Scotus explains that in some other cases, the patient is not 
disposed materially in the same way as the agent, and then it receives without matter, 
                                                 
595
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meaning that the patient receives the form without preceding material conditions.600  
Scotus explains that the sense is not disposed to receiving the species or the form of the 
sensible object as prime matter is so disposed, therefore, the sense receives without 
matter, that is, without material disposition.601   
Scotus then considers an objection that since the sensitive power is the same as 
the essence of the soul, and the soul is purely spiritual and can only receive something 
from a purely spiritual agent, then the sensitive power cannot receive the species of the 
sense object which is corporeal.602 But Scotus contends that the sensitive power is not the 
soul alone, but includes the organ, and thus is able to receive the species of the corporeal 
sense object, and moreover, he claims that the sensitive power, even as it includes the 
organ, remains really identical to the essence of the soul. 603  Thus, the “sensitive power 
with the organ is such a cause of sensing.”604  Scotus further claims that two partial 
causes, the sensitive power and the organ, unite (concurrunt) in the act of sensing itself in 
such a way that the sensitive power is inseparable from the organ.605  
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From these passages it is clear that Scotus accepts the distinction between natural 
change and spiritual change, where spiritual change is the change involved in sensation 
such that the form is not received according to material disposition, but according to 
intentional existence.  That the spiritual change is a corporeal event is also clear from 
these passages, for Scotus says explicitly that what receives the form is not the sensitive 
power alone, but the composite of the organ and sensitive power receives the form.  
Whether the change involved in sensation is a corporeal change the question that I turn to 
now. 
 
4.2.2   Sensation:  Corporeal or Incorporeal Change 
 
In the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus claims: “to feel or be sentient is to have 
sensation as a form.”606  He clarifies the meaning of this statement observing that “. . . the 
sense in which the sensation is subjectively received would be sensing.”607  And so he 
concludes, “To sense, then is to receive or have a sensation.”608  Scotus is clear that what 
receives the species in sensation is the sense organ, or the organic part of the sense.609 In 
another passage in the Ordinatio he carefully characterizes the organ as the composite of 
a part of the body and the power of the soul and to say that the object is in the organ such 
that the whole object is sufficiently present when the species is present in that part of the 
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body.610 In Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus explains how he understands 
the sense organ that receives a sense object: 
The proximate recipient of any sensitive operation, however is primarily 
composed of matter and form, as is clear from the opening passages of De sensu 
et sensato, for what is the subject of vision is not the soul itself, but the organ 
composed of soul and a definite part of the body.  It is not the soul, nor any part 
thereof, nor the form of the chemical compounds that are in a definite part of the 
body, but it is the form of the organ as a whole which is the proximate ground for 
receiving the vision, like humanity is the form of man as a whole. 
Hence it appears clear that if we call an “organ” that part of the whole 
animal which is the proximate subject of sensation, we must say it is composed of 
the soul as the principle of the operation and of a part of the body structured in a 
certain way, and then it will be clear why a blind eye is an “eye” only in a 
qualified sense, for it is only one part of that composite which is meant to be 
called an eye and is missing the other part needed for a complete eye.611 
 
Scotus insists here that it is the “form of the organ as a whole” (forma totius organi) that 
is the “proximate ground of receiving” (proxima ratio recipiendi). 
Scotus is not original in his claims here and appears to be influenced by Giles of 
Rome, who, according to Alluntis and Wolter, while not originating this notion of “the 
form of the whole,” popularized it. 612  It appears that the notion of the form of the whole 
indicates that the union of the bodily organ with the soul brings into being a different 
kind of entity unlike the inanimate wax in Aristotle’s example.  Considering how Scotus 
                                                 
610
 Scotus, I Ord. d. 3, p. 3, q. 1 [Balic III:  236-37]:  “Sed potentia organicae dedit ut possit habere 
obiectum sit praesens non in potentia ipsa sed in organo, hoc est in parte corporis quam perficit potentia 
organica:  et ista praesentia sufficit, quia totum—compositum ex parte corporis sic mixta et ex potentia—
est organum; et huic toti obiectum sufficienter est praesens quando species est in illa parte corporis.” 
611
 Quodl., 9.28, [11]:  “. . . quaelibet autem operatio sensitiva est primo compositi ex materia et forma, 
sicut proprii receptivi sicut patet in principio De Sensu et Sensato enim ipsa anima est immediate receptiva 
visionis, sed ipsum organum, quod est compositum ex anima, et determinata parte corporis est proxima 
ratio recipiendi visionem, nec est anima, nec aliquid animae nec illa forma mixtionis, quae est in 
determinata parte corporis, sed forma totius organi eo modo, quo humanitas est forma totius hominis, est 
proxima ratio recipiendi visionem. Ex hoc patet, quod si organum dicatur illa pars totius animalis, in qua 
tanquam in proximo receptivo, recipitur sensatio, organum dicetur esse aliquid compositum ex anima, ut est 
principium talis opeationis, et ex parte corporis sic mixta, et tunc patet, quare oculus caecus non est oculus, 
nisi secundum quid:  quia non est nisi altera pars compositi, quod natum esset dici oculus oarens alia parte, 
qua complete oculus est oculus.” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 227. 
612
 Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 227.  See also, Giles of Rome, Aegidii Romani Theoremata de esse et essentia, 
ed. E. Hocedez (Louvain, 1930), 44-45. 
       
 
 171
  
  
understands the whole as greater than the sum of its parts and his careful treatment of 
unity, Scotus’ focus here becomes even more intriguing.  While certainly Aquinas too 
understands the sense organ as the composite of the sensitive soul and a bodily organ, he 
insists that sensation is primarily passive.  Scotus’ emphasis in this passage, that the form 
of the organ as a whole is the proximate ground of receiving the species, recognizes the 
unique capacities that the sense organ as a composite has over and above the 
characteristics that either of its components has alone, that is, the sense organ is alive and 
therefore has capacities or powers that are peculiar to a living being.  It seems clear that 
Scotus embraces Aristotle’s homonymy principle, namely, a body that is not living can 
be called a body in name only, for he says that an eye that is blind cannot be properly 
called an eye.613  Not only does Scotus’ use of the notion of the “form of the whole” 
emphasize the complete unity of the ensouled bodily organ, but it also reshapes the view 
of sensation from a primarily passive process to an active process.  Wax may be able to 
receive the impression of the gold ring, but, I contend, a living sense organ receives the 
form as an attentive receiver.  I will return to this claim later, the point to take here is that 
Scotus clearly understands the sense as a composite of the sensitive soul and the bodily 
organ.   
In Question 13 of the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus discusses Aristotle’s claim 
that the senses are acted upon.  Since the senses are acted upon, they are altered, and 
Scotus understands this alteration as a bodily movement:  “for sensation results from a 
bodily movement and the sense being acted upon.”614 Scotus contends further that the 
                                                 
613
 See Cross 2003, 275. 
614
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.61 [21]:  “. . . et ipsi sensus alterantur, patiuntur enim:  actio enim ipsorum motus est 
per corpus, patiente aliquid sensu. . .” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 300.  (Text is italicized in the 
Wadding edition.) 
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sense can be said to be altered, because:  “in this something composite receives 
something extended and from a natural agent locally present.”615  It is clear that Scotus 
understands that sensation involves a bodily change, that it is not simply an event that 
takes place in a corporeal organ, but the corporeal organ is itself altered.  He does not 
elaborate however, on what this change is. 
In the QMA Scotus claims that the action of the species in the organ is a real 
action.616  Since Aristotle claims in De Anima that sensible qualities in excess destroy the 
organs of sense, Scotus contends that the sensible qualities only do this by way of the 
species that is received by the sense organ, and therefore, the species is a source of real 
action.617  The sensible species, Scotus says, seems to be a real accident.618  Etzkorn and 
Wolter explain that the species is an accidental quality in the subject in which it exists, 
                                                 
615
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.62 [21]:  “Sensus autem per oppositum potest dici alterari, et quia ibi compositum 
quantum recipit, et quia ab agente naturali; cui est localiter praesens.” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 301.   
616
 Scotus, QMA, b. 5, q. 7. p. 3[1]:  “Species in organo habet actionem realem, quia “excellens sensibile 
corrumpit sensum”, II De anima.  Non nisi per speciem, ergo species est quo est actio realis.  Ergo videtur 
quod species sit accidens reale.”  Trans. Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 439. 
617
 Ibid. 
618
 Ibid.  See also, Dominik Perler, “What Am I Thinking About?  John Duns Scotus and Peter Aureol on 
Intentional Objects,” Vivarium 32:1 (1994), 78; Perler 2003; and Dominik Perler, “Duns Scotus on 
Signification,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 3:  97-120. Perler explains the ontological status of the 
species as an accident. (103)  Perler also explains the difference between sensible species and the 
intelligible species:  “The intelligible species is a mental entity—ontologically speaking, a quality of the 
intellect—which is produced by the intellect on the basis of a sensible species and which functions to 
represent the understood thing. . .Sensible species and intelligible species are distinct, since they are in two 
distinct parts of the soul.  In contrast to the sensible species, the intelligible species is not merely a passing 
imprint of the thing, but a cognitive image that can exist even when the represented thing is not present.” 
(102-103)  I want to point out here the real difference between sensible species and the intelligible species 
is not how long they remain, rather the difference is that the sensible species is held in a bodily organ 
whereas the intelligible species is in the inorganic intellect.  Following from this difference, the sensible 
species exists under material conditions, which Scotus understands as both “the here and the now” and 
singularity.  The intelligible species does not exist under material conditions and is able to represent the 
object as a universal.  Since Scotus follows Aristotle in holding that the intellect cannot think without the 
phantasm, there is a sense image or phantasm that is held in the internal senses and remains longer than the 
passing sensible species.  The phantasm mediates between the sensible species and the intelligible species.  
The important point to note here is that the sensible species, the phantasm, and the intelligible species, 
being species, all have the same ontological status of accident, they differ in terms of how they represent 
the object.  As will be discussed in the next section, Scotus recognizes the species as an intention, that is, it 
exists according to intentional existence. 
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whether this be the object itself, the medium, or the soul of the knowing subject.619  From 
this passage, it seems that the corporeal change involved in sensation is the reception of 
the species which is itself an accident and as such effects a real change.  But what is the 
nature of this species?  What is its ontological status? 
 
4.2.3  The Ontological Status of the Sensible Form 
 That Scotus understands the species as an accident is important.  As discussed in 
Chapter 3, we saw that Scotus argues that accident is not synonymous with inherence, 
and that the accident is an individual thing in its own right such that it does not depend on 
its inherence in a substance to be what it is.  As Scotus contends in the QMA: “the entity 
of the accident is formally other than the entity of its subject.”620 In the discussion of 
Question 9 of the Quodlibetal Questions, we saw that in his account of per se being, 
Scotus contends that the accident can be a per se being when it does not inhere in a 
subject.  Given that Scotus understands the species as an accident, the fact that an 
accident is not necessarily synonymous with inherence, helps to understand how the 
sensible quality can be received in the sense organ without inhering in it in the ordinary 
way in which an accident inheres in a subject.  What has to be resolved is how the 
sensible species as an accidental quality can effect a real change in the sense, a corporeal 
change, without actually inhering in it, as well as what this corporeal change is.  I will 
attend first to the question of how the sensible species can be present in the sense organ 
without inhering in it, at least in an ordinary way.  To this end, I will consider Scotus’ 
                                                 
619
 Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 438.  See their footnote 1. 
620
 Scotus, QMA, b. 5, q. 7, p. 44[7]:  “. . . quia entitas accidentis est alia ab entitate subiecti formaliter. . .” 
Trans. Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 449.  
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discussion of lux  and lumen in the Ordinatio.  In the course of this discussion Scotus 
argues that lux  is able to exist totally in air without changing air and it does so as an 
intention (lumen) that is neither spiritual, nor corporeal, though, it is extended.621 
 In the Ordinatio, b. 2, d. 13, Scotus investigates the distinction between lux  and 
lumen.622  In his discussion Scotus contends that lux  is not a substance because it is 
sensible through itself.  A substance can never be directly sensed, it is always indirectly 
known through the sensing of accidents.623  Scotus claims that lux  is an accident.624  He 
contends further that lumen, the species of light, is not “a complete substance, that is, 
subsisting through itself; because it is neither spiritual, since it is extendable, nor 
corporeal, because then it would be two bodies at the same time.”625  Now, lux  is 
completely in air in such a way that it neither moves air when it arrives, nor moves air 
when it leaves.626  If lux  somehow moves air, that is, changes or alters air, then air would 
                                                 
621
 See Tachau 1988, 58.  Tachau notes that Scotus “specificially rejects the possibility that species are 
spiritual, corporeal, material, or that they are a substantial form,” as Henry of Ghent did before him.  See 
also, Scotus, I Ord. d. 3, p. 3, q. 2:  That Scotus does not consider the species to be spiritual is something 
that I will attend to in the course of the discussion in section 4.2.3, after I discuss how he understands the 
nature of an intention.  That it is not spiritual is an important claim in terms of understanding the 
corporeality of the process especially in regards to the questions that emerged from the discussion of 
Aquinas’ account.  As will be made clear, Scotus gives real being to the species, but it is a diminished 
being (esse diminutum).   
622
 Tachau 1988, 58.  Tachau notes that Scotus’ most extensive discussion of the species in medio is found 
in II Sent. d. 13. [edited and examined in the four extant versions by Edward R. McCarthy, Medieval Light 
Theory and Optics and Duns Scotus’ Treatment of Light in D. 13 of Book II of his Commentary on the 
Sentences, Ph.D. dissertation, The City University of New York, 1976.]  I will here use McCarthy’s 
translation of the Ordinatio, b. 2, d. 13 passages as well as the Latin version that is found in his dissertation.  
Following McCarthy, I will leave “lux ” and “lumen” untranslated in my discussion.  As will become clear 
in the discussion, Scotus understands “lumen” to be the intention or proper species of the sensible light 
(lux).   
623
 Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13:  “. . . quia lux  est per se sensibilis.  Non sic substantia, nisi per accidens.” 
Trans. McCarthy 1976, 329.  See also Wolter    .  Wolter observes that Scotus emphasizes repeatedly that 
substance is not something that we can sense, rather it is the accident that moves the sense. 
624
 Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13:  “Lux etiam in aliquo est accidens; ergo in nullo est substantia.”  Trans. 
McCarthy 1976, 330. 
625
 Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13:  “. . . dico quod lumen non est substantia completa, hoc est per se subsistens; 
quia neque spiritualis, cum sit sit extensibilis; neque corporalis, quia tunc duo corpora essent simul.”  
Trans. McCarthy 1976, 330. 
626
 Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13:  “Est enim lux  cum toto aere, nec oportet aerem moveri localiter ipsa 
adveniente, nec moveri ipsa recedente vel non adveniente lumine. . .” Trans. McCarthy 1976, 330. 
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not be breathable when illuminated.627  Somehow lux  is in air without altering air 
because lux  is in air by way of its species, lumen.  This leads Scotus to consider the 
distinction between a sensible quality and a quality in which exists the species or 
intention of the sensible quality.628  Thus, he considers the meaning of intention: 
It should be noted that this word intention is equivocal.  Intention is in one 
way said to be the act of the will.  In another way, it is the formal 
distinction in re.  However the intention of the thing from which the genus 
is derived, differs from the intention, from which the difference is derived.  
The third way, is said to be common.  The fourth way, is said to be an 
inclination toward an object, as a likeness is called a relationship to that 
which it is alike.629 
 
It is the fourth meaning of intention that applies to the sensible species.630  The sensible 
species is an intention precisely because as a likeness (similitudo) it tends toward an 
object: 
Hence an intention is not said to be that, which is held by the senses, 
because this way the object would be the same as the intention.  But the 
intention is said to be that, through which, as a formal principle it is 
connected with the object.  So whatever is the sign is the thing.  According 
to Augustine in De Trinitate and De Doctrina Christiana, it is not 
convertible.  Therefore in the distinction between a thing and a sign, the 
thing is taken as it is in reality, which is not as a sign.  Although that 
which is a sign is also the thing.  So in the distinction between a thing and 
its intention, although the intention is the thing itself and the sensible form 
to which this sense tends, that thing however is said to be the intention, 
which is not only the thing itself toward which the sense tends, but it is the 
inclination to something else, which is its proper similitude. 
 By this way I say that lumen is an intention or proper species of 
sensible light (lux ) itself.  Which is provable then, because, if it is not an 
                                                 
627
 Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13: “. . . quia tunc in medio illuminato non esset respiratio aeris si illud corpus 
esset localiter admotum propter lumen.”  Trans. McCarthy 1976, 331. 
628
 Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13:  “Cum autem genus qualitatis quantum ad tertiam speciem distinguatur in 
qualitatem sensibilem, et in qualitatem quae est species sive intentio qualitatis sensibilis. . .”   Trans. 
McCarthy 1976, 331. 
629
 Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13:  “. . . notandum est quod huius <modi> nomen intentio est equivocum. Uno 
modo dicitur actus voluntatis intentio. Alio modo: ratio formalis in re. Sed intentio rei a qua accipitur genus 
differt ab intentione a qua accipitur differentia. Tertio modo, dicitur communiter. Quarto modo, dicitur ratio 
tendendi in obiectum; sicut similitudo dicitur ratio tendendi in illud cuius est.”  Trans. McCarthy 1976, 331. 
 
630
 Tachau 1988, 62. 
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intention, then when applied on the sense it would impede sensation, 
because what is only sensible is not the cause of sensation.  If it were put 
on the sense, it would impede sensation, because the sensible alone 
applied to a sense is not perceived.  Thus lumen applied to the eye would 
hinder vision. Which case is false and contrary to the statement of the 
Commentator of the De Sensu et Sensato, where the Commentator wants 
to say, that it is necessary for lumen to be applied to the eye, so that it can 
receive the species of color and thereby see.631 
  
The senses do not perceive the intention, rather it is by way of the intention that the 
senses apprehend the object.  The intention, in effect, leads the senses to the object, 
without itself be perceived.  Through the intention the sense tends towards the object.  As 
we saw, according Pasnau, Aquinas claims that intentio means the same thing as 
conversio.  In Pasnau’s discussion of Scotus’ account of cognition, he explains that to 
tend (tendere) towards another is “to represent another.”632 Scotus sees the connection 
between the intention and the object of which it is an intention as based on a formal 
principle.  That the intention tends towards something else, based on form, is what makes 
it a proper similitude.  In his discussion of lumen, Scotus explains that it is the proper 
                                                 
631
 Scotus, Ord., b. 2, d. 13:  “Notandum est quod intentio non dicitur hic ‘quod intendit sensus’; 
quia hoc modo ipsum obiectum esset intentio. Sed intentio dicitur hic ‘illud per quod tamquam per 
principium formale in obiectum tendit sensus’. Et sicut quidquid est signum, est res, secundum Augustinum 
De Trinitate et De Doctrina Christiana, licet non econverso; et ideo in distinctione rei et signi res accipitur 
pro illa re quae non est signum, licet illa quae est signum sit etiam res, ita in distinctione rei et intentionis 
licet intentio sit res et form<a> sensibilis in quam possit sensus tendere, tamen illa dicitur intentio quae non 
est tantum res in quam sensus tendit, sed est ratio tendendi in alterum cuius est propria similitudo. 
Hoc modo dico quod lumen est proprie intentio sive species propria ipsius lucis sensibilis. Quod probatur. 
Tum quia si non esset intentio, tunc suprapositum sensui prohiberet sensum. Quia quod est tantum sensibile 
et non ratio sentiendi, si ponatur supra sensum, impedit sensationem. Quia sensibile supra sensum positum 
non sentitur, et ita lumen suprapositum oculo impediret ipsum videre. Hoc autem est falsum, et contra 
Commentatorem super librum De sensu et Sensato, ubi vult quod necessarium est lumen positum in oculo 
ad hoc ut recipiat species colorum et videat.”  Trans. McCarthy 1976, 331-332. 
632
 Pasnau 2003, 288.  Pasnau explains that representing another does not mean in the way that a word or 
picture represents something else, rather to represent refers to the “distinctive (and highly mysterious) way 
in which thoughts and perceptions are about things.”  Since words and pictures need an interpreter, they do 
not of themselves tend towards what they represent.  Thoughts and perceptions, Pasnau says, are the 
interpretation, they tend to things of themselves.  And it is in this way that they are intentional. Based on 
Scotus’ account that the relationship between the intention and the thing of which it is an intention is a 
formal relationship, the act of representing does not seem so mysterious.  See also Perler 2003, 166.  Here 
Perler is primarily concerned with the intelligible species.  As a species it is “immediately linked to things 
in the world,” and it is in this way that species are understood as representational.   
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species of the lux  which is the light that is sensed.  Now lumen itself cannot be sensible 
because what is completely sensible cannot be the cause of sensation.  The cause of 
sensation, as we have seen, is the species, which tends towards the object.  The species 
cannot itself be sensible because if it were, it would block sensation.  If you put the apple 
on your eye, you will not see the apple.  Scotus uses the example of light passing through 
a piece of red glass to show that the species is not itself perceived.633  If you look at the 
colored patch of red on the wall in order to perceive the red glass, then Scotus says you 
will only know the glass in a derivate way.  But if you were to stand in such a way that 
your eye is in the place where the red patch of light is on the wall, and look toward the 
glass, you would see the red glass properly and not see the species at all.  Moreover, 
when the species is in the air, it is not seen. Thus, it is the species that causes the 
sensation of the apple, but it is the apple that is sensed.  The species itself is not sensible 
and is therefore not perceived.  
In the QMA Scotus delineates three degrees of sense cognition or sensitive 
knowledge:   
The first is that of intuitive cognition which is of a thing present, and not 
just through a species, nor only under a knowable aspect, but in its proper 
nature.  The second degree is of a thing known through a proper species 
produced from it.  The third is through some species fashioned by the 
cognitive power from the proper species of certain things that were 
impressed upon it.  All of these cognitions are per se.634 
                                                 
633
 Scotus, QMA, b. 5, q. 7, p. 4:  “Item, species in medio est vere visibilis; ergo res.  Probatio assumpti si 
radius solis transeat per vitrum rubeum, potest species ruboris vitri videri in pariete ubi terminatur radius 
ille.  Quod autem iste rubor in pariete sit species patet, quia si ponatur ibi oculus, per illud videbit ruborem 
in vitro.”  Trans. Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 439.  See also, Quodl. 14.88 [26], addition, Alluntis & Wolter 
1975, 341. 
634
 Scotus, QMA, b. 2, q. 3, p. 109[23]:  “Primus est intuitivae cognitionis, quae est de re praesente non 
tantum per speciem, nec tantum sub ratione cognoscibilis, sed in propria natura.  Secundus gradus est rei 
cognitae per speciem propriam ex se genitam.  Tertius est per speciem aliquam factam a virtute cognitiva, 
et hoc ex speciebus aliquorum propriis sibi impressis.  Omnes istae cognitiones sunt per se.”  Trans. 
Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 197-198.  Scotus discusses a fourth degree of sensitive knowledge that he calls 
“knowledge per accident,” a knowledge of the object or its opposite by way of negation.  See p. 110:  
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Scotus offers the following examples:  for the first, sight sees color; for the second, the 
phantasy imagines a color that was seen; and for the third, the phantasy imagines a gold 
mountain.635  I want to draw attention to the first degree of sensitive knowledge where the 
sense apprehends the sense object as present, “not just through a species, nor only under a 
knowable aspect, but in its proper nature.”  Sensation, as understood at the level of 
intuitive cognition, apprehends the sense object as it is actually present and existing.  We 
are not able to sense something whenever we wish, we only sense something that is 
actually present to us.  And when we do sense an object, Scotus contends that the exterior 
sensation is of the object immediately, and therefore: “it is accidental that there be a 
species there for the sake of sensation.”636  Scotus explains that the species is required in 
the interior sense because the object is not present in itself.637  In sensation the species is 
not the object of the senses, rather the object of the senses is the external sense object.  
We see color, not the species of color.  Etzkorn and Wolter explain: 
That is, when the sensible “species” in the medium encounters the eye, its 
effect is sensation; the sensation therefore is distinct from the “species” 
that causes it.  Though the “species” causes the sensation qua quality in 
the eye, it is not what is cognitively sensed as object, and hence if it is 
known by the internal sense as something on-going, this is accidental.  Or 
‘accidental’ may refer to the fact that it is not what is sensed, but it is the 
object outside that is sensed . . .”638  
 
  The species is that by which the object is sensed, not that which is sensed.    
                                                                                                                                                 
“Ultra hos gradus cognitionis est cognitio per accidens; et hoc:  vel oppositi per remotionem, vel obiecti.”  
Trans. Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 198. 
635
 Scotus, QMA, b. 2, q. 3, p. 109[23]:  “Verbi gratia, de primo gradu, visus videt colorem; de secundo, 
phantasia imaginatur colorem visum; de trtio, phantasia imaginatur montem aureum. . .”  Trans. Etzkorn & 
Wolter 1998, 198. 
636
 Scotus, QMA, b. 5, q. 7, p. 106[7]:  “. . .species in organo extra non est ratio repraesentandi obiectum ut 
cognitum, sed sensatio exterior est obiecti immediate.  Unde accidit quod ibi sit species propter 
sensationem.”  Trans. Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 465-466. 
637
 Scotus, QMA, b. 5, q. 7, p. 106[7]:  “In interiori vero requiritur ita quod interior est praecise obiecti, ut 
lucet in specie, quia non est obiecti in se praesentis.”  Trans. Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 466. 
638
 Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 466.  See their footnote 108. 
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 From this discussion we can take the following points, the species is an accident 
and therefore a thing.  The species is not spiritual nor is it corporeal.  This is puzzling 
because Scotus contends that it is somehow extendable but not material, as he says that 
lumen is an intention and as such it is extendable.  That it is extendable seems to mean 
that it can be in something that is material, while the intention itself is not material or 
corporeal.  For example, Scotus considers sense knowledge to be extended because it is 
in the sense organ.639   What kind of existence does the species have?  Scotus understands 
the existence of the intention or species as diminished being (esse diminutum):  “the 
cognitive object has diminished being, however, the extramental object has absolute and 
real being.”640 Diminished being is the being that an internal object has, or the being that 
a known object has.641  In the Quodlibetal Questions Scotus claims that the proper 
species of an object is a lesser entity than the object itself.642 As Perler points out, 
diminished being should not be understood in terms of quantity but should be understood 
as “existence in a certain respect,” opposed to existence absolutely (esse simpliciter).643 
Perler explains that a stone taken in itself has existence absolutely, but a stone taken as an 
intelligible being has existence in a certain respect, that is, it is the object of an 
intellective act.644 Thus, the stone as an intelligible being has intentional existence (esse 
                                                 
639
 See Cross 2003, 266.  Cross here explains that intellective knowledge cannot be extended, while sense 
knowledge is.  The intellect operates without organs, where as the sense operates through an organ. 
640
 Scotus, IV Oxon. D. 1, q. 1:  “obiectum cognitum habet esse diminutum; obiectum autem extra habet 
esse simpliciter et reale.”  As quoted in Tachau 1988, 69, see footnote 53. (my translation above) 
641
 Tachau 1988, 58.  Tachau explains that species have only diminished being and belong to the 
Aristotelian category of quality.  See also, Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 501.  Alluntis & Wolter explain that the 
expression (ens diminutum) originated in the Arabian translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and Averroes’ 
commentary on it.  Scotus uses it to express the kind of being a thing acquires in the mind or intellect by 
being known.  See also Pasnau 2003, 289; Perler 1994, 75; A. Maurer, “Ens diminutum:  A Note on its 
Origin and Meaning,” Mediaeval Studies, 12 (1950), 216-222. 
642
 Scotus, Quodl. 14.78[22]:  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter, 337. 
643
 Perler 1994, 75.   
644
 Perler 1994, 75. 
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intentionale).645  Diminished being is identified with intentional existence.  As we saw 
above, Scotus contrasts diminished being with real being.  In a passage in the Oxon. He 
also contrasts real existence with intentional existence.646  So the species that is received 
in the senses is able to be in the sense organ as an intentio, in much the same way as light 
is totally in the air by way of its species, lumen, which is an intentio.  Thus the species or 
intentio is not a body, nor is it spiritual.  As an intentio it represents its object but is of a 
lesser being than its object.  In sensation, Scotus says that something extended is received 
by the sense organ, and this something extended is the species.   
 
4.2.4  The Cognitive Activity of Sensation 
In this section I will discuss the question concerning the activity of the sense.  In 
Question 12 of the QDA, Scotus’ understanding of sensation stands apart from Aquinas’ 
understanding.  Here he considers whether the powers of the soul, intellective or sensitive 
are only passive.647  In this question he specifically argues against passivity as conceived 
by Aquinas.  Scotus says that Aristotle’s account attributes to the impressed species, 
rather than the powers of the soul, the acts of sensing and intellection. 648  Scotus claims 
that “with respect to their operations, the powers of the soul are active,” adding that 
                                                 
645
 Perler 1994, 75.  Perler goes on to explain that the entire stone, in all its aspects, is the object of the 
intellective act.  The reason it can be an object to the intellect is that it is made present by way of the 
intelligible species which is itself made through the activity of the agent intellect with the phantasm.  Since 
the phantasm is produced by way of the sensible species, and the whole object is in the sensible species, the 
intellect is able to know the object. (76-77) 
646
 Oxon. I, d. 3, q. 4:  “. . .quia objectum in quantum habet esse in intellectu, non habet esse reale, sed 
tantum intentionale.”  Trans. Wolter 1987, 121.   
647
 Scotus, QDA, q. 12: “Utrum potentiae animae, scilicet intellectiva et sensitiva, sint tantum passivae.”  
648
 Scotus, QDA, q. 12, p. 6-12:  For Scotus’ treatment of Aquinas here see . 6-12.  Scotus sees Aquinas as 
holding that the powers of the soul are passive with respect to the species impressed by the object (“. . . 
dicunt illas esse passivas primo respectu speciei impressae ab obiecto. . .”)  Scotus contends that on 
Aquinas’ account the acts of sensing and understanding are attributed more to the species than the powers 
in the soul, and this is false (“. . .sequiritur quod actus sentiendi et intelligendi magis debent attribui speciei 
quam potentiae, quod falsum est; quia species non sentit nec intelligit sicut potentia.”) (9)  
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otherwise they would be vilified.649  Scotus appeals to Averroes here, contending that 
intellection and sensation are immanent actions in the agent.650 These actions are not 
found in the object but are found in the human being who senses and who understands.651  
Moreover, the actions of sensing and understanding are vital operations, and are 
therefore, intrinsic, efficient principles.652  In Question 13 of the Quodlibetal Questions, 
Scotus gives an extended discussion on immanent operations. 
At the beginning of the discussion Scotus distinguishes between an action and an 
operation.  An action is “that productive action or at least an activity which in some 
fashion causes its term to exist,” whereas an operation is “an intrinsic act by which the 
operator himself is ultimately perfected.”653  What Scotus seeks to establish in this 
discussion is that in an operation there is some absolute entity, meaning that the operation 
can be understood apart from its object or term.  The first proof that he considers is based 
on the nature of perfection.  The ultimate perfection of a living substance destined by 
                                                 
649
 Scotus, QDA, q. 12, p. 21:  “Dicendum igitur quod potentiae animae respectu suarum operationum sunt 
activae; aliter nimis vilescerent, ut patebit.”   Scotus is always interested in recognizing and preserving the 
perfection of the cognitive power.  To say that the powers of the soul are not active is not to preserve their 
perfection.  In a passage in the Ordinatio, d.3,  p. 3, q. 1, Scotus uses the same expression, that a cognitive 
power would be vilified, when he argues that the intellect needs to have its own object present to it, and not 
the presence of an object that is begged (mendicata) from the phantasm.  To have to beg from the phantasm 
would greatly vilify the intellectual power:  “. . .ut intellectualis est, non habet obiectum sufficienter 
praesens si non habet ipsum nisi in praesentia mendicata a virtute phantastica.  Hoc ergo multum vilificat 
naturam intellectivam ut intellectiva est, quia removetur ab ea illud quod est perfectionis in potentia 
cognitiva. . .”    
650
 Scotus, QDA, q. 12, p. 21:  “. . .sed expresse dicit COMMENTATOR quod intelligere et sentire sunt 
actiones immanentes in agente.”   
651
 Scotus, QDA, q. 12, p. 21:  “Certum est autem quod manent in sentiente et intelligente, non autem in 
obiecto extrinseco; igitur obiectum non est activum talium, sed potius homo sentiens et intelligens, 
mediantibus suis potentiis animae.” 
652
 Scotus, QDA, q. 12, p. 24:  “Item, operationes vitales sunt effectivae a principio vitali et intrinseco, si 
sint naturales; actual sentiendi et intlligendi sunt operations vitales, et etiam substantiales sentienti et 
intelligenti; igitur a principio intrinseco effectivo.” 
653
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.4 [2]:  “. . .quia ipsa est semper ad terminum aliquem accipientem aliquo modo esse 
per ipsam actionem:  sed intelligitur quod sit actio, hoc est, operatio, qua agens tanquam actu ultimo 
perficitur.”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 285. 
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nature for sensitive and intellectual activity is not a mere relation.  But its operation is the 
ultimate perfection of such a substance, therefore, its operation is not a mere relation.654 
Scotus argues that the “ultimate perfection of the living nature is what such a 
nature desires above all else by natural desire.”655  Scotus appeals to the nature of 
beatitude and the authority of Aristotle and Augustine to conclude that “the most 
desirable end is an activity or consists in an operation.”656  As discussed in Chapter 2, the 
beatific vision requires that the divine essence be present and existing in itself.  In the 
beatific vision the cognizer is able to cognize the divine essence in its actual existence. 
What seems to be required is that the cognizer’s activity is not one of receptivity only but 
one of actively attending to the object that is actually present as it is actually present.  
Thus, the ultimate perfection of an intellectual nature must consist in an intrinsic 
operation.   
In the second Article of Question 13 Scotus considers whether an operation does 
in fact have a real relationship with its object.  In the course of his discussion he 
distinguishes between intuitive cognition and abstractive cognition.  He contends that any 
perception involving the external senses is able to grasp its object in its actual existence, 
and this is a “knowledge of the existent as such.”657 The example he offers is seeing 
color, and generally any sensation involving the exterior senses.658  There is another 
                                                 
654
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.8 [3]:  “. . .operatio est huiusmodi perfectio substantiae vivae, quae nata est operari, 
puta viventis vita sensitiva, vel intellectiva; igitur operatio non est sola relatio. . .”  Trans. Alluntis & 
Wolter 1975, 285. 
655
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.9 [3]:  “. . .sed ultima perfectio naturae viventis a tali natura summe desideratur 
desiderio naturali. . .” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 285. 
656
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.11 [4]:  “. . .saltem in hoc omnes conveniunt, quod sinem ultimum, et maxime 
desiderabilem dicunt esse operationem, vel in operatione consistere.”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 286.   
657
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.27 [8]:  “Aliqua ergo cognitio est per se existentis, sicut quae attingit obiectum in sua 
propria existentia actuali.”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 286. 
658
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.27 [8]:  “Exemplum de visione coloris, et communiter in sensatione sensus 
exterioris.”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 290. 
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knowledge in which the object is known, but not existing as such.659  In this case the 
knowledge of the object is indifferent to the object’s actual existence. The example that 
Scotus gives imagining color since one can imagine color both when it exists and when it 
does not exist.660  He then contends that this same distinction is found at the intellectual 
level.   
Scotus says that it is obvious that there is intellectual knowledge of the 
nonexistent, but he contends that there can be intellectual knowledge of the “existent qua 
existent,” and the beatific vision must be just such a case.  If the knowledge of the 
beatific object is indifferent to the object’s actual existence, then the blessed could be 
happy with a nonexistent object, but this is absurd.  In the beatific vision there is a “clear 
face-to-face vision of this object, since the act of knowing it tends to this object as 
present in itself with its own actual existence.”661  The intellect must be able on its own to 
tend to an extramental object that is present to it.   
In Question 6 of the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus makes these same points. 
Abstractive cognition is  
indifferent as to whether the object is existing or not, and also whether it is 
present in reality or not.  We often experience this act in ourselves, for 
universals and the essences of things we grasp equally well whether they 
exist extramentally in some subject or not, or whether we have an instance 
of them actually present or not. . . This act of understanding which can be 
called “scientific,” because it is a prerequisite condition for knowing the 
conclusion and understanding the principle, can very appropriately be 
                                                 
659
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.27 [8]:  “Aliqua etiam est cognitio obiecti, non ut existentis in se, sed vel obiectum 
non existit:  vel saltem illa cognitio non est eius, ut actualiter existentis.”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 
290. 
660
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.27[8]:  “Exemplum, ut imaginatio coloris quia contingit imaginari rem, quando non 
existit, sicut quando existit.”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 290. 
661
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.28 [8]:  “. . .de quo dicitur habere claram visionem, sive facialem:  propter hoc, quod 
actus eius cognoscendi tendit in illud, ut in se praesens in propria existentia actuali.”  Trans. Alluntis & 
Wolter 1975, 291. 
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called “abstractive” because it “abstracts” the object from existence or 
non-existence, from presence or absence.”662 
 
Thus, abstractive cognition is a cognition that is indifferent to the existence of the 
object.  Intuitive cognition, on the contrary, is cognition that is of the object as present 
and existing in itself: 
It is knowledge precisely of a present object as present and of an 
existing object as existing. . .  On the other hand, a sense power has such 
perfection in its knowledge, because it can attain an object in itself as 
existing and present in its real existence, and not just diminuitively in a 
kind of imperfect likeness of itself.663 
 
Scotus again makes the same point as he does in Question 13 that the beatific vision 
requires intuitive cognition: 
Since abstractive cognition concerns equally the existent and the 
nonexistent, if the beatific act were of this sort one could be beatifically 
happy with a nonexistent object, which is impossible.  Also, abstractive 
knowledge is possible where the object is not attained in itself but only in 
some likeness.  Beatitude, on the contrary, can never be found unless the 
beatific object is reach immediately and in itself.664  
 
Scotus seems to say here that the difference between abstractive cognition and intuitive is 
in terms of whether a likeness is involved.  This has led some to consider that no species 
                                                 
662
 Scotus, Quodl. 6.18[7]:  “. . .unus indifferenter potest esse respectu obiecti existentis, et non existentis, 
et indifferenter etiam respectu obiecti, non realiter praesentis, sicut et realiter praesentis:  istum actum 
frequenter experimur in nobis:  quia universali, sive quiditates rerum intelligimus aeque, sive habeant ex 
natura rei esse extra in aliquo supposito, sive non: et ita de praesentia et absentia. . . iste actu intelligendi, 
qui scientificus dici potest, quia praevius, et requisitus ad scire conclusionis, et ad intelligere principii, 
potest satis proprie dici abstractivus, quia abstrahit obiectum ab existentia, et non existentia:  praesentia, et 
absentia.”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 135-136. 
663
 Scotus, Quodl. 6.19[8]:  “actus intelligendi est. . . praecise sit obiecti praesentis, ut praesentis:  et 
existentis, ut existentis. . . sensitiva autem habet hanc perfectionem in cognitione sua:  quia potest obiectum 
attingere in se, ut existens, et ut praesens est in existentia reali: et non tantum diminute attingendo ipsum in 
quadam perfectione diminuta . . .” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 136. 
664
 Scotus, Quodl. 6.20[8]:  “. . .quia abstractiva est aeque existentis, et non existentis, et sic beatitudo 
potest esse in obiecto non  existente:  quod est impossiblile:  abstractiva etiam posset haberi, licet obiectum 
non attingatur in se, sed in similitudine:  beatitudo autem nunquam habetur, nisi ipsum obiectum beatificum 
immediate in se attingatur. . .”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 137. 
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is involved in intuitive cognition.665 In his account of Scotus’ understanding of intuitive 
cognition, Wolter contends, on the contrary, that a species is involved in intuitive 
cognition.  I am in agreement with Wolter’s reading. Every time that Scotus discusses 
intuitive cognition, he always uses sensation as an example of intuitive cognition, and in 
particular, the seeing of a color.  Sensation always involves a species.  As we have seen, 
the species as an 666intentio, tends to the external object.  It is the external object that is 
sensed.  Moreover, we can only sense when there is an external object present, not any 
time we wish.  In sensation we are sensing an object that is actually there, as it is present 
and existing.  Intuitive cognition is the hallmark of sensation and redefines sensation in 
subtle ways because it requires that the cognitive faculty, by way of the species, to 
actively apprehend the object.  
We can also consider the question of the involvement of the species in intuitive 
cognition by considering a passage in Question 14 of the Quodlibetal Questions where 
Scotus is concerned with the distinction between imperfect and perfect knowledge.  He 
defines perfect knowledge in terms of the object so that perfect knowledge “captures the 
object as such; i.e., it is proper and distinct knowledge of the object as it is in itself.”667  
Imperfect knowledge is knowledge that “captures the object only incidentally or in some 
common and confused concept.”668  Distinct knowledge can be either mediate or 
immediate where immediate knowledge means that the object is not understood by means 
                                                 
665
 See, for example, Sebastian Day 1947, 67.  Day contends that in abstractive cognition the object moves 
the intellect by way of a species, but in an intuitive cognition, the object moves the intellect by way of its 
own existence.  For discussions on intuitive cognition, see Tachau 1988, 68-81; Stephen Dumont 1989.    
666
 Allan Wolter, “Duns Scotus on Intuition, Memory, and Our Knowledge of Individuals,” in The 
Philosophical Theology of John Duns Scotus, ed. Marilyn McCord Adams (Ithaca : Cornell University 
Press, 1990), 98-122.  See p. 101.    
667
 Scotus, Quodl. 14.7[2]:  “. . .quod scilicet illa intelligatur perfecta, qua attingitur obiectum sub perfecta 
ratione suae cognoscibilitatis; hoc est, per se propria et distincta. . .” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 317 
668
 Scotus, Quodl. 14.7[2]:  “. . .imperfecta dicatur illa, qua attingitur tantum per accidens, vel tantum in 
aliquo conceptu communi, vel confuso.”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 317. 
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of some other object, it “excludes any medium that is itself known.”669 Thus, mediate 
knowledge is knowledge that is known by means of another known object.  Now the 
intellect is capable of distinct immediate knowledge because the intelligible species, like 
the sensible species in sensation, is not itself known, but is the means by which the object 
is made present to the intellect. Day considers the following passage in Question 14 to 
give evidence that no species is involved in intuitive cognition: 
Any such intellection, namely, that which is per se, proper, and 
immediate, requires the presence of the object in all its proper 
intelligibility as object [propria ratio objecti].  If the intellection is 
intuitive, this means in its own existence it is present as object.  If the 
intellection is abstractive, it is present in something which represents it in 
all its proper and essential meaning as a knowable object.670 
 
Rather than being evidence that no species is required in intuitive cognition, this passage 
explicitly says that in intuitive cognition, the object is present in its own existence.  That 
means that the object is actually present to the cognitive faculty, like color is present to 
the seeing eye.  In the case of intellective intuitive cognition, the intellect would enjoy the 
same actual presence of an external object that the sense does, the example being the 
divine essence in the beatific vision.671  The point that I want to make here is that 
intuitive cognition in which the object is what is sensed or known requires the presence 
of the object through the species, which itself is not perceived or known..  The reason that 
this point is critical is that Scotus’ repeated characterization of sensation as intuitive 
                                                 
669
 Scotus, Quodl. 14.8[2]:  “. . .cognitio distincta vel est mediata, vel immediata.  Dico immediatam, 
quando obiectum non mediante aliquo alio obiecto intelligitur per quod, vel in quo intelligatur:  ita quod hic 
excluditur medium cognitum, non autem medium, quod esset praecise ratio cognoscendi, vel intelligendi.”  
Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 317. 
670
 Scotus, Quodl. 14.36[10]:  “. . .quia omnis talis intellectio, scilicet per se, et propria, et immediata 
requirit ipsum obiectum sub propria ratione obiecti praesens, et hoc vel in propria existentia, puta si est 
intuitiva; vel in aliquo perfecto repraesentante ipsum sub propria et per se ratione cognoscibilis, si fuerit 
abstractiva. . .” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 324-325. 
671
 See Quodl. 6 where Scotus discusses the fact that the intellect knows intuitively those objects that are 
present to it in this life. 
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cognition redefines the process of sensation and emphasizes that the sense must be active 
in this process.  Consider the following passage: 
The cognitive potency not only has to receive the species of the 
object but also to tend to the object through its act. And this second 
thing is more essential to the potency, because the first is required 
because of some imperfection of the potency.  And the object is 
more principally an object because the potency tends toward it 
rather than because it [the object] impresses a species. This is 
evident, for if God were to impress a species on the intellect or the 
eye, [the intellect or the eye] would tend to the object just as it 
does now, and the object would be just as much an object [as it 
would be if it impressed the species rather than God].  But God 
would not be the object, because the potency does not tend to him 
and nevertheless he impressed it, just as he impresses upon an 
angel the species of creatures.  Therefore this is true; there is some 
per se moving agent for any potency that is passive.  But there is 
no need that in apprehending potencies that what moves them be 
the proper object of that potency under the aspect in virtue of 
which it is the motive, but what is necessary is that what terminates 
the act of potency is the aspect under which it is the object.672 
 
What defines sensation is not the receptivity of the form or species, but more properly 
that the cognitive faculty tends toward the object.  Now the species itself is understood by 
Scotus as an intentio, in representing the object it tends toward the object, in effect 
leading the sense to apprehend the object.  But this is where the Aristotle’s wax analogy 
falls short.  The wax may be able to receive an impression, but it cannot tend towards the 
object through its act.  Thus the operation of sense does have a real relationship to its 
object, but this operation is intrinsic to sense, that is, it is an immanent operation. 
                                                 
672QMA b. 7, q. 14, p. 29[6]:  “Nam potentia cognitiva non tantum habet recipere speciem obiecti, sed etiam 
tendere per actum suum in obiectum.  Et istud secudnum est essitalius potentiae, quia primum requiritur 
propter imperfectionem potentiae.  Et obiectum principlius est obiectum quia in ipsum tendit potentia, 
quam quia impriit speciem.  Quod patet:  si Deus impremeret speciem intellectui vel oculo, eodem modo 
ferretur in obiectum sicut modo, et obiectum ita esset obiectum.  Sed Deus non esset obiectum, quia in 
ipsum non tendit potentia, et tamen ipse imprimit, sicut impressit angelo species creaturarum.  Haec ergo 
est vera ‘cuiuslibet passivi est aliquod motivum per se’.  Sed non oportet in potentiis apprehensivis quod 
illud motivum sit proprium obiectum potentiae sub ratione qua est motivum, sed oportet quod ipsum, sub 
ratione qua obiectum, terminet actum potentiae.”  Trans. Etzkorn & Wolter 1998, 250. 
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 Scotus claims that unlike an action that is productive in the sense that it effects a 
product, an operation is one that in tending toward its term, does not produce this term, 
but presupposes it.673  He contends further, that an operation is simply the perfection of 
the one operating.674  Operations are dynamic (in fieri), always in a state of becoming.675  
The operation passes into its object as its term, but the object does not derive its being 
from the operation, but again, the object’s being is presupposed.676  In a transient action 
the form that is the term of the action lies outside the agent itself; in the immanent action, 
the form is in the agent itself.677  This means that in an immanent operation, there is a 
product, but the product is the operation itself, the acting itself, which is found in the 
agent, for example, Scotus says, the act of seeing is in the one doing the seeing.678   
The distinction between immanent and transient action is certainly not unique to 
Scotus and finds its roots in Aristotle.  In De Anima 2.5, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
Aristotle distinguishes the alteration that is involved in sensation from ordinary alteration.  
The alteration involved in sensation is a change to a thing’s disposition or nature.  The 
immanent operation is intrinsic to the sense organ, so that when it is operating, that is, 
sensing, it is acting according to its nature, it is the perfection of the agent as agent.  
Scotus’ discussion of immanent operations must be read in context of his claim about 
                                                 
673
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.72[25]:  “Operatio autem non est ad aliquem terminum accipientem esse per ipsam; 
imo eo modo, quo habet terminum ad quem:  nec est productiva termini ad quem, nec eductiva de potentia 
passi:  nec inductiva in passum, sed praesupponit terminum. . .”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 305.   
674
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.73[25]:  “. . .operatio est perfectio simpliciter operantis. . .”Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 
1975, 305. 
675
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.74[25]:  “. . .sive in fieri, sicut sunt operationes. . .” and 13.81 [27]:  “Ad primum, 
operatio habet duas conditiones, in quibus convenit cum actione.  Prima est, quod semper est in fieri, non 
dico successivo, quia operatio est indivisibilis, sed sic sic in fieri. . .”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 305-
307.    
676
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.81[27]:  “. . .quod operatio transit in obiectum, sicut in terminum:  licet non accipiat 
esse per ipsam:  quia praesuppositum in suo esse. . .” Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 307.   
677
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.81[27]:  “. . .quando igitur forma terminans actionem est extra ipsum agens:  tunc 
actio illa transit; quando vero forma illa est in ipso agente: tunc actio est immanens. . .”  Trans. Alluntis & 
Wolter 1975, 307. 
678
 Scotus, Quodl. 13.83[28]:  “. . . ut visio in vidente. . .”  Trans. Alluntis & Wolter 1975, 308. 
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cognition, that cognition is most properly the activity of tending toward the object 
through an act and his understanding of sensation as intuitive cognition, apprehending the 
object as it is present and existing.  When read in this way, Scotus’ understanding of the 
immanent operation involved in sensation, shifts the process of sensation as primarily 
passive to a primarily active process.  In the passages in the Quodlibetal Questions where 
Scotus discusses the immanent operation, characterizes it as “in fieri” which Alluntis and 
Wolter translate as dynamic or becoming.  That the immanent operation should be 
understood as dynamic is supported by Michael Sylwanowicz’ reading of Scotus found in 
his text on Scotus’ contingent causality.   
Sylwanowicz argues Scotus understands being as intrinsic activity.679  
Sylwanowicz understands “in fieri” as a dynamic process, such that for Scotus, essences 
are self-moving processes, i.e., essences are first and foremost activity, not passive prior 
to activity.680  The soul as essence is an intrinsic activity, and therefore, always fully in 
act.  Sylwanociz argues that being an intrinsic activity means having the capability of 
responding actively to the situation at hand.681 The fact that being is itself intrinsic 
activity allows us to have a change in perspective.  Sylwanowicz uses the example of a 
stone resting on a plank.  When the plank is removed, rather than simply saying that the 
stone falls, Sylwanowicz contends that the stone responds actively, the removal of the 
                                                 
679
  Michael Sylwanowicz, Contingent Causality and the Foundations of Duns Scotus’s Metaphysics (E.J. 
Brill: Leiden, 1996), 1.  Sylwanowicz endeavors to show how Scotus’ understanding of contingent 
causality is not only unique to Scotus but is also rooted in his understanding of being as constituted by a 
self-differentiating intrinsic activity that accounts for possibility.   
680
 Sylwanowicz 1996, 61, 71, 104.  Sylwanowicz contrasts Scotus’ view of essence with Aquinas.  He 
argues that for Aquinas, the essence is a passive potency where operation following being.  For Scotus, the 
essence is self-moving process such that its effect is the operation itself.  For Aquinas, the soul is distinct 
from the will, whereas for Scotus the will and the soul are only formally distinct, and both are intrinsic 
activities. 
681
 Sylwanowicz 1996, 74. 
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plank has created a new possibility.682  While Sylwanowicz is mainly concerned with the 
activity of the will, his contention that Scotus understands being as an intrinsic activity 
goes to the heart of Scotus’ metaphysics.  The emphasis that we have seen Scotus give to 
the activity of sensation over passivity, for example, is further supported if we understand 
it as grounded in such a dynamic metaphysics.  The sense organ is not simply a receptive 
capacity, but has the ability to respond actively.  Given that the sense organ is ensouled, 
its ability to respond actively is much more complex than the stone on the plank.  Its 
active response is in terms of its operation, its sensing.  Receiving the species as an 
intentio that leads the sense to the object, requires that the recipient be able to actively 
respond, that is, actively tend toward the object.  Scotus is not unique in insisting on a 
more active cognitive process, as Tachau points out, he is influenced by Olivi.683  
However, against Olivi, Scotus retains the species, because his concern is to account for 
the  presence of the object to the cognitive faculty, both at the level of sensation and 
intellection.  The presence of the object is made possible through the species as intentio.  
The intentio leads the cognitive faculty to apprehend the object precisely because the 
cognitive faculty is of an actively responding that that object which is present to it. 
 
Conclusion 
 From this discussion of Scotus’ account of sensation we can take the following 
points.  First, in the QDA Scotus does accept the distinction of natural change and 
spiritual change and contends along with Aquinas that the sensible form has intentional 
existence in the sense organ.  Second, Scotus contends, as does Aquinas, that the sense 
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 Sylwanowicz 1996, 61.   
683
 Tachau 1988, 68. 
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organ is a composite of the sensitive soul and a corporeal organ.  In the Quodlibetal 
Questions, Scotus contends that what receives the species in sensation is the form of the 
sense organ as a whole.  This notion emphasizes that the sense organ has unique 
capacities as an animate entity such that it is the fact that it can so act that there is 
sensation.  Sensation is a corporeal event in a corporeal organ for Scotus, meaning that 
the presence of the species comes to exist in the sense organ.  This is not a natural change 
but is nonetheless a corporeal change.  I contend, however, that this corporeal change 
must be understood in the way that we have seen Scotus understands the sense organ as 
ensouled.  Third, the species that is received by the sense organ has the ontological status 
of an accident, and in particular, is a quality.  It is neither spiritual nor corporeal.  It is 
rather an intentio that is able to be in the corporeal sense organ because it is extendable 
and this is comparable to the example of lux  and lumen.  Fourth, Scotus understands 
sensation most properly as a tending toward an object and in his most mature work, the 
Quodlibetal Questions, reframes the discussion of sensation by emphasizing that 
sensation is intuitive cognition. 
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Conclusion 
The question that I have been concerned to answer in this dissertation is how does 
the immaterial intellect have access to the material phantasm in order to make an object 
present to the intellect?  The problem is that the phantasm as a sense image or likeness 
exists in a bodily organ.  And as we have seen, that which is corporeal cannot act on that 
which is incorporeal.  But the nature of the species or the phantasm as an intentio is itself 
neither spiritual nor corporeal nor material, though it exists under material conditions.  
That the species is extendable simply seems to mean that it can be in a material subject, 
but its being in the material sense organ, does not change the species.  The species exists 
under the aspect of materiality, but is not defined by it.  In this way, the species is present 
in such a way that the cognitive faculty, sensitive or intellective, is able to access it.  The 
way that the species as an intentio is in the subject is not in an ordinary way of inhering.  
Just as light does not move or change air though the light is totally in the air, the intentio 
resides in the bodily organ, being in the organ but not of it.  Thus, the phantasm as a 
species exists in the bodily organ according to intentional existence.  Intentio for Scotus 
means to exist as a representation or likeness (similitudo) that tends toward its object.  In 
a certain way its function is to signify its object.  To have intentional existence does not 
mean, for Scotus, to be a mental entity, but a kind of entity that represents another. This 
claim is not unique to Scotus, certainly, as we saw, Aquinas understands that the species 
exists according to intentional existence.  What I argue is unique to Scotus is how his 
understanding of intentional existence depends upon a certain cognitive attention on the 
part of the cognitive faculty.  To explain what this means and its full significance, it must 
be understood in terms of the discussion in this dissertation. 
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In Chapter One,  I showed how Aristotle understands the relationship of the body 
and soul as highly specific.  In the first book of De Anima, Aristotle admonishes his 
predecessors who do not concern themselves with the characteristics of the body, and 
especially those who think that any soul could be clothed by any body.  Thus, we saw 
that Aristotle gives careful concern to the nature of the body, to the structure of the sense 
organ, and to the processes of the body-soul composite.  What emerged from this 
discussion is the deep and complex understanding of unity that underlies Aristotle’s 
understanding of the cognitive processes. 
In Chapter Two, I discussed how the beatific object and the beatific vision inform 
and guide Scotus’ cognitive project.  Of critical importance is the fact that the intellect is 
intrinsically able to cognize the divine essence as it is present and existing in itself.  The 
divine essence cannot by represented by a sense image and must be present to the 
intellect in its own existence.  As this is the highest cognitive experience, it is defining of 
all cognitive experience.  The presence of the object to the cognitive faculty in is own 
existence is of central importance in Scotus’ cognitive project.  Moreover, the cognitive 
faculties are intrinsically capable of noticing the existence of the object as the object 
actually exists.  By way of the discussion on the incarnation, it was shown that the world, 
and therefore, the object are worthy of being loved as the world is sacralized.  Thus, the 
material object is endowed with an intrinsic dignity that makes it a worthy object of 
cognitive attention in itself.  
In Chapter Three, I discussed how Scotus understands the soul and body 
relationship.  What emerged from this discussion is Scotus’ complicated and hierarchical 
understanding of unity, following Aristotle.  The unified whole being has characteristics 
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unique to itself that neither of its components has separately.  In the discussion of Scotus’ 
understanding of per se being, we saw that he considers an accident a per se being when 
it is considered apart from its subject.  The accident is not necessarily synonymous with 
inherence and is something in its own right.  The highest per se being is the suppositum 
and Scotus understands the suppositum that has an intellectual nature as a person.  The 
notion of person is what finally secures the unity of the human being.  What underlies the 
unity of the human being is substantial unity of form and matter, but it is the cognitive 
awareness that guarantees the unity of the person.  It was also shown that the 
immateriality of the intellective part of the soul does not preclude it from communicating 
actuality to the body.  Given the formal distinction between the faculties of the soul, that 
Scotus embraces a plurality of forms does not threaten the unity of the person. 
In Chapter Four, I discussed Aquinas’ account of sensation and in particular the 
nature of the spiritual change and intentional existence.  Aquinas argues that sensation 
requires a spiritual change by which the sensible form comes to exist in the sense organ, a 
composite of body and soul, according to intentional existence.  As we saw, there is a 
debate concerning whether sensation, according to Aquinas, is a corporeal change, 
distinct from a natural change, or whether it is a spiritual, that is, incorporeal, change that 
happens as a corporeal event.  Moreover, we saw that since Aquinas maintains that 
sensation is primarily passive, though he contends that cognition involves a tending 
toward the object, such that intentio is identified with conversio, it is difficult for him to 
account for cognitive attention.  In the discussion of Scotus’ account of sensation we saw 
that in an early work, his QDA, he embraces Aquinas’ distinction between natural change 
and spiritual change, understanding that sensation requires the spiritual change where the 
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sensible form is received according to intentional existence.  It also became clear that the 
way that Scotus characterizes the unity of the sense organ through the notion of the form 
of the whole allows him to reshape the sense organ’s receptivity activity.  It does not 
merely receive the sensible species but is actively tending towards it as it has an intrinsic 
operation.  Again, while the notions of immanent and transient operations are not unique 
to Scotus, his treatment of them, especially in regards to cognition, gives the cognitive 
faculties an activity of their own, beyond receiving.  
For Scotus, the sensible species is an accident and is able to inhere or to exist in 
its subject in a non-ordinary way.  The example of lux and lumen were offered in support 
of this claim and also to show how the species can exist in the sensible organ.  Sensation 
for Scotus does seem to involve a complicated physiological process in which the species 
comes to be present in the sense organ, having the ontological status of an accident, and 
in which the sense organ is at the same time tending toward the external object.  That 
Scotus depicts sensation as intuitive cognition gives the sense the intrinsic capacity to “to 
notice” the existence of the external object.  Sensation requires the presence of the 
external object.  For Aristotle and Aquinas the presence of the object is required in order 
to move the sense which is basically passive the reception of the sensible form.  The 
characterization of sensation as intuitive cognition allows Scotus to make the existence of 
the object that which the sense notices.  Thus, sensation for Scotus is an active tending 
toward the object.  The sensible species leads the sense to apprehend the object, but the 
sense has the intrinsic capacity to notice the object as it is present.  
In a passage in the Quodlibetal Questions, Scotus explains how he understands 
the activity of the agent intellect with the phantasm: 
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From the phantasm or sensible image in the imagination there 
would be produced in the intellect by virtue of the agent intellect an 
intelligible species, or something in which a thing appears as actually 
intelligible and which can be called, for brevity’s sake, an intelligible 
species.  And this very real production of one representation from another 
is accompanied by a metaphorical “transformation” of one object into 
another, namely, of something sensibly imaginable into something 
intelligible.  And this metaphorical description is a reasonable account of 
what goes on, because the object has a similar sort of existence as object 
in the one representation as it does in the other.  Therefore, in the real 
change whereby a spiritual representation is produced with the help of a 
corporeal representation, namely, where a universal representation is 
produced with the help of a singular representation, one can speak or think 
of a similar “transformation” of a corporeal object into spiritual one, or of 
a singular object into a universal one.684  
 
It is clear in this passage that the phantasm is a corporeal representation.  As a 
representation the phantasm has the nature of an intentio.  That it is corporeal means that 
it exists in the bodily organ and under the material condition of singularity.  It is not a 
mental entity, but as that which is able to exist in a bodily organ, in the way that lumen 
exists in air, it is itself not material, thus it is something that the intellect can act with.  
What is interesting in this passage is that Scotus considers the real change involved in the 
activity of the agent intellect with the phantasm to be a change from a corporeal 
representation to a spiritual representation.  The work of sensation is to ultimately make 
an object present to the intellect.  Such a presence can only be achieved by way of a 
species or an intentio.  The totality of the object is in the intentio.  What this means is that 
the object is an object because the cognitive faculty actively tends toward it by way of the 
species.    
                                                 
684
 Quodl., 15, 15.51 [16]:  “. . .quod virtute inellectus agentis de phantasmae in phantasia gignitur species 
inelligibilis in intellectus, vel aliqua ratio, in qua actus relucet intelligibile, quae breviter loquedo, dicatur 
species inelligibilis:  et ista gignitionem reale repraesentatius de repraesentativo dicitur concomitari quaeda 
gignitio metaphorica obiecti de obiecto, se intelligibilis de imaginabilis quod ideo rationabiliter dicitur, quia 
tale esse obiectivum habet obiectum in repraesensari; quale habet repraesentativum correspondens; et ideo 
translatione reali facta in repraesentativo, quando de corporali gignitur spirituale, scilicet de repraesentativo 
singulari gignitur repraesentativum universale, consimilis dicitur, vel intelligitur translatio in obiectis de 
corporali ad spirituale, vel de singulari ad universale.”   
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The consideration of the question on the nature of the phantasm not only reveals 
the phantasm as having the nature of an intentio and therefore accessible by the agent 
intellect, but and perhaps more importantly and interestingly, reveals how Scotus is able 
to account for cognitive attention and how the sense is able to notice the object in its own 
existence.  The fundamental activity of cognition for Scotus is attending to an object that 
is present to it.  Scotus’ understanding of Aristotle, which I contend is deeper, in ways, 
than even Aristotle wrote about, enables him to present a cohesive account of sensation 
beyond the way in which it was traditionally understood and which still is of interest 
today.  There are several points that I would like to make in regards to the relevancy of 
Scotus scholarship.   
First, questions still remain about the exact nature of the process by which the 
agent intellect acts with the phantasm to produce the intelligible species.  And this is a 
question worth considering, though it remained outside of the scope of this work.  Given 
the way that Scotus understands substantial unity, and especially the notion of person, it 
appears that he would be able to show how the phantasm could be understood as that 
which mediates between sensation and intellection, and thus this question is worth 
investigating further.  
Second, the problem of how the intellect and the body work together in cognition 
is not Descartes’ mind-body problem for either Aristotle or Scotus.  Both insist upon a 
unity of the soul and the body that underlies their cognitive projects.  It is in this way that 
I think that Scotus’ project remains relevant today, if simply for the fact that in order to 
understand his concerns in terms of cognition, we must set aside the separation of the 
mind from the body that underlies Descartes’ cognitive approach.  In doing so we come 
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to understand how our own language, for example, the word ‘physical’ might not serve us 
any better than it does the medieval context. 
Third, the additional work that I would like to pursue based on my work here 
concerns the object itself.  Two things have intrigued me in regards to the object.  First, 
that the object is worthy of cognitive attention itself and second that we apprehend the 
object as it is present and actually existing.  Both of these claims seem to be significant in 
terms of both phenomenology and modern science. Scotus claims that the object is a co-
cause with the intellect in the process of intellection such that the object accounts for the 
specific character of that intellection.  We are not simply knowing the form of the object, 
but know the object as it actually exists, and of course, this is made possible because of 
sensation as intuitive cognition.  Given the inherent dignity of the object and that it is 
intrinsically intelligible coupled again with the fact that the cognitive faculties are 
intrinsically able to notice the presence of the object seems to be a claim that the object is 
worthy of study in itself.  The beauty of Scotus’ thought is that it directs us to the world 
by way of his understanding of the highest cognitive experience. 
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